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Doctor of Public Health (DrPH) Integrating Statement  
 
The DrPH programme aims to equip its graduates with the experience to deal with 
the particular challenges of understanding and adapting scientific knowledge in order 
to achieve public health gains, as well as the analytical and practical skills required 
by managers and leaders in public health.  
 
When I first began working at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
(LSHTM) in 2008 to manage the Artemisinin-based Combination Therapy (ACT) 
Consortium, a $40m Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation-funded global research 
consortium with the aim to develop and evaluate delivery mechanisms to improve 
ACT use in Africa and Asia, I viewed the programme primarily as a form of 
professional development. As a ‘staff student’ I wanted to benefit from the expertise 
of colleagues, as well as formally learn about and reflect on the relationship between 
evidence and policy, while working on ways to facilitate that process as part of my 
job. In this regard, the first part of the DrPH, the taught component, was well-timed 
to be particularly helpful.  
 
The taught component consisted of two compulsory modules. In “Understanding 
Leadership, Management and Organisations”, taken in 2009, I explored a range of 
issues and theories relating to management, leadership, and organisations, and the 
application of these theories both to public health organisations, and my own 
management practice. “Evidence Based Public Health Policy”, taken in 2010, 
focused on key skills required for improving and shaping policy and practice, 
involving accessing, understanding, developing, disseminating, and facilitating the 
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use of evidence for better public health outcomes. At the time, I was attempting to 
juggle management issues within the ACT Consortium, while also trying to figure 
out how to best position and disseminate our study results in the future, so I found 
both modules to be full of theoretically-grounded practical advice. 
 
It was during this taught component phase that I first heard of intermittent preventive 
treatment and the Intermittent Preventive Treatment for infants (IPTi) Consortium, 
which had involved many malaria researchers from LSHTM. LSHTM is well known 
worldwide for its innovative malaria research, among other areas of expertise. I 
became fascinated by the ‘from the trenches’ stories I heard from malaria colleagues 
about what policy making was like within the World Health Organization (WHO). 
As a result of my work with the ACT Consortium (I was tasked with developing a 
plan to maximise our policy uptake, without treading on the toes of the WHO Global 
Malaria Programme, WHO-GMP, whose then-director happened to be on our 
scientific board), I was able to secure a placement with WHO-GMP for my 
Organisational and Policy Analysis (OPA) project.  
 
The OPA project – the second component of the DrPH programme – involves 
research that provides DrPH students with the opportunity to observe and analyse the 
workings of a public health organisation in its policy environment, in order to gain a 
better understanding of how to develop effective public health organisations and 
policy. WHO-GMP was the perfect place to observe and analyse public health policy 
making in action.  
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In 2011, WHO-GMP were in the process of embarking on a major review and re-
design of its policy setting process in order to be more responsive to what was an 
increasingly dynamic and rapidly evolving malaria landscape. My OPA covered the 
behind-the-scenes period that led to the creation of the Malaria Policy Advisory 
Committee (MPAC), a newer, more agile, and transparent evidence advisory body 
for global malaria control and elimination, compared to the system that was in place 
during the time of the IPTi policy development process.  
 
The aim of my OPA was to understand the organisational factors and forces that 
drove and restrained the change process for strengthening policy setting at WHO-
GMP. Using the qualitative study methods of participant observation, semi-
structured interviewing, and Kurt Lewin’s force field analysis, my results showed 
that the strongest driving force for change at WHO-GMP appeared to be its 
leadership, specifically its director, and its organisational mandate to set health 
policy. Although the MPAC had yet to be constituted and convened, the driving 
forces identified that would most likely contribute to its success were the 
transparency and the timeliness of its policy recommendations. Many of my key 
informants used the example of the IPTi policy process (among others) as an 
example of what a policy process shouldn’t be like. My interest in this topic was 
further peaked. 
 
Following my OPA, and perhaps as a result of my by then deeper understanding of 
policy making within WHO, I was asked to stay on at WHO-GMP in the capacity of 
a consultant to help form the MPAC (its terms of reference, membership, and 
operating procedures), and help ensure it was “transparent, responsive, and credible” 
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as WHO-GMP intended. As I will later outline in this thesis, MPAC’s first policy 
decision was for an intermittent preventive treatment, but for children (IPTc) instead 
of infants (IPTi). IPTc later became known as Seasonal Malaria Chemoprevention 
(SMC). In comparison to what I had heard about the IPTi policy process, the 
deliberations were relatively smooth during the discussion about SMC. Yes, not 
everyone in the room agreed on every aspect, but the debate was civil and the 
consensus to move forward was reached relatively quickly. As an observer of the 
process, I was curious about why this was happening. Was this ‘normal’? Could it be 
replicated? Was this because of something the researchers did, or because of the 
evidence advisory committee, or both? Were there lessons to be learned from all of 
this? 
  
It was during this experience of witnessing policy making in action that the seeds of 
what would later become my thesis – the final component of the DrPH – first began 
germinating. Comparing the policy process for SMC with the (what seemed to me) 
infamous IPTi process that preceded it, was a natural choice. If this were to have 
been a PhD thesis versus a DrPH thesis, I would have loved to also compare how the 
perceived differences between both intermittent preventive treatment evidence-to-
policy processes affected their implementation. However, my supervisors and I felt it 
would have been too large a topic for a DrPH. It remains a question I would like to 
explore in future. 
 
The ACT Consortium grant finally ended in the summer of 2016. Based on our 
original goals, we exceeded our expectations for results dissemination and 
knowledge transfer, and I am hopeful that one day in the not too distant future, we, 
7 
 
like IPTi and SMC before it, will feature as an LSHTM Research Excellence 
Framework (REF) impact case study. In the meantime, a welcome break from the 
consortium and the full-time world of global malaria politics finally allowed me the 
time, distance, and thinking space, to reflect and produce this piece of work.  
 
Completing my thesis hasn’t been an easy process, primarily because I have still 
continued to work part-time over the past two years, first on UK global outbreak 
preparedness and response, and at present on antimicrobial resistance, both fields 
where the good use of evidence in policy is essential. It has been necessary for me to 
work, but working part- versus full-time has been the only way I have been able to 
finish my thesis. Overall, the part-time DrPH programme has taken a long time (nine 
years), interspersed with lengthy periods of inactivity due to competing priorities, 
but I have finally managed to make it to this stage of the process, and am proud to 
say that I have. 
 
I am looking forward to the coming months, where I plan to continue sharing my 
thesis results, and contributing to the practice of improving the public health policy 
process. So far I have presented papers on my thesis results at the International 
Conference on Public Policy in Milan in 2015 and in Singapore in 2017. Recently I 
contributed a paper, co-authored by my DrPH supervisor, Dr. Justin Parkhurst, 
which went through the peer-review process, before being published in a Global 
Challenges journal series special issue, coordinated by the Global Strategy Lab at the 
University of Ottawa, on “Optimising the Institutional Design of Scientific Advisory 
Committees for Quality, Salience, and Legitimacy”. This article, together with a 
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previous article that was published in the Malaria Journal in 2012 following my 
DrPH OPA project, are included at the end of this thesis document for reference. 
 
Although I am not sure what the future will hold for me in terms of a research career 
at LSHTM (at the time of submitting this thesis, my contract at LSHTM is due to 
end in September 2018), I have enjoyed the experience that working in an exciting 
and rich academic environment, and particularly on my own research project, has 
brought me.  
 
As a public health practitioner, I remain interested in how and why policy decisions 
are made, and committed to how to improve that process in practice. I look forward 
to applying those lessons in my current and future leadership roles.  
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Thesis Abstract 
 
Evidence, in its multiple forms, is often perceived as playing key roles in public 
health policy development, although how and why evidence is used and when, 
despite a wide range of research on the subject, is less clear. This thesis – the final 
component of the professional doctorate programme known as the Doctor of Public 
Health (DrPH), which is intended for leaders and future leaders in public health 
policy and practice – looked at the policy development processes of two different 
global malaria preventive treatment policies produced by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) known as ‘Intermittent Preventive Treatment in infants’ (IPTi) 
and ‘Seasonal Malaria Chemoprevention’ (SMC).  
 
The aim of the DrPH research was to better understand the influences on the use of 
evidence in policy making in organisations such as the WHO, using a case study of 
the WHO’s malaria department – the Global Malaria Programme (WHO-GMP). 
Specifically, the thesis objectives are to: (a) explore the factors that influenced the 
consideration of particular evidence at WHO-GMP, i.e. determine what was 
considered ‘good evidence’ for policy (and why) in the case of IPTi and SMC; and 
(b) examine how factors associated with the policy process influenced eventual 
policy outcomes at WHO-GMP, i.e. determine what was considered ‘good use of 
evidence’ for policy (and why) in the case of IPTi and SMC. A more holistic 
understanding of what influences the use of evidence in policy making may help 
shed more light on the complexity of evidence use, and may help, in 
multidimensional ways, to increase and improve evidence use, which is the goal of 
many public health organisations, including the WHO.  
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By comparing the policy development processes for IPTi compared to SMC, the 
findings showed that forms of ‘good evidence’ often held up as high quality in terms 
of technical considerations, though important, were not sufficient to ensure universal 
agreement and uptake of recommendations, even within a highly technocratic body 
such as WHO-GMP. An analysis of 29 key informant interviews found that the 
perceived relevance of evidence to the policy question being asked mattered to 
expert actors, and that they also retained a concern over the legitimacy of the process 
by which technical evidence was brought to bear in the policy development process. 
Cash and colleagues’ (2003) findings from the field of sustainable development, that 
evidence must be credible, salient, and legitimate, to be accepted by the public, 
appears to equally apply within this evidence advisory body within WHO.  
 
While the WHO has principally focused on technical criteria for evidence inclusion 
in its policy development processes, this study suggests that the design and 
functionality of its advisory bodies must also enable transparent, responsive, and 
credible processes of evidence review to ensure that these bodies are effective in 
producing advice that engenders change in policy and practice. The findings from 
this thesis contribute to the public health policy literature on evidence use in policy 
making, and will be of interest to scholars of health policy as well as public health 
policy makers and practitioners. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This is a study investigating evidence use in global malaria policy development at 
the World Health Organization (WHO). Past work looking at decision making at 
WHO has engaged with topics such as its criteria for guideline development (Burda 
et al., 2014, Oxman et al., 2007) or critical reflection on the organisation’s response 
to global health crises (Horton, 2006, Piot, 2014, Abeysinghe, 2015). In this study, 
however, the focus is not so much on the outcomes of decisions, but rather on the 
internal processes involved, observing what is sometimes referred to as the ‘black 
box’ of how evidence actually informs the policy process (Birkland, 2014), within 
the primary global health institution responsible for the production of normative 
guidance to 193 member states (WHO, 2007b).  
 
Using interview data recorded between 2014 and 2015 when I was working part-time 
at WHO, and as part of my DrPH, I explore the factors that influenced the 
consideration of particular evidence, and examine how factors associated with the 
policy process influenced eventual policy outcomes for global malaria control and 
prevention.  
 
In this introductory chapter, I explain how my interest in evidence use in public 
health policy making developed; describe the context of malaria and ‘intermittent 
preventive treatment’, which is a type of malaria intervention recommended as 
policy by WHO, the focus of my case study; outline my DrPH thesis aims and 
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objectives; ending with a brief summary of the remaining chapters that follow. 
 
1.2 Background 
 
‘Evidence-based public health policy and practice’ is a core component of the DrPH 
programme at LSHTM (LSHTM, 2017a), and as a staff member at LSHTM, there 
are constant reminders, e.g. via award news, the academic staff promotion process, 
and the school’s Research Excellence Framework (REF) ranking, of the importance 
placed on research that influences public health policy and practice, and the prestige 
impactful research bestows on both the researcher as an individual, and LSHTM as 
an institution (LSHTM, 2017b). Indeed, a central part of my previous job as the 
manager of a large global malaria research consortium led by LSHTM was to ensure 
that our ‘evidence’ was ‘policy-driven’ and ultimately influenced policy via high-
impact journals and establishing a presence at high-level policy discussions. When I 
agreed to take on that role, I did not fully understand what this jargon meant. I have 
since come to learn that I am not alone; despite the discourse around evidence and its 
valuable role in forming policy, scratching below the surface reveals that there is 
little common agreement on what evidence is, let alone how and when it influences 
policy (Lin and Gibson, 2003, Nutley et al., 2007).  
 
Yet the pervasive terminology of ‘evidence-based policy’ (EBP) is difficult to avoid, 
particularly when you work in public health. This is partly because the use of 
evidence has been a long-established part of the policy process, and within public 
health, research evidence is in some respects considered the necessary foundation for 
many health policy decisions (c.f. Lavis et al., 2009, Lomas and Brown, 2009, 
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Nutley et al., 2007). Whether in the form of peer validated research or defined more 
broadly as any type of knowledge that influences a decision, particular uses of 
evidence can help to project rationality about a decision or an outcome (Sanderson, 
2006, Parsons, 2002, Berridge and Stanton, 1999).  
 
Sanderson (2006) explains that one of the presumptions behind policy making bodies 
and institutions wanting to be evidence-based is that policies and decisions formally 
influenced by evidence are perceived to be better than they otherwise would have 
been without evidence. Relatedly, taking that presumption further, Saunders (2005) 
suggests that adopting a culture of evidence use within a policy making institution is 
seen to help, in theory, to mitigate the ideologies and biases that individuals bring to 
the processes within that organisation. Parsons’ (2002) explanation of institutional 
cultures adopting evidence use is that evidence-based policy making has a 
hypothesised link between improved policy development and better policy delivery 
via the management of policy and decision processes. 
 
The public health sector has particularly embraced the language of EBP, in part 
because of the increased emphasis and influence of evidence-based medicine, which 
has driven certain ways evidence has been used within the policy process, although 
sometimes without considering how medicine may be different from public health 
(Cookson, 2005, Berridge and Stanton, 1999). 
 
For example, a commonly cited definition of evidence-based medicine is the 
conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making 
decisions about the care of individual patients (Sackett et al., 1996). However, Eddy 
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(2005) points out that what is missing from this definition is the question of 
implementation and the many ways that applying evidence to practice might happen 
in a real-life setting. What he draws attention to in his conclusion is that evidence-
based medicine is about “a set of principles and methods intended to ensure that to 
the greatest extent possible, medical decisions, guidelines, and other types of policies 
are based on and consistent with good evidence on effectiveness and benefit” (Eddy, 
2005, p. 16). Essentially evidence-based medicine is a way of working that 
incorporates elements of rigour, rationality, and continuous learning, in order to keep 
up with the latest evidence advances and, unlike evidence-based public health policy 
that typically aims for population-level outcomes, it focuses on the outcomes of the 
individual (Berridge and Stanton, 1999). So despite the connections between 
evidence-based policy and evidence-based medicine, the models are not directly 
transferable. Evidence in a clinical setting is decidedly different from that in social 
policy, with the latter being more open to contestation, competing ‘right’ answers, 
and political expediency than the former (French et al., 2009, Klein, 2000), which 
some argue is as it should be (Parkhurst, 2017, Cairney, 2015).  
 
Criticisms of how evidence-based medicine is applied in relation to its influence on 
EBP, do not dispute the desire to use evidence to make sure the best care possible in 
patients or populations is achieved, but rather focus on how some types of evidence 
become privileged over others (Greenhalgh et al., 2014, Greenhalgh and Russell, 
2009). There is a need, some argue (for example, see Klein, 2000, Parkhurst, 2017), 
for more contextualisation when applying research findings from one situation to 
another. One of the reasons for this is because of how evidence is defined. 
Specifically that evidence will be defined differently by different users, according to 
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use, and that context will shape this (Klein, 2000, Nutley et al., 2007, Lin and 
Gibson, 2003, Dobrow et al., 2004).  
 
For example in public health, most rankings or hierarchies of evidence place 
Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs) at the top. The reason RCTs are often given 
priority is because of their rigour in ensuring internal validity, i.e. their ability to 
show an intervention effect with certainty (Petticrew and Roberts, 2003, Cartwright 
and Hardie, 2012). However, the internal and external validity of the evidence are 
confused in the assumed superiority of RCTs within public health, as there is a need 
for additional information for most social and politically relevant questions to 
understand whether an intervention tested in an RCT will produce similar results for 
a policy maker, i.e. whether or not something that worked ‘there’ will also work 
‘here’ in their own country or context (Cartwright and Hardie, 2012, Parkhurst, 
2017).  
 
RCTs appear to be mainly useful to answer a subset of questions that a policy maker 
may be considering on a given issue, such as whether a medical intervention is 
effective (Cartwright and Hardie, 2012, Parkhurst, 2017). They tend to be less 
helpful in answering broader social questions such as whether that intervention 
would be accepted or appropriate (Parkhurst, 2017, Petticrew and Roberts, 2003).  
 
Parkhurst (2017) notes that one reason evidence-based policy has been very effective 
in the field of clinical medicine is because of how RCT findings, testing new drug 
treatments for example, relate to and can be applied to human physiology. That is, 
because drug treatments work through biochemical and physiological mechanisms 
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that humans share, researchers and policy makers can assume some generalisability 
of drug RCT results across populations, even though local contextual elements may 
differ. However, he explains that this form of evidence application becomes much 
more difficult and complicated when it is applied to more complex policy questions 
and solutions related to clinical medicine interventions which have to (and should) 
reflect conflicting social values and norms. An example he provides is that for the 
use of the drug Viagra to treat erectile dysfunction, where the evidence (16 RCTs) 
clearly demonstrates that the drug is effective and ‘works’, but does not answer the 
question of whether a government should prioritise it as a form of public health 
intervention over other public health priorities that might appear to have a weaker 
evidence base according to the medical model of health (Parkhurst, 2017, p. 20). 
 
It would appear that in some cases, promoting RCTs as the best type of evidence to 
guide policy in effect favours or promotes policy solutions towards those issues 
conducive to RCTs to begin with (Abeysinghe and Parkhurst, 2016, Barnes and 
Parkhurst, 2014, Petticrew and Roberts, 2003, Parkhurst, 2017), such as the 
therapeutic effect of short-term clinical treatments for diseases like malaria. Smith 
(2013) explains that this preference is compounded by the notion among many 
academic researchers, implicit in the evidence use literature, which assumes that 
more use of the ‘best’ evidence equals better use of evidence. Parkhurst (2017) and 
others have identified this evidence hierarchy approach as problematic due to the 
way it can work to de-politicise socially complex policy debates by prioritising 
technically effective solutions over socially or politically desirable ones (see also 
Cairney, 2015, Oliver et al., 2014b).  
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Therefore, as a public health practitioner with a research interest in evidence use, 
while one can appreciate the appeal of RCTs to public health policy makers in search 
of quantifiable solutions to certain measurable questions, one must also acknowledge 
that ‘evidence-based policy making’, when reflective of multiple competing social 
values, is not as straightforward or linear in the way the term ‘evidence-based’ policy 
implies it might be (Parkhurst, 2017, Smith, 2013, Cairney, 2015). In addition, the 
extent to which public health policies ‘use’ evidence in multiple forms, and how 
multiple competing tensions are eventually resolved by actors in the practice of 
policy development, is not always obvious and can sometimes be difficult to discern 
(c.f. Weiss, 1979, Black, 2001, Oliver et al., 2014b), not just for scholars of evidence 
use, but speaking from experience, for actors involved in the policy development 
process itself. 
 
Smith (2013) recognises these challenges from the start, quoting Pawson (2006, p. 
viii) to say: 
 
There is no such thing as evidence-based policy. Evidence is the six-
stone weakling of the policy world. Even its most enthusiastic 
advocates are inclined to prefer the phrase ‘evidence-informed policy’ 
as a way of conveying a more authentic impression of research’s 
sway…. (Smith, 2013, p. 1).   
 
This recognition aligns with my own experience as a public health practitioner 
tasked with increasing and improving the use of my global malaria research 
consortium’s ‘policy-driven’ evidence; it wasn’t clear to me how we could influence 
policy through our research, given the RCT-related limitations of internal versus 
external validity, let alone whether promoting our research results in a ‘policy-
driven’ way was even the right thing to do. Some public health actors do attempt to 
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at least acknowledge the limits of and tensions within EBP in this way, so that the 
language they use to describe the influence of evidence in policy making still reflects 
the principle of, and their underlying good intention to use, evidence to improve the 
public health of a population (Fielding and Briss, 2006). Some scholars suggest that 
indeed it might be better to advocate for ‘evidence-informed’ rather than ‘evidence-
based’ policy (see Young et al., 2002, Boaz et al., 2008, Head, 2016), although these 
authors, and others (see Smith, 2013, Pawson, 2006) also acknowledge that the term 
still has its limitations, given the continued emphasis on the role of evidence over 
other influencing factors.  
 
Despite the residual limitations of the term, an example of a public health actor and 
global health institution preferring the use of the phrase ‘evidence-informed policy’ 
over that of EBP is the WHO Global Malaria Programme (WHO-GMP), which is the 
setting of my case study. The phrase is the preferred expression the WHO-GMP uses 
to describe the goal of its principal evidence advisory body, the Malaria Policy 
Advisory Committee (MPAC), in addition to some other interesting word choice. 
MPAC’s terms of reference from its creation in 2012 state (italics added for 
emphasis): 
 
WHO-GMP, in keeping with its mandate to articulate ethical and 
evidence-informed policies for malaria control, established MPAC as 
a mechanism to increase the timeliness, transparency, independence 
and relevance of its recommendations to WHO Member States for 
malaria control and elimination (WHO, 2012b, p. 1).  
 
Many years after the creation of MPAC and its terms of reference, the clear and 
deliberate use of these words within an organisation that internally (based on my 
observation and experience) prides itself on its evidence review processes, technical 
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authority, and normative function, still intrigues me, to the extent that I eventually 
decided to make evidence use for policy development within WHO-GMP the focus 
of my DrPH thesis. 
 
1.3 Case study setting 
 
I first began working at WHO-GMP in 2011 as part of my DrPH Organisational and 
Policy Analysis project (see D’Souza, 2014), documenting and analysing the drivers 
and constraints of WHO-GMP’s efforts to strengthen its policy setting process via 
MPAC, and then again between 2012 and 2015 to support MPAC’s biannual open-
session evidence advisory meetings. It became clear to me over this period that the 
process of evidence-use mattered as much to WHO-GMP as the evidence itself, and 
I wanted to understand how and why this was the case. 
 
Knowing that there was already a substantial body of work not only on the use of 
evidence in policy (c.f. Lin and Gibson, 2003, Nutley et al., 2007), but also on ways 
to overcome ‘barriers’ and increase ‘knowledge transfer’ (Contandriopoulos et al., 
2010, Estabrooks et al., 2006, Innvaer et al., 2002, Mitton et al., 2007, Oliver et al., 
2014a), as well as increasing attention to the shortcoming of these approaches 
(Cairney, 2015, Oliver et al., 2014b, Parkhurst, 2017, Smith, 2013) (see next chapter 
for review of this literature), I wished to further explore this type of discourse, but in 
a context which would satisfy my (and the DrPH programme’s) preference for 
research which might eventually be of practical value for public health policy makers 
and practitioners.  
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For example, I became aware that “instead of repeating studies of perceptions of 
barriers and facilitators of use of research evidence, appropriate methods must be 
used to answer questions about when, why, how, and who finds what type of 
knowledge sound, timely, and relevant at different stages of the policy cycle” (Oliver 
et al., 2014b, p. 8). The notion is that a more holistic understanding of influencing 
factors, such as the role of different policy actors or their institutional structures, 
which have been acknowledged but are not well explored in the current applied 
literature (see Liverani et al., 2013, Mitton et al., 2007, Oliver et al., 2014b), could 
help shed some light on the complexity of evidence use in health policy making 
(Greenhalgh et al., 2014, Oliver et al., 2014b). As Weiss and Bucuvalas (1980) 
pointed out several decades ago:  
 
However well we come to understand the nature, flow, and response 
to…research, if we are ever to discern its influence on public policy 
we will have to confront the realities of the decision-making process. 
Only with better awareness of the convoluted ways in which 
decisions take shape – and the complex interplay of situations, 
problems, opportunities, and actors – will we make headway in 
untangling the contributions of … knowledge to the formation of 
policy” (Weiss and Bucuvalas, 1980, p. 274). 
 
Many experts seem to agree with the notion that public health researchers and 
practitioners looking to improve evidence use in policy making should and/or are 
ready to move beyond the theoretically naive concepts of barriers and facilitators of 
a seemingly linear process, and into the messy complex social reality that is 
evidence-based policy making (Cairney, 2015, Oliver et al., 2014b, Parkhurst, 2017, 
Smith, 2013). Parkhurst (2017) for instance, argues that a shift is needed to engage 
with questions of what improved evidence use looks like by asking explicitly 
normative questions about how we might judge ‘good evidence’ in terms of policy 
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appropriateness, and the ‘good use of evidence’ from a perspective of the decision 
making process. He suggests that these considerations can then enable reflections on 
how to improve ‘evidence advisory systems’ over time, which he defines as the 
collection of structural bodies or groups, their rules, and norms of practice, which 
serve to govern the ways that evidence informs policy decisions (Parkhurst, 2017). 
 
The ‘evidence advisory system’ that this thesis focuses on is on the role and function 
of evidence advisory bodies within WHO, an influential global health institution and 
archetypal technocratic agency that frames itself as a steward and promoter of 
evidence-based policy making (WHO, 2007b, p. 5), since its evidence advisory 
bodies are made up of experts that are explicitly tasked with the review of scientific 
information on behalf of WHO. In the case of the WHO-GMP, the focus of this 
study, evidence advisory body members are tasked with reviewing the evidence and 
advising WHO in their development of global policy recommendations to control 
and eliminate malaria (WHO, 2012b). The experiences, composition, and 
professional status of actors involved with these bodies are among the factors that 
interact and influence how evidence is interpreted and how recommendations are 
formed (Atkins et al., 2013). In the case of WHO-GMP, evidence advisory body 
members, such as those on its principal evidence advisory body, MPAC, tend to be 
clinicians (WHO, 2017a), who having been trained in the practice of evidence-based 
medicine described earlier in this chapter, tend to bring that experience and belief 
system with them into policy deliberation (Greenhalgh et al., 2014).  
 
Other insights into the role and function of evidence advisory bodies in health are 
part of a slowly growing literature on how to improve their inner workings, for 
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example by including patient experience information (Campbell et al., 2010) or 
economic information (Eddama and Coast, 2009, Williams et al., 2007) in order to 
promote the integration of evidence into health policy and practice. Other literature 
has been concerned with exploring how such bodies deal with constructing or 
facilitating a process less prone to bias, for example by applying clear, 
comprehensive, and consistent evidence inclusion criteria (Schlander, 2008).  
 
What many of these studies have in common, however, is their focus on advisory 
bodies serving national governments. In health care, an exemplar often referenced is 
the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in England and Wales 
(see Culyer and Rawlins, 2012, Culyer, 2006, Kelly et al., 2010), which serves a 
mandated role to develop guidelines and make decisions that can have direct 
influence over policy and practice for the National Health Service. Yet, few studies 
examine the processes and perceptions of global health evidence advisory bodies, 
such as MPAC, who advise technocratic agencies such as WHO, in this case WHO-
GMP, on recommendations for global health policy, in this case global malaria 
control and elimination. This may be an important distinction, however, because 
global health governance systems are decidedly different to national bodies, given 
the lack of a supreme authority and much more indirect systems of accountability to 
population groups. 
 
Exploring the influences on the use of evidence in policy making within a global 
health evidence advisory body (MPAC) within a global health policy institution 
(WHO) might be useful to help address some of the limitations highlighted by Oliver 
and colleagues (2014b), by understanding the ways in which evidence and policy 
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interact, and how these factors influence policy outcomes for a global health priority 
(malaria). In particular, I will compare two different policy development processes 
for malaria control and prevention that took place within the department between 
2006 and 2012 (these are outlined in brief in the next section to set up my research 
question, but are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 to provide the full context for 
my case study). Both the policies I refer to relate to what is known within the global 
malaria community as ‘intermittent preventive treatment’, or IPT, which is the 
delivery of a treatment dose of an anti-malarial drug given at pre-specified times for 
the prevention of malaria, regardless of the presence of symptoms or confirmed 
malaria infection.  
 
The findings from this comparison may contribute to a growing body of literature on 
evidence use and evidence advisory bodies in global public health. More importantly 
perhaps, in the context of the DrPH programme and the overarching goals of public 
health (to promote population health), the results may contribute to the 
understanding by public health policy makers and practitioners of how ‘good 
evidence’ and ‘good use of evidence’ to build better ‘evidence advisory systems’ can 
more effectively contribute to solving complex public health problems, of which 
preventing malaria infection, and sustaining that prevention, is just one prime 
example.    
 
1.4 Case study context 
 
Malaria is a complex, mosquito-borne, infectious disease and a major global public 
health problem. In 2015 there were over 200 million new cases of malaria and nearly 
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500,000 deaths (WHO, 2016). An estimated 90% of malaria cases and 92% of 
malaria deaths occur in Africa, the majority among children below five years of age 
(WHO, 2016). This makes this particular age group, in this particular geographical 
location, an important target for global health policy makers and funders of public 
health research and programmes, who have a vested interest in reducing the global 
burden of malaria for moral, economic, and global health security reasons (WHO, 
2015).  
 
The global malaria community, which is comprised of funders, researchers, policy 
makers, and other stakeholders, state that they are strongly committed to finding 
ways of addressing the consequences of malaria for vulnerable populations (RBM, 
2015, Malaria Summit, 2018). One of the ways they do this is through the 
development and implementation of public health interventions to try to reduce the 
number (burden) of malaria cases (morbidity) and malaria deaths (mortality). 
Intermittent preventive treatment (IPT) is one such public health intervention aimed 
at treating and preventing malaria episodes in certain at-risk populations such as 
infants (IPTi), children (IPTc/SMC), and pregnant women (IPTp), whether they are 
known to be infected with malaria or not, through pre-specified drug treatment doses 
at pre-specified times separated by ‘intermittent’ periods without drug treatment 
(both the ideal choice of drug treatment and the dose timing(s) will vary, depending 
on the at-risk target population).  
 
The way the IPT intervention works is two-fold: (a) it clears existing malaria 
parasites from the human body through treatment with effective anti-malarial drugs, 
and (b) it helps prevent new infections by maintaining therapeutic levels of that anti-
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malarial drug in the human body over a sustained period of time when the person is 
considered to be most ‘at risk’, through repeated dosing (WHO, 2015, Greenwood, 
2006). Because IPT is a form of mass drug administration, where the purpose is 
primarily to prevent malaria infection and by extension death, whether or not the 
intervention ‘works’ is measured by the length and extent of its ‘protective efficacy’, 
which in plain language, is a percentage calculation of the amount of reduced clinical 
malaria episodes in infants (or children, or pregnant women, depending on the form 
of IPT) as a result of that particular IPT intervention (WHO, 2010, WHO, 2012c, 
WHO, 2012a). In meta-analysis or other situations where a body of evidence (several 
IPT RCTs for example) is considered, protective efficacy is often ‘pooled’ to give an 
average measure of protective effect. It should be noted that as with other forms of 
mass drug administration, recommending IPT as a preventive treatment for malaria 
is not based on protective efficacy alone; researchers and policy makers also 
consider other relevant (but mostly technical) information in balancing potential 
good versus harm, such as measures of drug safety, the possibility of a ‘rebound’ 
effect once naturally built immunity in malaria-endemic populations is lost, and the 
impact on drug resistance of an increasingly limited array of effective anti-malarial 
drugs (WHO, 2010, WHO, 2012c, WHO, 2012a). 
 
In 2001, the results of a RCT in Tanzania using Intermittent Preventive Treatment in 
infants, or IPTi, using the anti-malarial drug Sulfadoxine–Pyrimethamine (SP), 
delivered through the Expanded Programme on Immunisation (EPI), which is the 
WHO’s standardised essential vaccine schedule for infants, showed that IPTi could 
be a useful public health intervention as it reduced clinical malaria episodes in 
infants by 59% (Schellenberg et al., 2001). Subsequently, a global research 
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partnership, funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), was 
established in 2003 called the IPTi Consortium whose goal was to build the evidence 
base for IPTi, that would then lead to a policy recommendation for IPTi by the WHO 
(IPTi Consortium, 2003). In fact, a ‘Policy Platform’ within WHO was established in 
2006 by the Consortium specifically for the purpose of facilitating a WHO IPTi 
policy recommendation.  
 
I will explore the timeline of the IPTi policy development in more detail in my 
contextual chapter (Chapter 4), but to summarise, following repeated stalling of the 
policy process, for numerous reasons, despite a seeming wealth of evidence on IPTi, 
it took until April 2009, eight years after the first IPTi study was published, for 
WHO, via its policy setting process at the time, to finally issue a global policy 
recommendation on IPTi to its member states in 2010 (see WHO, 2010).  
 
Shortly after this, in 2011, WHO-GMP embarked on the policy setting strengthening 
exercise I became involved with as part of my DrPH. Its goal was to increase the 
‘timeliness’, ‘transparency’, ‘independence’, and ‘relevance’ of its recommendations 
to WHO member states in relation to malaria control and elimination (D’Souza, 
2014). The result of that exercise was the evidence advisory body, MPAC, which 
was first convened in 2012 (D'Souza and Newman, 2012).  
 
The first body of evidence to come under MPAC review was for Seasonal Malaria 
Chemoprevention (SMC), formerly known as IPTc, which like IPTi is a form of 
intermittent preventive treatment, but for children (between one to five years of age) 
instead of infants (under one years old). SMC is officially defined as the intermittent 
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administration (once a month, up to four months) of full treatment courses of the 
anti-malarial drug (Amodiaquine + SP) during the malaria season to prevent malarial 
illness by maintaining therapeutic anti-malarial drug concentrations in the blood 
throughout the period of greatest malarial risk (WHO, 2012c), which for SMC-
relevant countries is essentially the rainy season.  
 
Here, similar to IPTi, there was a promising RCT showing high (86%) protective 
efficacy (Cisse et al., 2006), but unlike with IPTi, an official consortium with overt 
policy goals via a ‘Policy Platform’ was never formed. Again, I will explore the 
timeline of the SMC policy development in more detail in Chapter 4, but in short, a 
series of non-controversial SMC studies culminated in a formal meeting of a single 
WHO evidence advisory body (the Chemotherapy Technical Expert Group, or TEG) 
to review the evidence for SMC in May 2011, which resulted in a positive policy 
recommendation for the intervention (see WHO, 2011c). The recommendation was 
reviewed by the newly formed MPAC in February 2012, and by March, WHO-GMP 
issued a policy recommendation for SMC (WHO, 2012c).  
 
Within a year of the announcement and accompanying policy document from WHO 
recommending SMC, an implementation guide was published, nine countries 
included SMC in their strategic plans for malaria control, and SMC was 
implemented in southern Senegal, in parts of Mali, Chad, and Niger, and in a pilot 
scheme in northern Nigeria (Bhasin et al., 2014). In comparison, for IPTi, it took 
several years for an implementation guide to be published, and only one African 
country has implemented IPTi as a policy (Greenwood, 2018).  
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Although there are some commonalities between the two policies (both are forms of 
IPT for malaria), there are also differences, for example in target age group and 
implementation mechanism (WHO, 2010, WHO, 2012c). In addition, although there 
was some overlap in the timeline between both policy processes, the system of 
evidence advice had changed within WHO-GMP by the time of the SMC policy 
decision. Therefore, although comparisons can be made between the two policy 
processes, they are not directly comparable; my unit of study is WHO-GMP rather 
than the two policy processes themselves.  
 
One aspect about the two policy development processes that allows for comparison 
however, is that they resulted in two very different perceptions by the same 
stakeholders about what they viewed as the ‘success’ of those processes. Perhaps this 
is to be expected given WHO-GMP’s attempts to strengthen its policy setting 
processes by the time of SMC (see D'Souza and Newman, 2012), but it does not 
explain how and why the SMC policy development process is perceived to have 
been somehow better according to the actors involved.  
 
I will expand on these aspects in greater detail in the following contextual and results 
chapters, but in summary, for IPTi, the process through which evidence was used to 
inform policy was seen as contentious and problematic to those who were involved, 
in comparison to the process for SMC (LSHTM, 2014a, LSHTM, 2014b). For 
example, many of the researchers for both IPTi and SMC were from LSHTM, where 
I am currently employed. LSHTM, like most other institutes of higher education in 
the UK, takes part in the UK government’s Research Excellence Framework (REF) 
exercise that ranks them on the measure of their research impact, which is a 
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reflection of “the extent to which [their] research has influenced policy and the wider 
world” (LSHTM, 2014c).  
 
REF scores are considered to be especially important to research-focused, graduate-
only institutions like LSHTM, which get no additional income through fees from 
undergraduates, since The Higher Education Funding Council for England uses REF 
outcomes to calculate each institution's annual research funding allocation. As a 
result, LSHTM spends a lot of time (several years based on my experience) 
choosing, and then carefully crafting, optimal individual impact case studies, in the 
hopes that they will be judged as outstanding, which in turn improves LSHTM’s 
ranking in the REF tables of excellence. During the last REF exercise in 2014, 
LSHTM, which was eventually ranked no. 10 overall out of all universities in the 
UK, and no. 2 on the specific measure of impact, submitted a total of 27 individual 
impact case studies for REF consideration, including one each on IPTi and SMC 
(LSHTM, 2014c). 
 
The LSHTM REF impact case study on SMC states: 
 
The way in which SMC has progressed rapidly from pilot research 
studies to early implementation is widely regarded as a model of 
how this process should be conducted. Staff from LSHTM, working 
together with their partners in Africa, have played a key role in all 
stages of this process. (LSHTM, 2014a, p. 3) 
 
In comparison, for IPTi, the LSHTM REF impact case study (LSHTM, 2014b), 
which could not claim for IPTi to be as emphatic a success, cautiously concludes: 
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The complexities of the policy-making process provided a learning 
opportunity helping groups (including the ACT Consortium) to 
engage better with policy-makers. (LSHTM, 2014b, p. 3) 
 
It should be noted that it isn’t just LSHTM researchers who use IPTi as an example 
of a ‘learning opportunity’ instead of a policy success. For example, researchers at 
the Barcelona Institute for Global Health, also heavily involved as part of the IPTi 
Consortium, whose operations were led by their institute, uses the case of ‘What 
went wrong with IPTi?’ as one of the core case studies during teaching on its 
masters-level global health courses (ISGlobal, 2014).  
 
In terms of the formal academic literature however, and excluding my own 
subsequent work later either published or presented from these thesis findings, only 
one analysis of ‘what went wrong’ exists – which was work done by Valeria Oliveira 
Cruz and Gill Walt, who were funded by the IPTi Consortium prior to its ending in 
2009, to understand what lessons could be learnt from the IPTi policy development 
process, if any. Using a framework of interests, institutions, and ideas, Cruz and 
Walt (2013) suggest that the varying tensions in the IPTi policy process were 
primarily the result of actors transgressing the ‘delicate’ boundaries between 
research and advocacy, and that in future, actor demands and expectations of 
knowledge translation need to be better understood.  
 
Although the IPTi policy development process preceded my own time at WHO, and 
to a large extent LSHTM, I was nevertheless familiar with the case and perceptions 
of it based on my work in malaria research at LSHTM, where many of the IPTi, and 
SMC, researchers were based, including Cruz and Walt who later studied the IPTi 
process. In comparison, I noticed during my work at WHO, that SMC was, and still 
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is, viewed by my colleagues (both at WHO and LSHTM) as a model process due to 
its seeming efficiency (LSHTM, 2014a, Greenwood, 2018). I wanted to understand 
in my global malaria colleagues’ own words, outside of neutrally presented academic 
journal articles or carefully crafted LSHTM REF impact case studies, why they felt 
this was the case, and what the reasons were behind it, according to them. 
 
In looking at the negative assessment of one policy process in relation to the positive 
assessment of the other, according to those individuals involved, this case study 
allows for the exploration of the influencing factors that affected the use of evidence 
in the two IPT policy processes within WHO-GMP, during a period of organisational 
self-improvement related to evidence review. In studying the process of WHO global 
malaria policy development, there may be lessons about the institutionalisation of 
practices to improve evidence use, and why that matters, that can be learned by the 
public health and global malaria community from this case, as well as by researchers 
of evidence use in public health policy making.   
  
1.5 Aims and objectives 
 
This study investigates the use of evidence in global malaria policy development, 
with a focus on the WHO-GMP and its evidence advisory bodies. In particular, I aim 
to: 
1. Explore the factors that influenced the consideration of particular evidence at 
WHO-GMP, i.e. determine what was considered ‘good evidence’ for policy (and 
why) in the case of IPTi and SMC. 
40 
 
2. Examine how factors associated with the policy process influenced eventual 
policy outcomes at WHO-GMP, i.e. determine what was considered ‘good use of 
evidence’ for policy (and why) in the case of IPTi and SMC. 
 
1.6 Summary and outline of thesis 
 
In this chapter, I have: 
 outlined the development of my interest in evidence use in policy making, 
particularly global malaria policy, within WHO-GMP; 
 provided background information about intermittent preventive malaria treatment 
and a brief timeline of the global policy development for IPTi and SMC; 
 indicated what I set out to achieve in this study, and why. 
 
The remaining chapters are organised as follows:  
 Chapter 2 contextualises the study in the relevant literature briefly mentioned in 
this introductory chapter, and illustrates how I arrived at my framework for 
analysis.  
 Chapter 3 is an account of the research methodology and method. 
 Chapter 4 provides the global malaria contextual background and introduces the 
journeys of the two global malaria policies (IPTi and SMC) I will be comparing 
in more detail.  
 Chapters 5 and 6 – my two main results chapters – focus, in turn, on comparing 
the evidence base (what is ‘good evidence’) and the policy process (what is 
‘good use of evidence’) for each policy.  
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 Finally, Chapter 7 focuses on the discussion, conclusions, and key lessons for 
public health researchers, policy makers, and practitioners that wish to promote 
or sustain practices and processes that increase evidence use in policy and 
decision making.  
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Chapter 2. Existing reviews and theoretical perspectives  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to review select literature on evidence use in public health 
policy making, and some of the factors that might influence its use as they might 
apply to my research question. As mentioned in the previous introductory chapter, 
there is already a substantial body of work on evidence use in policy, and not just on 
ways to overcome ‘barriers’ and increase ‘knowledge transfer’, but increasingly, and 
of relevance to my thesis, on the shortcomings of these approaches and ways in 
which the field of ‘evidence use in policy making’ might move forward.  
 
As such, in the following sections I provide brief overviews of key texts on evidence 
use in public health policy making, including on some of the influences on evidence 
use, as well as the politics of evidence-based policy making, before discussing how 
current debates and gaps in the literature helped inform my research question and 
analytical framework, and where I see my thesis contributing to this revived and 
growing field of study.  
 
2.2 Ways of perceiving evidence use in public health policy making 
 
The use of evidence has been a long established part of the policy process (c.f. 
Cartwright and Hardie, 2012, Lin and Gibson, 2003), and within public health, 
research evidence is widely considered in some respects the necessary foundation for 
many health policy decisions (Lavis et al., 2009, Lomas and Brown, 2009, Nutley et 
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al., 2007). As a public health practitioner, one can understand the appeal of 
‘evidence-based policy’ (EBP) and all the positive and logical connotations 
associated with it; after all, it is intuitive to many working in public health, who 
strive to improve public health outcomes, to wish to transform evidence into action. 
However, what emerged during the course of my literature review, and following 
further reflection of my own experience, is the consideration that the multiple steps 
involved in assessing and utilising research evidence within policy making is in fact 
not necessarily as straightforward as what many of us who work in public health 
might naively assume. 
 
To begin with, that there are multiple uses of research was emphasised by Weiss 
(1979) in her research on the different meanings of (social) research utilisation which 
classifies seven distinct models, summarised as follows:  
1. Knowledge-driven – derived from the natural sciences and seemingly linear, 
applied research follows from basic research to develop policy solutions to 
identified problems;  
2. Problem-solving – similarly linear but more decision-driven, involving the direct 
application of results from specific studies to a pending policy decision that is in 
need of a solution; 
3. Interactive – less linear and more disorderly, with an interconnected and back-
and-forth process of solution-searching between policy developers and a variety 
of sources of information, including, but not limited to, researchers; 
4. Political – where research is used strategically as a form of ‘ammunition’ for pre-
determined policy positions; 
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5. Tactical – used, in other words, as a tactic by policy makers, and often unrelated 
to the substance of the research itself, mainly as proof of responsiveness, an 
excuse to delay action, and/or to pre-empt or deflect criticism; 
6. Enlightenment – the indirect process of permeation through which research 
(social science research in particular) influences policy thinking more broadly; 
7. Part of the intellectual enterprise – social science research and policy, as 
responding to, and being influenced by, both each other, as well as the changing 
interests of society more generally. 
 
For example, basic research or specific studies are the predominant form of evidence 
in the “knowledge-driven” and “problem-solving” models she proposes, but it is a 
form of evidence that can be used in different ways or that might be more or less 
relevant in different models of use (Weiss, 1979). In other words, research evidence 
can be adapted (versus simply adopted or transferred) according to the need or in 
response to a particular situation, and the factors that influence its use can vary (c.f. 
Lin and Gibson, 2003, Nutley et al., 2007, Weiss, 1979). Evidence use is in actuality 
far more dynamic, complex, and contingent than the traditional EBP instrumental 
views of research use imply (Nutley et al., 2007). 
 
The body of evidence on the complex and contingent use of research leads Nutley 
and colleagues (2007) to suggest that an interactive and dialogical model, that 
balances positivist and interpretivist framings of research use, offers the most insight 
and potential to improving research use. They offer that these interactive model 
mechanisms could encompass a range of methods, such as formal partnerships 
between relevant actors, as well as more informal workshops and seminars to 
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enhance discussion and debate, in order to accommodate uncertainties in research, 
which are inherent and accepted as part of more reflexive social research approaches 
(Nutley et al., 2007).  
 
Another relevant work on evidence use, but specific to health rather than public 
services more generally, describes health policy as the product of three competing 
rationalities (Lin and Gibson, 2003, p. 14 ): (a) cultural rationality, which is defined 
as “values, ethics, what (perceived) societal opinions feel is right in relation to health 
policy”; (b) political rationality, which relates to the process through which power is 
exercised and decisions are made, including such factors as “the willingness of 
policy makers to have transparent processes and be accountable, the ability of 
interest groups to participate … and the role of commentators (be it media, experts, 
or lobbyists)”; and finally, (c) technical rationality, which is described as the 
knowledge produced by researchers, which can include diverse forms of evidence, 
such as epidemiology and economic data. Lin and Gibson describe this technical 
form of rationality as “the weakest link in the chain” (p. 14) because it is dominated 
by positivist science that aims for universality, when policy making is often context-
specific. They argue that these rationalities (and the health policies that they create) 
are shaped by “historical political legacies” and reflect “ongoing processes of social 
learning” which collectively reflect the contestability, power, interests, 
heterogeneous voices, and complexity that is inherent in health policy making (Lin 
and Gibson, 2003, p. 15). 
 
Smith (2013) offers an alternative view, that the relationship between how evidence 
is used in policy might be best understood as a “continual exchange and translation 
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of ideas” (p. 75). She proposes a four-genre ideas-related typology for analysing the 
relationship between evidence and policy: institutionalised ideas which have become 
‘unchallengeable’ and embedded in policy and discourse; critical and charismatic 
ideas, which in different ways may challenge institutionalised ideas; and 
chameleonic ideas, which can transform to simultaneously appeal and be acceptable 
to a variety of policy actors, but also challenge existing policy (see Smith, 2013, ch. 
3). Smith (2013) suggests that ‘ideas’ are potentially a more acceptable and accurate 
descriptor of how evidence informs policy in practice, as the notion “allows space to 
acknowledge the normative, political, and empirical dimensions of public health 
debates”, while also acknowledging “the malleable nature of knowledge which is 
translated as it moves between actors and across contexts” (Smith, 2013, p. 213).  
 
Nutley and colleagues (2007) offer that more attention ought to be paid to group and 
collective research use in informing public policy decisions such as at the 
organisational level. They point out that most evidence use literature focuses on the 
individual, but that focusing on research use at the systems or ‘meso-organisational’ 
level can help find ways of better incorporating research into procedures, standards, 
and other practice tools and processes, and that this is an important research gap for 
future work within the field of evidence use (Nutley et al., 2007).  
 
In summary, it would appear that there are multiple uses of evidence, depending on 
the circumstances, motivations, and context of the actors involved, which may all 
change over time, in different ways, and which may reflect individual as well as 
institutional, or even societal, learning and views. While these various constructs and 
perceptions of evidence use in public health policy making are helpful for beginning 
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to illustrate and appreciate the ‘dynamic, complex, and contingent’ uses of evidence, 
and although there is also a distinct body of literature focused on ways of better 
incorporating research into procedures, standards, and other practice tools and 
processes at the practitioner and systems levels (Dopson et al., 2002, Ferlie et al., 
2000, Dopson et al., 2003, Ferlie et al., 1999, Locock and Boaz, 2004, Dopson et al., 
2001), advice or lessons are often framed in ways of improving individual (and uni-
directional) ‘knowledge transfer’ (see next section), and in the language of 
‘brokering boundaries’ and the ‘gaps’ between science, policy, and practice (Cash et 
al., 2002, Cruz and Walt, 2013, Cash et al., 2003). That is to say, that although the 
complexity of evidence use in public health, in particular in clinical settings, is often 
acknowledged, including certain social and political implications (for example, see 
Ferlie et al., 2000, Ferlie et al., 1999), not all influences on evidence use (whether in 
policy or practice) are necessarily given full research consideration. This is 
acknowledged in the ‘evidence into healthcare practice’ literature as due in part to 
the dominance of the medical profession and the strong influence of their biomedical 
science model on what is considered credible and legitimate evidence in public 
health (Cammer et al., 2013, Fitzgerald et al., 2003, Dopson et al., 2003, Dopson et 
al., 2002; see also background section in Chapter 1 of this thesis for more on the 
influence of evidence-based medicine on evidence-based public health policy).   
 
Cash and colleagues’ (2002, 2003) work on influences on evidence use for 
sustainable development policy acknowledge that the boundaries between science 
and policy are essentially socially constructed and negotiated, but can serve 
important functions, such as helping to organise and allocate authority within 
‘knowledge systems’. However, Cruz and Walt’s (2013) work on influences on 
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evidence use in the IPTi process (described in Chapter 1), which does also 
acknowledge complexity in policy development, reinforces the notion of boundaries, 
and illustrates how deeply embedded the concepts of ‘two worlds’, and ‘knowledge 
translation’ are in the public health policy literature, and based on their findings, 
within the global malaria community itself. 
 
2.3 Influences on evidence use  
 
As Lin and Gibson (2003) critique early on in their book, the idea that there is a 
‘gap’ at all between the ‘two communities’ of researchers and policy makers – a 
theory originally developed by Caplan (1979) – that can and should be bridged has 
been the key driver behind a large volume of work dedicated to some form of 
‘knowledge transfer and exchange’. This, in turn, has led to a number of reviews to 
distil lessons on ‘what works’, often framed, as described in my introductory 
chapter, in the language of common ‘barriers’ or ‘facilitators’ to improve evidence 
use (Davies et al., 2015, Langer et al., 2016, Oliver et al., 2014a, Mitton et al., 2007, 
Contandriopoulos et al., 2010, Court and Young, 2003).  
 
Although I have already alluded to what many scholars view as the shortcomings of 
perceiving evidence use in this simplistic and linear way, nevertheless, summarising 
some of the reviews on the influencing roles of ‘barriers’ and ‘facilitators’, as they 
might relate to my study, before then discussing the shortcomings in more detail, is 
necessary because the notions of ‘two communities’ and the ways to improve 
‘knowledge transfer’ between them, is so pervasive within the discourse of the 
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public health practitioner community to which I belong, including among my global 
malaria research colleagues at LSHTM. 
 
For one thing, much of the knowledge transfer literature implies that 
evidence/knowledge should be taken up into policy (Smith, 2013). This could be 
considered a reflection of actor values and their expectations (both of themselves, 
but also from the point of view of other actors). For example, in Court and Young’s 
(2003) review of 50 cases of evidence use in development policy, all the cases 
included showed some impact on policy or practice. They explain that sometimes 
this impact was immediate, while at other times it required what they describe as 
“strenuous advocacy efforts” (see p. vii). Narrowing the focus of knowledge transfer 
to such cases at least implicitly appears to equate the success of knowledge transfer 
with the ability of actors to enact change in policy and practice. Indeed, much of this 
body of literature distils suggestions to actors on how to enact such change. 
 
Mostly written from the researcher versus policy maker point of view, much of the 
‘knowledge transfer’ literature explores numerous methods for increasing evidence 
use through influencing individual actions, with conclusions that there is more that 
can be done by all actors in the process – including both policy makers and 
researchers – to increase knowledge transfer. For example, some common themes 
are to call for knowledge outputs to be framed as relevant to policy maker needs, 
such as fitting outputs to policy makers’ timescales and agendas, and ensuring that 
the information output is relevant to the problem (Contandriopoulos et al., 2010, 
Court and Young, 2003). Many papers also discuss the importance of presenting 
information in an accessible, understandable, and useable way, with Court and 
50 
 
Young (2003) highlighting the need to develop clear narratives in order to improve 
actor engagement (see also Contandriopoulos et al., 2010, Jones, 2009, Mitton et al., 
2007, Nutley et al., 2002, Ward et al., 2009).  
 
However, the credibility of the research itself matters too (Court and Young, 2003, 
Nutley et al., 2007, Cash et al., 2003). Nutley and colleagues (2007) summarise that 
aside from technical validity, research is more likely to be accessed and used when it 
comes from credible and trusted individuals and organisations, or where it is 
supported by experts in the field. In this sense, the neutral reputation of the source of 
the research is important and influential, and may even in some cases be more 
important than the technical quality of the research itself (Nutley et al., 2007). 
  
Another seemingly controllable – and trust and reputation-building/beneficial – step 
was ongoing collaborative relationships between the key stakeholders in the policy 
development process. Both Mitton and colleagues (2007) and Court and Young 
(2003) reported that involving policy makers from an early stage, including in the 
research design process, increased their engagement in the policy process, and the 
likelihood that the outputs would be incorporated into policy. Instead, other papers 
point to the importance of knowledge brokers, rather than the original producers of 
research findings, to link, network, and facilitate evidence use (Contandriopoulos et 
al., 2010, Davison et al., 2015, Jones, 2009, Shaxson et al., 2012). In addition, 
Innvaer and colleagues (2002) highlight the widely held view of ‘two worlds’ of 
researchers and policy makers, noting the frustrations of both researchers and policy 
makers with their counterparts on the other side. In looking to identify what might 
better predict or influence evidence use, they conclude that the most commonly 
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identified facilitator of evidence use was personal contact between researchers and 
policy makers (Innvaer et al., 2002).  
 
Smith (2013) similarly distils common lessons from existing reviews (p. 20-21) and 
highlights the implication that the disconnect between researchers and policy makers 
can be overcome by simply improving communication and trust between these two 
groups. However, she also notes that various attempts to increase the use of 
particular pieces of research is distinct from actually improving the use of research in 
policy (Smith, 2013, p.23). 
 
Oliver and colleagues (2014b), as another example of an existing review of the 
evidence use literature, conclude that “[m]uch of the research in this area is 
theoretically naive, focusing primarily on the uptake of research evidence as opposed 
to evidence defined more broadly, and privileging academics’ research priorities 
over those of policy makers” (p. 1). They call for a new research agenda, which 
focuses on the “influences on and processes of policy” through in-depth, empirical 
descriptions of how evidence “fits with the other drivers and triggers that affect 
policy” (Oliver et al., 2014b, p. 7). 
 
As Oliver and colleagues (2014b) suggest, another way to understand influences on 
evidence use in policy and decision making is to look at the processes and 
environment that facilitate the policy process, and the capacity that exists at the 
individual and organisational level to seek, analyse, and use evidence (see also 
Bowen and Zwi, 2005, Lachman et al., 1994).  
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In one of the few ‘knowledge transfer’ reviews to consider political science literature 
in its examination of knowledge exchange interventions at the organisational and 
policy level, Contandriopoulos and colleagues (2010) found that context “dictates 
the realm of the possible for knowledge exchange strategies aimed at influencing 
policy making or organisational behaviour. If a given issue’s salience and 
prioritisation are high enough for users to initiate knowledge exchange efforts and 
invest resources in them, then the probability of its use and impact can, from the 
outset, be presumed to be high” (p. 465).  
 
Contandriopoulos and colleagues (2010) suggest that in technically-focused decision 
making, there is generally a perceived low level of contestation of the evidence. In 
such cases, technically-focused debate could be resolved through rational dialogues 
and arguments, based upon a similar worldview amongst actors. In contrast, high 
contestation of the evidence was found to lead to political debates and a strategic 
approach towards knowledge use. In other words, in minimally polarised contexts, 
evidence use more likely resembles Weiss’s (1979) earlier-described problem-driven 
model, whereas evidence use more likely resembles Weiss’s (1979) political model 
in highly polarised contexts where there is high contestation of the evidence 
(Contandriopoulos et al., 2010). 
 
Court and Young (2003) and Contandriopoulos and colleagues (2010) also note that 
whether the evidence fit with perceived logic and pre-established ideas affected the 
weight that the evidence was likely to be given, and that this in turn affected whether 
or not it would be used in policy. Contandriopoulos and colleagues (2010) concluded 
that the external validity, that is the generalisability or local applicability, and 
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perceived alignment with existing knowledge, was awarded far greater weight than 
internal validity and scientific rigour when considering which information was likely 
to be used in policy making. This is an interesting finding, because it recognises that 
policy makers may think differently from public health researchers in how they 
approach evidence use. These various aspects of timeliness and relevance are 
sometimes referred to as ‘salience’ by some authors (for example, Cash et al., 2002) 
and ‘generalisable’ or ‘context-based’ decision making by others (for example, 
Dobrow et al., 2004) but in general refer to the local applicability of the evidence at 
that particular point in time of evidence consideration and policy decision making. 
 
Much of the ‘knowledge transfer’ literature also discusses the role of a perceived 
crisis in shaping the policy process, and the timing of policy decisions. Court and 
Young (2003) and Jones and colleagues (2009) argue that in times of crisis, ‘policy 
windows’ open, in which policy makers are more open to the uptake of knowledge, 
especially if it offers them specific solutions to their problems. Jones and colleagues 
(2009) examined the policy opportunities in post-conflict states, and noted that the 
knowledge gap created a ‘blank state’ in policy making which policy makers were 
often keen to fill with ‘problem-solving’ research, although they acknowledged that 
this approach may end up prioritising short-term gains at the expense of long-term 
goals.  
 
Analysing what influences the use of evidence in policy making also requires 
consideration of how issues rise to the top to become subjects of policy action. The 
importance of agenda setting and prioritisation was noted by Murphy and Fafard 
(2012), who discussed that unless something was considered an issue of importance, 
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there was little movement to make it a priority. This was also reflected in 
Contandriopoulos and colleagues’ (2010) finding that where there was low 
agreement among actors around the problem definition, the issue was more 
politicised, with subsequent implications for evidence use i.e. high politicisation was 
seen to drive the ‘political’ uses of evidence mentioned earlier, whereas in contexts 
of low politicisation (high agreement about the policy issue), it was found that there 
was more likely to be neutral debate.  
 
The seemingly implied inverse relationship between politicisation and evidence use 
in the ‘knowledge transfer’ literature can be contrasted with the political science 
literature which tends, in comparison, to conceptualise policy decisions as choices 
between competing sets of outcomes that require consideration of multiple social 
values, and not just purely as judgements based on evidence alone (Parkhurst, 2017, 
Cairney, 2015). Parkhurst (2017) and Cairney (2015) explain that in political 
science, politicisation is not seen as a problem that impedes effective or successful 
knowledge transfer. Rather it is recognised that politicisation is part of a bigger 
series of considerations. Similar to best practice described in the public health 
literature, they suggest that evidence may need to be systematically and rigorously 
reviewed according to the standards of the scientific community, but evidence is not 
considered to be the sole criteria in determining the social desirability of a policy 
outcome (Parkhurst, 2017, Cairney, 2015).  
 
Political values, which can change over time and across contexts, affect not just the 
politicisation and perception of a policy issue, but also the politicisation and 
perception of the evidence used to answer the policy question. For example, RCTs 
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and the ‘hierarchy of evidence’ that developed out of the evidence-based medicine 
movement, are, rightly or wrongly, often seen by the public health community to 
provide guidelines for the effective use of evidence in policy (see Chapter 1). Barnes 
and Parkhurst (2014) explain that simply appealing to rigorous evidence (typically in 
the form of RCTs) to guide policy is a de facto political position, because it biases 
policy decisions to align with those issues conducive to RCT design, and away from 
complex social issues which are harder to evaluate with such methods.  
 
While Parkhurst (2017), and others (Parkhurst and Abeysinghe, 2016, Petticrew and 
Roberts, 2003, Cartwright and Hardie, 2012), have noted the limitations of 
hierarchies of evidence in terms of policy usefulness, some say there still needs to be 
critical reflection of where evidence hierarchies can be useful, and what ‘good 
evidence for policy’ would have to look like if single hierarchies do not meet 
evidence use needs for policy making (Parkhurst, 2017, Berridge and Stanton, 1999). 
Parkhurst (2017), based on the work of Cash and colleagues (2003), suggests using 
the concept of policy ‘appropriateness’. Rather than promoting one hierarchy 
relevant to a single consideration, Parkhurst (2017) defines appropriate evidence as 
that collection of high quality evidence which addresses multiple relevant political 
concerns, which is created to best serve policy needs, and which is applicable in the 
local context. He defines high quality evidence as that which is applied 
systematically, inclusively, and with integrity to scientific principles, as well as 
using methodological criteria relevant to the data type (clinical interventions 
evaluated through RCTs for example). In other words, appropriate evidence is 
evidence that is technically valid and credible, in addition to being politically 
relevant, and locally applicable. 
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Regardless of where they might eventually fall in the hierarchy of evidence and its 
associated projections of technical validity and credibility, Barnes and Parkhurst 
(2014) also note that bodies of evidence are not developed in a vacuum, and that 
actors will spend considerable resources to generate bodies of evidence in areas of 
interest to them. Calling for policy to follow established bodies of evidence serves a 
political position which in turn affects the context, as it aligns policy decisions with 
those issues that funders have decided to fund and researchers have decided (or are 
forced as a result of funding availability) to research.  
 
Related to this point, and as part of her exploration of chameleonic ideas, Smith 
(2013, ch. 6) found that academics framed their research proposals to funding 
councils based on what they felt funders ‘wanted to hear’, which was seen to limit 
the potential for critical or challenging research, in the case of health inequalities 
research. In addition, policy-makers’ own institutional hierarchies, for example 
between junior and senior civil servants and their ministers, impacted on the journey 
that research evidence took in both her case studies (health inequalities and tobacco 
control). Smith (2013) suggests that the success of chameleonic ideas lies in being 
able to negotiate these expectations and simultaneously appeal to, yet also challenge, 
existing policy ideas. However, a potential downfall, Smith (2013) explains, is that 
the path of chameleonic ideas is far more unpredictable and risky, and can therefore 
end up having unintended negative consequences, such as a loss of credibility 
depending on how one’s funding source(s) is seen to influence research findings.  
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One of the four key lessons that Smith (2013) offers through the comparisons of both 
her case studies, and within her ideas-typology mentioned earlier in this chapter, is 
that politics is “a central component of public health” and shouldn’t been seen as a 
barrier to the use of research in policy (Smith, 2013, p.216). Smith (2013) suggests 
that the political nature of evidence, and its influence on evidence use, is just one 
demonstration of the complexities of the two-way interactive relationship between 
research and policy.  
 
It would appear that it isn’t just the perceived credibility of the research, and the 
potential political factors that help shape it, that can influence evidence use (Court 
and Young, 2003, Cash et al., 2003, Nutley et al., 2007, Parkhurst, 2017), but the 
perceived credibility of the actors, through individual behavior and institutional 
processes, which are inherently political themselves, although not always explicitly 
so, that may play an influencing role in how evidence is used as well (Smith, 2013, 
Nutley et al., 2007, Parkhurst, 2017, Cash et al., 2003).  
 
2.4 Managing the political process of policy making  
 
Other scholars of evidence use have also drawn attention to the shortcomings of 
traditional ‘knowledge transfer’ approaches to improving the use of evidence, that 
have a tendency to gloss over political considerations from policy decision making 
(Cairney, 2015, Oliver et al., 2014b, Liverani et al., 2013). In incorporating theories 
from policy studies in their explanations of health policy processes, they argue that 
the public health community must consider the non-linear relationship between input 
(e.g. evidence) and output (e.g. policy decisions) by depicting policy making as a 
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nuanced craft process, which can face many challenges, not just simple notions of 
barriers and facilitators (Cairney, 2015, Oliver et al., 2014b, Parkhurst, 2017, Smith, 
2013).  
 
In his book, The Politics of Evidence-Based Policymaking, Cairney (2015), using the 
case studies of tobacco control and climate change adaption, identifies practical 
consequences and advice for researchers trying to maximise the use of scientific 
evidence. He illustrates how policy makers cannot consider all evidence relevant to 
policy problems (known as ‘bounded rationality’), but instead use two ‘shortcuts’: 
‘rational’ ways to gather enough evidence, and what seems like ‘irrational’ decision 
making, which draws on emotions, beliefs, and habits (see Cairney, 2015, ch. 2). 
Cairney (2015) goes on to describe how most scientists focus on the rational 
approach to evidence use, by identifying uncertainty when policy makers have 
incomplete evidence, and trying to solve that uncertainty by improving the supply of 
information, which unsurprisingly, according to his policy theory arguments, then 
tends to have little impact on policy making decisions. This is because policy 
making, he explains, is both rational and irrational; it takes place within a complex 
policy environment (or context), that needs to be better understood and actively 
engaged with, and not in a vacuum where scientific evidence alone matters over 
other considerations (Cairney, 2015). 
 
Cairney (2015) advises that perhaps a better strategy for scientists, given policy 
makers tend to use evidence in a limited way before making major decisions, is to 
employ some level of engagement with politics and advocacy in order to be more 
persuasive, such as by forming coalitions with like-minded actors, exploiting 
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windows of opportunity when policy solutions are feasible, and accompanying 
evidence with, for example, simple stories to appeal to the emotional or ideological 
biases of policy makers – all of which involve framing issues in a way that provides 
relative competitive advantage in a world of increasingly limited attention spans (see 
Cairney, 2015, ch. 5). Cairney suggests that scientists basically have a choice: (a) to 
produce information and accept it will have a limited impact, but still maintain their 
professional ideals of objectivity; or his offered solution, (b) to go beyond their 
comfort zone to increase evidence impact ‘in the real world’ (versus an idealised 
world where scientists often bemoan politics as getting in the way of ‘evidence-
based policy making’), by playing ‘the rules of the game’ by using advocacy, which 
will come at the expense of objectivity (Cairney, 2015).  
 
Cairney is not alone in his encouragement of researcher advocacy and engagement 
with the political process of policy making. Chapmam (2001) and colleagues 
(Chapman and Wakefield, 2001, Haynes et al., 2011) use decades of advocacy 
experience on public health issues such as tobacco control in Australia to reflect on 
the important roles and challenges of advocacy in public health, although most of 
their cases involve researcher engagement with the media and the public as the 
means to engage with policy makers to advance their issue agendas. In a primer-
focused article on using advocacy in public health, Chapman (2004) further iterates 
the strategic use of news media to advance public health policy initiatives, although 
he suggests first seeing if a ‘win-win’ outcome can be ‘engineered’ with policy 
makers first, before influencing them via the constituents they are accountable to.  
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Freudenberg (2005) too uses the example of tobacco control activists to promote 
advocacy as a public health tool to counter the ‘science and politics of disease 
promotion’, but expands on his examples to include other types of ‘disease 
promoting’ corporations besides tobacco companies, such as environmental activists 
targeting the automobile industry regarding pollution, and consumer activists 
targeting the food industry for its contributions to obesity and diabetes (see also 
Freudenberg et al., 2011). However, in the cases presented by Chapman and 
Freudenberg and their respective colleagues, the researchers/advocates were working 
in the face of some form of opposition (namely, the tobacco, automobile, and food 
industries), rather than for the same public health goals, which makes the lessons 
they provide context-specific and not necessarily transferable for researchers 
presenting findings to government or global health evidence advisory committees for 
example, where one can assume they ultimately share the same common objective, 
to preserve and promote health.  
 
In any case, the call for increased engagement with the media to advocate for a range 
of public health policy issues is not new (Boaz and Gough, 2016), although it 
appears there has also been a concurrent debate about how appropriate overt 
advocacy is (Lackey, 2007, Scott et al., 2007, Smith and Stewart, 2017, Cruz and 
Walt, 2013), regardless of media engagement. For example, Lackey explains that in 
his opinion, it is completely inappropriate “to let our [researcher] personal policy 
preferences colour our science” (Lackey, 2007, p. 12), whereas Scott and colleagues 
(2007) and Cruz and Walt (2013) present a more nuanced view, reflecting on the 
existing tension between science and advocacy, and how perhaps some form of 
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‘contribution’ to policy debates may be appropriate depending on the political 
environment.  
 
Most recently, Smith and Stewart (2017) present findings from a literature review on 
public health advocacy (which also captures some of examples highlighted above, 
among others), which was supplemented with qualitative data in the form of 
interviews and focus group discussions. They present the current state of the debate 
as a complex “continuum between ‘ivory tower’ academia and fully fledged (often 
self-identified) advocacy and activism, in which the role of research is secondary to 
the advocacy aims” (Smith and Stewart, 2017, p. 42), within which lies overlapping 
activities for the dissemination of findings, knowledge exchange, work to support 
evidence-based policy, and evidence-informed advocacy. Smith and Stewart (2017) 
suggest that some of the tension and conflict regarding public health advocacy may 
be due to two deeply contrasting conceptualisations within the public health 
community, where advocacy is either seen as a ‘selling’ strategy, as opposed to 
being more ‘facilitational’ (particularly in the context of community groups, as 
described in the original paper by Carlisle, 2000), which was relatively more 
desirable and acceptable, perhaps because it doesn’t necessarily run counter to what 
is viewed within the public health community as being good personal and 
professional practice.  
 
What much of the literature on public health advocacy has in common with the 
literature that incorporates elements from policy studies is that they both emphasise 
that the ‘real world’ of policy making is a less ordered and more unpredictable 
environment than the commonly used visual of a perfectly circular policy cycle 
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might suggest. It has multiple actors, within multiple organisations, influencing 
policy at multiple levels, and through multiple ways. In order to help successfully 
navigate this complexity, Cairney (2015) and others (Boaz et al., 2008, Boaz and 
Hayden, 2002, Ferlie et al., 2011) highlight the value of developing networks 
between actors, which sometimes makes them difficult to access if they are close-
knit to begin with, and well as the tendency for certain beliefs – what Smith (2013) 
terms as institutionalised ideas – to be commonly held and expressed within policy 
discussions within groups, which makes major policy changes by policy makers (and 
the ability of scientists to influence such change) perhaps difficult to accomplish, but 
in their eyes still worthy of pursuit. 
 
In a multidisciplinary special collection in Palgrave Communications, titled “The 
politics of evidence-based policy making: maximising the use of evidence in policy”, 
led and edited by Cairney (2017), the practical lessons from two commissioned 
articles stand out as being particularly helpful to public health practitioners. Taking 
lessons from psychology and policy studies to produce a three-step strategy on 
communicating effectively with policy makers, Cairney and Kwiatkowski (2017) 
advise: (a) against bombarding policy makers with too much evidence. They explain 
that people in general have too much information to process, and so they often use 
heuristics to filter information in order to make decisions quickly; (b) that timing is 
everything, as it matters during key individuals’ patterns of thinking and the 
alignment of conditions in political systems; and finally, (c) to engage with real 
world policy making rather than waiting for a ‘rational’ and orderly process to 
appear. In fact, Cairney and Kwiatkowski (2017) advise that to present evidence 
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during the romanticised ‘policy cycle’ is misguided, and that without establishing 
legitimacy and building trust it may even be counterproductive.  
 
In the second article within the same special issue, one by Oliver and Pearce (2017), 
they also offer three key lessons, but for policy practitioners, that have been learned 
from evidence-based medicine instead of psychology. They suggest that those 
looking to improve evidence-based policy: (a) be more transparent about the 
processes and structures used to find and use evidence; (b) consider how to balance 
evidence and other interests in assembling the ‘evidence jigsaw’; and (c) and this is a 
lesson they suggest for those in evidence-based medicine too – that understanding 
power is vital, particularly how it shapes how knowledge is produced and used 
(Oliver and Pearce, 2017).  
 
Also continuing in the same vein of embracing, versus denying or blocking, the 
politics of evidence, and attempting to move the debates on improving evidence use 
forward, albeit moving away from the more advocacy-oriented approach proposed 
by Cairney (2015), is Parkhurst (2017) with his book The Politics of Evidence: From 
Evidence-based Policy to the Good Governance of Evidence.  
 
Like with previous scholars reviewed in this chapter, in particular Cairney (2015) 
and Smith (2013), Parkhurst (2017) makes the assertion that politics is an intrinsic 
part of the policy process, which will inevitably involve tradeoffs, and that evidence 
rarely truly ‘speaks for itself’ (Parkhurst, 2017, ch. 1). However, due to its nature 
and its emphasis on measurement, scientific health evidence “can help identify who 
will benefit from different choices or how much different benefits will accrue to 
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different groups” (Parkhurst, 2017, p. 9), which makes reviews of technical evidence 
useful for addressing ‘who’ and ‘how’ questions, while being less useful at 
addressing whether the policy decision is the right choice to make to begin with 
(Parkhurst, 2017). 
 
Of particular relevance to my own research question, Parkhurst notes that “in the 
evidence based policy world, almost no attention has been paid to the legitimacy of 
the process through which evidence is applied” (Parkhurst, 2017, p. 30). He argues 
that “from a policy studies perspective, the process by which public policy decisions 
are made and social outcomes are achieved must be accepted as legitimate by the 
population” (Parkhurst, 2017, p. 30). The concern so far, he and others (Oliver et al., 
2014a, Oliver et al., 2014b) argue, has been over competing political or cultural 
considerations being classified as ‘barriers’ to be overcome. Parkhurst (2017) argues 
that democratic debate is not a barrier, but rather is necessary, and reflects the 
understanding that the process by which decisions are made matters to ensure that 
the final policy decisions will be respected. He suggests that an alternative approach 
to the heavy focus on individuals as the driving force to improving evidence use in 
policy making, is to focus on the institutionalisation of changes that serve to improve 
evidence use (that is, improving the ‘systems of evidence advice’ mentioned in the 
last chapter).  
 
What the authors referenced in this section emphasise is that the process of policy 
making matters too, and that this process is inherently political, which doesn’t 
preclude it from also being fair and inclusive of multiple considerations and values, 
via better governance systems for example. These systems may affect how evidence 
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and the policy development process is perceived by audiences and actors within the 
process, which may in turn influence how evidence is used in those processes. For 
example, Parkhurst (2017) suggests building toward a comprehensive framework 
that aims to promote the good governance of appropriate evidence within policy 
decision making processes through ‘good evidence for policy’ and the ‘good use of 
evidence for policy’ (Parkhurst, 2017, p. 163).  
 
Good governance includes taking multiple steps to create, select, and interpret 
evidence in the service of good policy making, and principles such as the use of 
appropriate evidence, accountability in evidence use, transparency, and accepting 
and allowing contestability of evidence, to ensure that there is room for sufficient 
debate (Parkhurst, 2017, p. 160). These principles reflect different facets of 
legitimacy, which Cash and colleagues refer to as “whether an actor perceives the 
process in a system as unbiased and meeting standards of political and procedural 
fairness….based on who participated and who did not, the processes for making 
those [policy] choices, and how information is produced, vetted, and disseminated” 
(Cash et al., 2002, p.5).  
 
The reason these legitimacy-enhancing principles are needed, Parkhurst (2017) 
explains in his book’s chapters 3-5, is in order for ‘good evidence’ and the ‘good use 
of evidence’ to overcome two critical biases in the creation, selection, and 
interpretation of evidence: technical bias, in which evidence is misused or 
manipulated in various ways producing suboptimal social outcomes, and issue bias, 
in which appeals to evidence serve to obscure key social values towards issues that 
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have or are conducive to measurement; both forms of which can be affected by 
unintentional cognitive biases, or by more intentional political choices. 
 
2.5 Reflective summary and analytical framework 
 
This exploration of recent and select existing reviews and theoretical perspectives, 
together with the introduction in Chapter 1, has highlighted some of the tensions 
between the technocratic desire to promote expert knowledge and evidence use, and 
the political realities of policy making. While the embrace of evidence-based policy, 
growing from its origins in evidence-based medicine, through to recent and repeated 
attempts to distil lessons for ‘what works’, has been valuable for evidence use in 
public health policy making in order to improve public health outcomes and better 
serve society, it is clear that it also has its shortcomings, and much of the recent 
literature in the field of evidence use vocally identifies this.  
 
As noted by Smith (2013), the evidence-based policy movement has tended towards 
the notion that more use of certain types of evidence equates to better use. However, 
Parkhurst (2017) and others (Cairney, 2015, Oliver et al., 2014b) have pointed out 
that prioritising technical effectiveness at the expense of competing valid social 
concerns, depoliticises policy debates that need to reflect those concerns as part of 
the policy process, and that a more explicit recognition of the nature of politics is 
needed in future work to promote evidence use in policy, recognising that social 
goals can and should be contested, given our naturally biased uses of evidence.  
 
Parkhurst (2017) also argues that a shift is needed to engage with questions of what 
67 
 
improved evidence use might look like by asking explicitly normative questions 
about how we might judge ‘good evidence’ in terms of policy appropriateness, and 
the ‘good use of evidence’ from the perspective of the decision making process. 
These two elements are an integral part of ‘systems’ of evidence use – what Cash 
and colleagues (2003) alternatively refer to as ‘knowledge systems’ – and enabling 
reflections on how to improve these evidence advisory systems over time, rather than 
simply focusing on uptake of single pieces of research, could serve as an alternative 
way to thinking about how to improve evidence use. 
 
However, as outlined in the introduction to this thesis (see previous chapter), and as 
evidenced within the key texts reviewed for this chapter, much of the evidence use 
literature tend to be based on systematic reviews of ‘what works’, and many case 
studies tend to be at the country level and government focused; there are few 
empirical case studies that look specifically at, and provide lessons for, what good 
evidence and the good use of evidence mean to those actors involved in public health 
policy making processes, particularly within global institutions, and their specific 
evidence advisory systems. Of note, few studies examine the processes and 
perceptions of global health evidence advisory bodies, within the context of their 
broader environment, and interactions with other actors within their institutional 
networks. 
 
Therefore, exploring the influences on the use of evidence in policy making within a 
global health evidence advisory body (MPAC), within a global health policy 
institution (WHO), and in the context of a particular case study (the development of 
global malaria intermittent preventive treatment policies by WHO-GMP) that I had 
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insider knowledge of and access to, might be useful to help understand the complex 
ways in which evidence and policy interact with each other, and how these factors 
intentionally and unintentionally influence policy outcomes for a global health 
priority (malaria). The results will hopefully contribute to a growing body of 
literature on evidence use, and on evidence advisory bodies in global public health, 
as well as the various types of factors that influence them.  In particular, I’d like to 
explore the questions and understandings of what constitutes ‘good evidence’ and 
‘good use of evidence’ in the complex processes around gathering and interpreting 
the evidence for IPTi and SMC, and to understand and draw lessons from the 
attempts by different sets of actors to introduce and use evidence in both policy 
development processes, in addition to the implications and unintended consequences 
of those efforts. A more holistic understanding of what influences the use of 
evidence in policy making may help shed more light on the complexity of evidence 
use, and may help, in multidimensional ways, to increase and improve evidence use, 
which is the goal of many public health organisations, including the WHO.    
 
Although there are clearly several frameworks to drawn on based on the existing 
reviews and theoretical perspectives summarised within this chapter, I found that the 
framework that best helped classify and capture features of evidence (what is good 
evidence) and aspects of the political process of policy making (what is good use of 
evidence), based on my review of the literature (for example, elements of work by 
Cairney, 2015, Contandriopoulos et al., 2010, Cruz and Walt, 2013, Lin and Gibson, 
2003, Nutley et al., 2007, Oliver et al., 2014a, Parkhurst, 2017, Smith, 2013, among 
others), while still leaving room for what these concepts might mean to the actors in 
my particular context, was the work by Cash and colleagues (2003) referenced 
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throughout this chapter. They analysed environmental sustainability across a range 
of countries and found that the effectiveness of science to inform policy (that was 
acceptable to the public, versus within evidence advisory bodies in my case) rested 
on three key factors: (a) credibility, which refers to the scientific adequacy of the 
evidence; (b) salience, which refers to the relevance of the science to the needs of 
decision-makers; and (c) legitimacy, which refers to the perception that the evidence 
generation and use has been unbiased and fair in its treatment of divergent 
stakeholder views and interests. These factors, when viewed more broadly, aren’t 
mutually exclusive, and no one factor could be considered more important than the 
other, even though the public health literature appears to implicitly place greater 
weight on measures of evidence credibility or forms of ‘good evidence’. 
  
The multiple concepts of credibility, salience, and legitimacy, reflecting ‘good 
evidence’ and ‘good use of evidence’ are captured in the adapted framework 
presented in Table 1 (see next page), which show the possible factors that may shape 
evidence use in IPTi and SMC policy development at WHO-GMP, based on some of 
the relevant literature summarised in this and the preceding introductory chapter. The 
concepts shown both emerged from my data, as well as helped structure my literature 
review and the analysis of my findings, and the subsequent order in which they are 
presented in my results chapters, although they aren’t an exact mapping, given that 
some of the terms have multiple definitions and are open to interpretation. For 
example, some elements of salience could be interpreted as features of both 
appropriate evidence, as well as legitimate processes, both of which may have a role 
to play in making the outcomes of evidence use within policy development 
acceptable to participant actors.   
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Table 1. Analytical framework – factors that may shape evidence use in IPT policy development at the WHO-GMP (adapted from Cash 
et al., 2003) 
Select factors that may influence the use of evidence in public health 
policy development, based on a targeted review of the literature 
(Chapters 1 and 2) 
Factors affecting 
evidence use      
(Cash et al., 2003)  
Factors affecting IPT 
evidence use, based on 
thematic analysis of data 
Location of IPT ‘evidence 
use for policy development’ 
analysis within this thesis 
RCTs when applicable (e.g. Cartwright and Hardie, 2012, Petticrew and 
Roberts, 2003)  
Credibility 
Hierarchy of evidence 
Features of 
evidence 
(Chapter 5) 
 
Evidence that is high quality, technically valid, following principles of good 
scientific practice (e.g. Nutley et al., 2007, Parkhurst, 2017) 
Efficacy, repeatability, 
resistance, safety, rebound  
Technical rationality (Lin and Gibson, 2003) that evidence should be taken 
up (e.g. Court and Young, 2003, Smith, 2013) Strength and quality 
Politically relevant and locally applicable evidence (e.g. Parkhurst, 2017) 
Salience 
Local applicability 
Context-based evidence (Dobrow et al., 2004) provided and presented in 
useable ways (e.g. Contandriopoulos et al., 2010, Court and Young, 2003, 
Mitton et al., 2007, Nutley et al., 2007) 
Contextual relevance 
External validity/generalisability (e.g. Contandriopoulos et al., 2010) Generalisability 
Policy windows/opportune timing (e.g. Cairney and Kwiatkowski, 2017, 
Court and Young, 2003, Jones, 2009) Timing 
Process of 
policy 
development 
(Chapter 6) 
Framing policy relevance via active advocacy (e.g. Cairney, 2015) Framing 
Contestation of evidence (e.g. Contandriopoulos et al., 2010) 
Legitimacy 
Consensus, or lack thereof 
 
Politicisation of issue (e.g. Contandriopoulos et al., 2010) 
Democratic debate that is seen as fair and inclusive (e.g. Parkhurst, 2017) Membership/representation 
Advocacy/ boundary transgression (e.g. Cruz and Walt, 2013, Smith, 2013) 
Expectation and framing Political rationality (Lin and Gibson, 2003) where power is exercised and 
decisions made in transparent and accountable ways (e.g. Parkhurst, 2017) 
Credible, trusted individuals and organisations (e.g. Nutley et al., 2007) not 
influenced by funding sources (e.g. Smith, 2013) Conflicting agendas 
Slowly-built trust over time (e.g. Cairney and Kwiatkowski, 2017) based on 
transparency (e.g. Oliver and Pearce, 2017) 
Transparency and good, 
trustful relations 
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In this study I explore whether these possible factors relating to ‘credibility’, 
‘salience’, and ‘legitimacy’, outlined in the framework above – and the various ways 
these might be perceived by the relevant actors within the context of my case study – 
also apply within WHO evidence advisory bodies for global malaria policy. These 
broad concepts allowed exploration of my study findings to consider how similarities 
and differences might be seen between the two policy processes studied, IPTi and 
SMC, in terms of features of the evidence base, its relevance to needs, and the 
process by which the evidence was used in the policy development for IPTi and 
SMC policy recommendations by WHO-GMP.  
 
Differences between the two policy development processes affecting ‘credibility’ 
and ‘salience’ are explored in Chapter 5, titled “The features of the evidence used to 
form global malaria intermittent preventive treatment policy”. Differences between 
the two policy development processes affecting ‘legitimacy’ are explored in Chapter 
6, titled “The process of forming global malaria intermittent preventive treatment 
policy”. First, I discuss my methods (Chapter 3), and the global malaria context and 
the case of intermittent preventive treatment (Chapter 4), which as this chapter has 
identified, provides the necessary contextual foundation for better understanding 
evidence use in policy development in this particular case.  
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Chapter 3. Methods 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines my thesis research methods – specifically, my approach, the 
case selection, method of data collection, and analysis – and reflects on the 
implications of my chosen approaches for the findings that follow in my research 
results chapters. 
 
As noted earlier, this study explores the use of evidence in global malaria policy 
development, with a focus on the WHO-GMP and its evidence advisory bodies. In 
particular, I aim to: 
1. Explore the factors that influenced the consideration of particular evidence at 
WHO-GMP in the case of IPTi and SMC. 
2. Examine how factors associated with the policy process influenced eventual 
policy outcomes at WHO-GMP in the case of IPTi and SMC. 
 
Focusing on one global policy study setting allowed me to explore what was 
considered ‘good evidence’ and ‘good use of evidence’, and why, in this particular 
case, and from the perspective of the actors involved.  
 
3.2 Approach to the DrPH and case study 
 
A case study was judged to be the most appropriate design choice for my needs 
because this study was complex with multiple dimensions to explore that were 
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context-specific, and because of the particular interest in why and how certain 
factors influence evidence use in policy development (Yin, 2009, Green and 
Thorogood, 2014, Walt et al., 2008).  
 
Using case studies as a research method is well established in policy and political 
science, including in health and social care policy research (Exworthy et al., 2011). It 
is considered be particularly appropriate for researching processes, such as policy 
processes (George and Bennett, 2005), as long as it is clear what the case study is ‘a 
case of’, and how it fits within the wider body of knowledge (Ragin and Becker, 
1992), in addition to its real-life context (Yin, 2009). This particular thesis is a case 
study of WHO-GMP evidence advisory processes, specifically intermittent 
preventive treatment global malaria policy development, over a certain period, 
primarily 2006 to 2012. Because there were two intermittent preventive treatment 
evidence advisory processes that took place within this time period, and case study 
context (WHO global malaria policy development), that could be compared and 
contrasted to develop a deeper understanding of the complexity of evidence use for 
policy development, a single case study was judged to be sufficient for the purpose 
of my research aims. 
 
The use of case study research as a form of study design does also have its criticisms 
however, for example around its difficulty in establishing causality and/or 
generalisability. Yin (2009) suggests that the challenge of establishing causality is 
seen by some as relating to particular types of case studies, namely those that are 
explanatory, rather than exploratory, of a certain phenomenon (Yin, 2009). 
Similarly, Ragin (1999) argues that exploratory case-oriented research compared to 
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more explanatory variable-oriented research have different objectives, with case 
study research being geared towards analysing the complexity of causal 
relationships, whereas variable-oriented research is more suitable for testing 
hypotheses about causal relationships. Instead of measuring effects and generating 
insights independent from context, case studies help us to understand the 
mechanisms that cause these effects and are often highly dependent on context 
(Gerring, 2004, Flyvbjerg, 2006). In addition, ‘cases’ are usually not randomly 
sampled, but are chosen for their significance and relevance to the theory or topic 
they aim to explore (Ragin, 1999). In fact, Ragin (1999) argues that cases should 
always be chosen based on their relevance to the study, and that it is the researcher’s 
task to make sense of these cases by identifying and interpreting their 
commonalities. Therefore, case study research can be viewed as usually being 
interpretative, as it relies on the researcher’s ability to make sense of the case. 
 
In my case, my role as a malaria research manager at LSHTM, as well as a policy 
professional at WHO-GMP, informed both my approach and study design. At the 
time of developing my research question, and throughout the data collection and 
analyses, I was employed as a consultant by WHO-GMP to provide management 
support for the Malaria Policy Advisory Committee (MPAC), the principal evidence 
advisory body that developed one of the WHO policies I selected as part of my case 
study. My own position in the policy process and the subsequent insights gained and 
experienced, led me to undertake an interpretive and partially ethnographic 
‘observer-participant’ approach that would be considered appropriate for this study 
based on previous studies that have also sought to understand policy development 
‘from the inside’ of a policy-informing institution or government department.  
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For example, most recently, in Maybin’s (2016) study on the production of health 
policy within the UK Department of Health, she describes her ethnographic approach 
as being especially well-placed to capture ‘practice’ in all its tacit complexity, as she 
was present, in context, and in real-time, to observe, engage, reflect, and interpret 
what was happening around her. In a separate study by Antrobus and Kitson (1999), 
they too undertook an ethnographic approach, as leaders within the Royal College of 
Nursing, to explore the influence of nursing leadership on health policy and nursing 
practice, and the socio-political factors that impact it, within a particular cultural 
(UK) context. An ethnographic approach enabled them to explore the underlying 
social construction of nurse leadership by their peers, and the multiple meanings 
attached to that construction. This ‘immersive’ aspect of gathering insights into 
beliefs and practices otherwise normally ‘hidden’ from public gaze is one of the key 
features of ethnography, which has been acknowledged as being a critically useful, 
although sometimes underutilised, methodology in health research (Savage, 2000, 
Reeves et al., 2008). 
 
Interpretive research is by definition context-specific, stressing the situatedness of 
the subject or case of interest at a particular place and time, involving a particular set 
of actors, interactions, and relationships (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012), in this 
case in order to study the practice of evidence use to inform policy development 
within WHO-GMP and its evidence advisory bodies. As one of the actors within the 
context of my study, taking this approach meant constantly interpreting and 
reflecting between my own background knowledge, my position, the data I was 
collecting, and how they related to the concepts found in the literature I reviewed. 
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My initial worry was that I would identify too closely with the interviewees and/or 
context, and not apply enough of a critical lens to the data. However, I came to 
realise over the course of my study, as my understanding and appreciation of 
qualitative research and the case developed, was that in actuality, what I was really 
hoping to accomplish and contribute to the literature was explanations of evidence 
use according to the accounts of those individuals involved in the process, which is 
the essence of interpretive research (Yanow, 2015).  
 
Typically in studies that critically examine the inner workings of an organisation, 
there is necessary concern about how freely individuals can or will speak about their 
work (Delaney, 1960). Whilst access to, and openness of, key informants can be an 
issue in organisational studies (Delaney, 1960), being an ‘insider’ helped identify 
participants whose participation in the policy process wasn’t necessarily visible to 
‘outsiders’, and facilitated a more open discussion during the interviews.  
 
Many of my key informants, both researchers and policy makers, expressed their 
eagerness to reflect about their experience of evidence use, because as someone who 
straddled roles at both LSHTM and WHO, I was seen to at least appreciate, if not 
empathise, with their point of view. In my experience, the rapport built around the 
shared ‘inside’ experience of malaria research (or malaria policy work, depending on 
whom I was speaking to) helped mitigate some of the barriers some key informants 
might have otherwise felt in talking about their work. In short, my insider role 
helped overcome some of the main challenges often prescribed to interviewing 
‘elites’, namely gaining access, acquiring trust, and establishing rapport (Harvey, 
2011, Mikecz, 2012, Welch et al., 2002). In addition to facilitating access to both key 
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informants and otherwise hard-to-observe events such as closed session policy 
discussion meetings, being an ‘insider’ also helped aid my analysis, because I could 
contextualise my findings, which, as later chapters will hopefully illustrate, helped in 
my understanding of the nuanced ways in which evidence and policy development 
processes interacted in this case. 
 
Being an insider did also have its challenges; I soon became more aware of the 
differences in disciplinary background, power, gender, and culture between myself 
and some of the key informants/elites I was interviewing (Lancaster, 2017, Welch et 
al., 2002), which I worried might influence my style of interviewing and interacting 
with my colleagues, and/or bias my analysis. For example, I sometimes sensed that 
certain responses to certain questions may have been presented in a particular way 
because I was perceived to be aligned with certain researchers at LSHTM, or staff at 
WHO (depending on whom I was speaking to), or because I was seen to be relatively 
‘new’ to malaria (compared to some of my colleagues), or because I was undertaking 
a qualitative study (perceived by my clinically-oriented colleagues as being ‘soft’ 
and perhaps too open-ended, and therefore in need of some form of steering). I 
attempted to counteract this by trying to maintain my reflexivity during the course of 
my study. Which is to say, I made a conscious effort both during my interviews and 
when reflecting and analysing the data afterwards, to be self aware of my own 
position as an ‘observer-participant’ and the position of the person(s) I was 
observing or interviewing, and what we may and may not have had in common, 
taking care to ‘listen’ to what was being said and done, and not project what I may 
have been hoping to see, which is an acknowledged risk of ‘insider’ research in case 
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studies (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009, Unluer, 2012), but also viewed as being a 
manageable one (Brannick and Coghlan, 2007). 
 
In addition, I also became aware that some of the specific anecdotes and insights 
offered by these key informants/elites made them identifiable in what is a small 
community working on intermittent preventive treatment evidence and policy, which 
raised issues related to maintaining anonymity that are common in elite interviewing 
(Lancaster, 2017). It is the reason I strove to preserve at least the confidentiality of 
key informants, by presenting data in summary (see Data Collection and Ethics 
sections of this chapter).    
 
3.3 Case selection  
 
Case selection is considered crucial for case studies (Gerring, 2004) and was 
partially influenced by the goals of the DrPH programme at LSHTM, which is to 
equip its graduates with the experience to deal with the particular challenges of 
understanding and adapting scientific knowledge in order to achieve public health 
gains.  
 
Although there are many institutions where one could examine the challenges of 
evidence use in policy development, I focused on the influences on evidence use in 
policy making at the WHO for my case study for both pragmatic and strategic 
reasons. As mentioned previously, at the time of developing my study, I happened to 
be partly based at WHO, and I know that understanding and improving evidence use 
within WHO is of interest to many – both scholars, which include supporters as well 
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as critics of the WHO, as well as the WHO itself (D'Souza and Newman, 2012, 
Horton, 2006, Oxman et al., 2007, WHO, 2007b).  
 
Contemporary assessments of WHO, for example its handling of the 2014 Ebola 
crisis (Gates, 2015, Moon et al., 2015, Piot, 2014), have not always been kind. 
However, there are reasons to believe that the WHO can and should be influential 
given its long-standing mandated and valuable role to form evidence-based health 
policy in order to improve international public health (Lee, 2008, Murray and Lopez, 
1996, WHO, 2007b, Lee and Walt, 1992). Indeed, the few studies that have 
specifically examined evidence use for guideline development within the WHO in its 
normal work (versus in a global health emergency scenario) have urged the 
institution to improve its evidence use for policy development via more transparent, 
inclusive, systematic, and explicit processes for policy recommendation formulation 
(c.f. Burda et al., 2014, Oxman et al., 2007). However, by this they typically refer to 
better implementing the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development, 
and Evaluation (GRADE) approach to rating the certainty of evidence. Evidence use, 
and the factors that may influence it, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis, 
is more complex than implementing a standardised rating system for evidence 
suggests it might be. 
  
Although there were many disease and policy topic areas within the WHO to choose 
from, the influences on evidence use in malaria policy making at WHO-GMP 
presented a useful area for case study because of the dynamic state of global malaria 
control at the moment (Bradley, 1999, Hay et al., 2004, WHO, 2016). On one hand 
malaria continues to remain a major public health problem in many low and middle-
80 
 
income countries (LMICs), while at the same time many of these countries are 
witnessing impressive progress in the uptake of malaria control interventions, such 
as insecticide-treated mosquito nets, resulting in significant reductions of malaria-
related morbidity and mortality (WHO, 2016).  
 
As a result, there was and is a view among representatives of the global malaria 
community that malaria control, and in some cases elimination, has a critical window 
of opportunity for success before the tools at their disposal are no longer effective, or 
there is less funding interest either by governments or by donors to support them 
(RBM, 2015, WHO, 2015, Malaria Summit, 2018). This has led to increasing 
pressure on the global malaria policy setting process to keep pace with the volume of 
research and surveillance data being generated both through research efforts, and the 
massive implementation of malaria control interventions (D'Souza and Newman, 
2012).  
 
How the global malaria policy setting process/evidence advisory bodies within 
WHO-GMP, the WHO department that is the setting for this case, subsequently 
responded to, and interacted with, the evidence bases for two forms of intermittent 
preventive treatment (IPTi and SMC), amidst pressure to develop a policy 
recommendation, is the focus of this thesis. The reasons for why I focus on IPTi and 
SMC specifically were outlined in Chapter 1, and I provide more of the case 
background in the next chapter (Chapter 4). 
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3.4 Data collection 
 
My main method of data collection was interviews, although this was supplemented 
by the identification and review of documents from the IPTi Consortium, WHO-
GMP, and the BMGF, as well as my own observation and field notes from my work 
providing behind-the-scenes management support to MPAC, in order to help fill 
gaps, cross-check data, and establish the contextual timeline outlined in Chapter 4. 
That is to say, documents were used primarily to help construct and verify elements 
of the case study, but interviews were my main source of data for analysis. 
 
Interviews were grounded in the value of the key informant’s perspective. This form 
of interpretative data collection method offers understanding from the point of view 
of the participants in it (Green and Thorogood, 2014). In an interpretive study the 
idea of theory-free observation is sometimes problematised given that researchers, 
such as myself in this case, can never capture ‘reality’ exactly as it is, given they 
cannot eliminate the influence of particular interests, influences, and purposes 
(Smith, 2008). It is suggested that this is partially because interviews are products of 
social interaction and cannot be expected to establish ‘the truth’ (Silverman, 2006). 
In contrast to other types of data, such as survey data, interviews are likely to 
produce multiple narratives, which sometimes may complement or contradict each 
other, but together provide insights into evidence use and the policy process (Rapley, 
2004). 
 
My final sample included 29 key informants whom I interviewed in person during 
the span of a year between October 2014 and October 2015, primarily in London or 
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in Geneva. I selected key informants based on their specialist knowledge of the 
issues and processes being analysed. I began by identifying key individuals that 
would ensure a wide range of perspectives from those involved in the IPTi and/or 
SMC policy processes. They included: (a) staff from the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation (BMGF), who funded the IPTi and SMC studies, as well as the policy 
strengthening process that led to the creation of MPAC; (b) staff from the research 
institutions who conducted the IPTi and SMC studies, many of whom had ties to 
LSHTM, even if they no longer worked or studied there; (c) members of two of 
WHO-GMP’s evidence advisory bodies – the Chemotherapy Technical Expert 
Group (TEG) and the MPAC – who advised WHO-GMP on the IPTi and SMC 
policies; and (d) staff from WHO-GMP who were responsible for issuing the IPTi 
and SMC policies to relevant member states. 
 
A table summarising the roles of each key informant in either or both policy 
processes has been provided for reference (see Table 2). In several cases, there was 
sometimes a shift of roles over time; for example, some IPTi Consortium members 
later went on to work at WHO-GMP or on its evidence advisory bodies such as the 
Chemotherapy TEG or MPAC. However, I have not specified job titles or the 
timings of particular posts at particular institutions in order to protect anonymity, as 
the global malaria community is quite small. The main purpose of the following 
table is to demonstrate that the key informants were well placed to provide a range of 
perspectives on the evidence advisory processes for SMC compared to IPTi, and to 
provide the reader with some background about the roles of key informants for when 
they are quoted anonymously in the results chapters that follow. 
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Table 2. General summary of Key Informant roles and their involvement in the IPTi 
and/or SMC policy processes 
 
All of the informants I contacted were receptive to being interviewed and expressed 
interest and support for the processes I was trying to analyse and understand. As 
explained previously, it helped that I knew many of them personally, and where I 
didn’t, I was easily introduced. I made clear that I was not specifically evaluating the 
WHO, BMGF, or their own institutions, or IPTi and SMC as malaria control 
Interview 
number 
Interview 
date 
KI 
Code Role(s) 
Policy 
process 
  
dd.mm.yy 
 
Research WHO-GMP 
Evidence 
Advisory 
Body 
BMGF IPTi SMC 
1 14.10.14 22  x  x x x 
2 23.10.14 23    x x x 
3 27.10.14 24 x x   x x 
4 05.11.14 25 x     x 
5 06.11.14 26 x     x 
6 06.11.14 27 x     x 
7 26.11.14 28 x     x 
8 26.11.14 29 x  x  x x 
9 27.11.14 30 x     x 
10 28.11.14 32 x    x x 
11 09.12.14 33 x     x 
12 09.12.14 34 x  x   x 
13 11.12.14 35  x   x x 
14 11.12.14 36 x x x  x x 
15 12.12.14 39 x x x  x x 
16 16.01.15 40 x    x  
17 11.02.15 41 x x x  x x 
18 23.02.15 42  x   x x 
19 25.02.15 44 x  x  x  
20 26.02.15 45 x     x 
21 04.03.15 46  x x  x x 
22 05.03.15 48 x x x  x x 
23 16.03.15 49 x  x  x x 
24 19.03.15 50  x   x x 
25 29.04.15 51 x  x  x x 
26 02.05.15 53 x  x  x x 
27 05.05.15 54 x     x 
28 10.06.15 55 x  x  x x 
29 26.10.15 58    x x x 
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interventions, but rather exploring the policy development process itself, and 
hopefully contributing towards ways to improve it.  
 
Because many of my key informants were quite senior, and all were very busy, I had 
to be diligent in reconfirming their availability since many of my interviews were 
scheduled several months in advance. Because of how I had split my time between 
Geneva and London during the year of my data collection, in cases where I had to be 
rescheduled, I was able to respond to alternative interview openings at short notice. 
In addition, there were some opportunistic chances to meet and interview key 
informants at major malaria-related conferences and meetings in New Orleans, 
Oxford, and Philadelphia where we both happened to be in attendance.  
 
The interviews, which lasted on average for an hour, were all recorded using a digital 
sound recorder and transcribed shortly after, typically within two days. I took notes 
during interviews primarily to remind myself about questions or issues I would need 
to follow up on. I achieved saturation of data on the range of concepts explored with 
key informants using the topic guide (see Appendix 1). By saturation of data in this 
case I mean that in addition to my pre-identified themes and the themes that emerged 
over the course of my interviews (see Analytical Framework), no new themes and/or 
additional observations and reflections were shared by those I interviewed that 
hadn’t already been raised and discussed at length by my pool of key informants. 
 
The topic guide allowed me to structure the conversation to elicit data exploring the 
factors that influenced evidence use in the IPTi and SMC policy processes. The 
sequence of questions was broadly chronological, starting with the origins of the 
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policies, their experience of the evidence base and evidence review process, internal 
and external influencing factors, and the roles of the various actors involved. This 
sequencing of questions felt intuitive, providing a narrative with a beginning and an 
ending that all interviewees were likely to be familiar with. It also allowed for 
reflection on the use of the evidence and the role of policy setting processes towards 
the end of the interview. I did not find reason to significantly revise the topic guide 
after applying it in the first several interviews, but did adapt the follow-up questions 
and probes based on my key informant, and their responses to my questions, along 
with exploring any relevant case aspects that emerged from previous interviews with 
other informants.  
 
However, as with any qualitative research process, it could be argued that all 
accounts were partial in the sense that they reflected the insights of a particular 
individual, involved in a particular role, at a particular point in time. These point to 
the subjective nature of interview data, and the reality that interviewees had 
genuinely different views on aspects of evidence use for policy development, 
depending on their own role in the process.  
 
Given that several years had passed since the IPTi policy process in particular, there 
was potential for recall problems. For this reason, I focused mainly on SMC, the 
more recent policy process, mainly delving into IPTi policy process issues as a 
comparator. In either policy process, I asked for concrete examples and drilled down 
into issues during my follow-up questions. At times, it seemed that in using what 
they perceived as negative aspects of the IPTi policy process, interviewees were 
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better able to reflect and express what they viewed as more positive aspects of the 
SMC process in comparison. 
 
A number of interviewees noted that they could not remember some details, for 
example, the dates of certain evidence review meetings, or the exact wording of 
meeting conclusions, but these were details I was able to follow up on and cross-
check due to my access to the supplementary data mentioned previously. These data 
included published and unpublished documentary sources, including IPTi 
Consortium documents, official WHO policy documents for IPTi and SMC, 
evidence advisory body meeting reports for IPTi and SMC, and internal BMGF and 
WHO-GMP documents on IPTi and SMC. Observational notes documented during 
meetings and conferences I was present for between March 2011 and October 2015 
were also used for cross-checking and referencing against data arising from key 
informant interviews.  
 
3.5 Coding and analysis 
 
Using two policy processes for comparison within the case study setting of WHO-
GMP allowed for exploring the complexity of evidence use beyond a single policy 
process. I used NVivo 10 to help manage my data, and a combination of inductive 
(data-driven) and deductive (theory-driven) approaches during the coding process.  
 
For example, based on my initial literature review for my DrPH Review (upgrading 
document), I had broad categories from the literature that I used to help structure my 
analysis of the data. These included examining the actors involved (the perceived 
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values and implicit and explicit behaviour/processes of the individuals and 
institutions involved in IPT evidence generation and use); the context (the internal 
and external environments in which IPT actors operate); and evidence characteristics 
(features of the IPT evidence that were under consideration, and explanations of why 
they were important). However, reading and re-reading the data to generate initial 
codes led to the realisation that there were different issues and patterns emerging, 
which then led to an iterative process of going back to the literature to finalise the 
framework that most applied to my findings, which in turn helped shape and 
coalesce my eventual thesis literature review chapter, and the structure/sub-
categories of my two results chapters on features of evidence, and processes of use, 
in this case.   
 
The results were analysed thematically, relating to the emerging concepts of various 
forms of credibility, salience, and legitimacy, adapted from work by Cash and 
colleagues (2003) and my interpretation of the evidence use literature, but also 
influenced by repeated regular discussions over many years with Parkhurst (2017), 
one of my DrPH supervisors, whose own research interests also lie in both features 
of evidence, and processes of evidence use.  
 
There were no strict boundaries between data collection and analysis, and some 
themes began to emerge during the course of data collection. Likewise, it was 
possible to go back to the original data to contextualise the information by re-reading 
the reference document e.g. a meeting report, or transcript of a previous interview. 
As a result, it was possible to ask interviewees about case aspects that had emerged 
from previous interviews with other informants. This in turn helped with further 
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refining and reflecting on emerging themes following subsequent interviews with 
other informants. 
 
3.6 Ethics 
 
I received approval to conduct my thesis research from the Ethics Committee of 
LSHTM in October 2014, following my DrPH Review in September 2014 and prior 
to the start of my data collection. My research was also approved by the WHO-GMP 
Director. Legal approval by the WHO-GMP Director’s Office was enquired about 
but ultimately it was determined that it was not required as I was interviewing key 
informants in their personal capacity and not seeking formal statements of or about 
the WHO.  
  
Prior to being interviewed, all key informants received an information sheet and 
signed a consent form (see Appendix 2). As the sample is small and the context in 
which the key informants work is insular, many if not all of the key informants are 
known to one another, and so in writing the results chapters that follow, I have 
endeavoured to at least preserve confidentiality so that no data can be linked to a 
specific individual. Names are never mentioned in association with quotes and the 
data is presented in summary.  
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Chapter 4: The global malaria context and the case of intermittent preventive 
treatment 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this descriptive chapter, which expands on the brief summary first 
presented in section 1.4, and builds on the work initially done by Cruz and Walt 
(2013) on the IPTi policy process also mentioned in that section, is to synthesise and 
present the contextual background of my case study as an introduction to, and the 
narrative thread across, the two analytical results chapters that follow. The story of 
the policy processes for IPTi and SMC have primarily been pieced together from a 
combination of journal articles and key documents from the IPTi Consortium, the 
BMGF, LSHTM, and WHO, as well as interviewee accounts, news articles, and my 
own background knowledge gained during my DrPH Organisational and Policy 
Analysis (OPA) project at WHO-GMP. 
 
Because the SMC studies were never part of a formal consortium, and the policy 
process was shorter and less contested, there is not the same depth of documented 
history as with IPTi, which can be considered a disadvantage when reconstructing 
the timeline of events within a case study. However, I did also have an advantage 
when it came to the SMC process; I was an observer during the WHO Technical 
Expert Group (TEG) meeting for SMC (it took place during my OPA) and I was the 
rapporteur for the first MPAC meeting where SMC was discussed and endorsed as a 
malaria control intervention for countries with seasonal malaria transmission. 
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In the following sections, I will outline the changing fortunes of malaria as a global 
health issue, and the policy journeys of IPTi and SMC within the context of its policy 
setting body, and the setting of this case study, WHO-GMP. 
 
4.2 The fall and rise of malaria as a global health issue 
 
Understanding the story of IPTi and SMC begins with appreciating the modern day 
story of malaria within the global health context. 
 
According to many in the global malaria community (Greenwood and Mutabingwa, 
2002, Bruno et al., 1997), and to those who study malaria as a global health issue 
(Brown, 2017, Chandler and Beisel, 2017, Litsios, 2002, Packard, 2007), the late 
1990s marked a turning point in global interest in malaria. There was a resurgence of 
international attention for the disease, which had decreased after what was perceived 
to be the relative failure of the malaria eradication campaign of the 1960s (Litsios, 
1997, Packard, 2007, Greenwood et al., 2008, Packard, 1998). Over the next 40 
years, the malaria agenda had gone from the grand aspiration of eradication to a 
period of global neglect to a recovered vision (Bradley, 1999, Breman et al., 2004, 
Greenwood and Mutabingwa, 2002, Greenwood et al., 2005, Packard, 2007, White et 
al., 1999, Whitty et al., 2002). By 2007 there was another call for eradication, and a 
plan to eliminate malaria in some endemic countries (Feachem and Phillips, 2009, 
Chandler and Beisel, 2017). In fact, ‘accelerating towards elimination’ is once again 
a goal of the WHO Global Technical Strategy for Malaria 2016–2030, which was 
adopted by the World Health Assembly in May 2015 (WHO, 2015). Translating that 
vision into a reality once again appears to be a common goal of the global malaria 
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community (Tanner et al., 2015), although the political and cyclical nature of that 
aspiration has not gone unnoticed by some observers (Eckl, 2017, Chandler and 
Beisel, 2017). 
 
After the initial and failed eradication campaign of the 1960s, the malaria policy 
environment was at a low point. The numbers of researchers working in malaria 
were relatively few and their networks were limited (Packard, 2007). In the 1970s 
and 1980s, biomedical scientists, public health specialists, and social scientists were 
attracted into other policy communities as the global health agenda focused on health 
systems and primary health care, health reforms, and financing (Zwi and Mills, 
1995). Litsios (1998) suggests that over this period, malaria researchers isolated 
themselves by remaining loyal to the global malaria eradication agenda, and lost 
much of their influence on the development of other WHO public health policies and 
approaches.  
 
However, by the 1990s, global attention began shifting back to malaria. This is 
reflected in the history and evolution of the Multilateral Initiative on Malaria (MIM), 
an African-led international initiative established in 1997 with a mission to 
strengthen and sustain, through collaborative research and training, the capacity of 
malaria-endemic countries in Africa to carry out malaria research (Heddini et al., 
2004, Greenwood and Mutabingwa, 2002). In 1997, only 150 scientists (from 
Europe, the USA, and Africa) participated in their first malaria conference in Dakar 
because there were so few researchers involved in malaria. A decade later, the MIM 
conference in Nairobi in 2008 (still the only malaria-specific international 
conference in the world) drew over 3000 participants (MIM, 2017).  
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The resurgence in attention was accompanied by a huge rise in the funds available 
for malaria research, control, as well as advocacy. This is reflected not only in the 
creation of MIM in 1997, but also in the formation of the Roll Back Malaria 
Partnership in 1998, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) in 1999, and 
the Global Fund against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) in 2001 
(Chandler and Beisel, 2017). From approximate expenditure of US $ 20 million in 
the 1980s, funding for malaria research grew to over US $ 300 million in 2004 
(Malaria R&D Alliance, 2005). In 2014, US $ 610 million was invested on malaria 
research and development alone, a large proportion of which (23% or over US $ 140 
million) came from the BMGF, second only to the US National Institutes of Health 
which contributed 24% (Policy Cures, 2014). The BMGF has tripled funding on 
malaria (McCoy et al., 2009a) with Bill and Melinda Gates often repeating that they 
would like to see malaria eradicated within their lifetime (Liu et al., 2013, Roberts 
and Enserink, 2007, Tanner and de Savigny, 2008, Gates and Chambers, 2015), an 
assertion that has inevitably influenced the global health agenda around global 
malaria control, elimination, and eradication (Chandler and Beisel, 2017, Eckl, 2017, 
McCoy and McGoey, 2011). 
 
The large increase in malaria research funding led to more and better opportunities 
for malaria research, and also led to greater discussion among malaria researchers 
around how few interventions against malaria existed (Breman et al., 2004, White et 
al., 1999, Whitty et al., 2002). At the end of the 1990s there were relatively limited 
tools for malaria treatment and control (Packard, 2007). For example, the anti-
malarial drug Chloroquine was still widely used across Africa, despite large-scale 
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resistance and the wide availability of a similarly inexpensive, but more efficacious, 
alternative drug, Sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine, also known as SP (Shretta et al., 2000, 
White et al., 1999).  
 
In this context of limited interventions to control malaria, evidence showing 
protective efficacy of Intermittent Preventive Treatment of pregnant women (IPTp) 
(Parise et al., 1998, Shulman et al., 1999), led to a policy recommendation of the 
intervention by WHO-GMP in 2000. Many interviewees felt this decision was 
rushed and based on limited evidence, which contributed to a slow uptake of IPTp by 
African ministries of health. The rapidity of the WHO IPTp decision was contrasted 
with the sluggish decade-long WHO policy development process for another 
intervention, insecticide-treated mosquito nets, which preceded it. Other 
interventions to tackle malaria from during this time period included the use of 
artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs), a form of anti-malarial treatment 
recommended by WHO-GMP in 2003 (WHO, 2003), and new studies on indoor 
residual spraying in particular areas (Roberts et al., 2000) which were encouraging, 
but limited to a few settings.  
 
By this time, WHO had already “began to refashion itself as the coordinator, 
strategic planner, and leader of global health initiatives as a strategy of survival in 
response to [a] transformed international political context” (Brown et al., 2006, p. 
62) that had seen its role and authority diminished. Part of this transition was to 
reinforce its role in normative guidance and policy setting, in this case for malaria. 
WHO-GMP reoriented its global malaria policy recommendations to focus on 
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malaria case control, focusing on artemisinin-based combination therapies, long-
lasting insecticide-treated mosquito nets, indoor residual spraying, and IPTp.  
 
In tandem, WHO-GMP’s then director, Dr. Arata Kochi, a famously undiplomatic 
and controversial figure within the global public health community (Bohannon, 
2006, Boseley, 2006, McNeil Jr., 2006), put forward a new three-level policy review 
process that had been successfully used in his previous WHO department, the Stop 
TB Initiative. It involved a number of Technical Expert Groups (TEGs), a Technical 
and Research Advisory Committee (TRAC), and a Strategic and Technical Advisory 
Group (STAG) (D’Souza, 2014) (See Appendix 3 for more details). Unfortunately, 
concerns about the transparency of the membership at each of these three policy-
setting levels, combined with the delays inherent in a three-layered system – the 
prime example of which we will shortly dive in to – limited the utility of this 
approach (D’Souza, 2014).  
 
As a result, and further aggravated by its lack of adequate funding, WHO-GMP’s 
policy-setting activities were largely occurring as singly convened technical expert 
ad-hoc consultations, rather than through the regular meeting of standing technical 
expert groups (D’Souza, 2014). This led to the perception among important 
stakeholders that the leadership role of WHO-GMP in shaping the global malaria 
policy agenda was weakening (D’Souza, 2014). In that vacuum, a variety of other 
well-funded groups and entities began slowly encroaching on WHO-GMP’s policy-
setting functions (D’Souza, 2014). It was during this ‘Kochi era’ of WHO-GMP 
(described as such by WHO-GMP interviewees) that the story of the IPTi policy 
journey largely took place. 
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4.3 Twists and turns in the policy journey of the IPTi Consortium 
 
In the context of the increasing interest in malaria, and greater availability of 
research funding, but few effective interventions (Bradley, 1999, Breman et al., 
2004), the results of the first IPTi study, introduced in Chapter 1 – a RCT, published 
in the Lancet, showing 59% protective efficacy (Schellenberg et al., 2001) – 
generated much enthusiasm among the core group of scientists involved in the trial, 
and subsequently in the medical profession (The Lancet, 2008), because the results 
were considered potentially game-changing compared to the 35% pooled protective 
efficacy of malaria prevention interventions in pregnancy i.e. IPTp and insecticide-
treated mosquito nets (Eisele et al., 2010).  
 
The researchers from the first IPTi study, along with researchers from other 
academic institutions, and staff at WHO and UNICEF, subsequently formed a cross-
institutional US $28 million BMGF-funded global research partnership in 2003 – the 
IPTi Consortium. They stated in their funding proposal that they had “developed a 
research and implementation agenda that will rapidly resolve the outstanding 
scientific questions about this innovative form of malaria control, and move the 
intervention into policy and practice” within five years, by the end of 2008 (IPTi 
Consortium, 2003, p. 2). They also added, somewhat ambitiously, that they had 
“prepared a strategic plan showing how, by the end of 2005, sufficient information 
will exist on which to base a policy recommendation” (IPTi Consortium, 2003, p. 3). 
This date was also known within the IPTi Consortium as ‘the green line’, and was 
included in their proposal to the BMGF (see Figure 1, next page). Although shown 
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in black and white within the proposal, and therefore as black and white in Figure 1 
below, the arrow indicating that a policy recommendation would be made in 
December 2005 was frequently shown in meeting presentations as green (later 
described within this thesis by a quoted interviewee to mean “green for go”). 
Although it appears to indicate that the IPTi Consortium considered multiple 
technical measures and outcomes of their RCTs to be of value for policy 
consideration, the figure also suggests that protective efficacy, delivered through the 
pre-existing Expanded Programme on Immunisation (EPI), were the sole primary 
considerations the IPTi Consortium presumed a WHO policy recommendation 
would be based on.  
 
Figure 1. Target date for a WHO policy recommendation on IPTi, as projected by 
the IPTi Consortium to the BMGF (IPTi Consortium, 2003) 
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As part of the strategic plan and policy goals of the IPTi Consortium, a concurrent 
Policy Platform was established in WHO-GMP to review the evidence gathered 
through the Consortium’s research groups (WHO, 2006b). This Policy Platform was 
both a part of the IPTi Consortium (see Figure 2 below) as well as part of WHO-
GMP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Schematic view of the interactions between the different institutional 
elements of the IPTi Consortium (IPTi Consortium, 2003) 
 
The role of the Policy Platform was to facilitate the evidence review process of IPTi 
evidence, as it became available, so WHO-GMP could reach a policy 
recommendation on IPTi. This review process involved passing a series of WHO-
GMP committees described in the previous section that had been set up by then-
director Dr. Kochi – the TEG, the TRAC (that reviewed TEG recommendations), 
and the STAG (that reviewed TRAC recommendations). 
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The first TEG meeting for IPTi was held in October 2006, already past the ‘green 
line’ projection internally set by the IPTi Consortium, to assess the results of 11 
studies on the efficacy and safety of IPTi in infants and children (WHO, 2006a), 
even though three of the studies were not yet published. Nevertheless, the 
recommendation of the 2006 TEG to WHO-GMP was that IPTi should become a 
WHO-recommended malaria intervention, provided that implementation would take 
place alongside rigorous drug safety and drug resistance monitoring, and that as 
additional data on IPTi emerged, there would be further assessments of the 
intervention. The TEG recommended: 
 
In settings where sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine (SP) remains effective, 
the benefits of IPTi using SP appear to outweigh the risks … IPTi is 
a promising new intervention to consider adding to the package of 
available interventions for malaria control where there is malaria 
burden in infants (WHO, 2006a, p. 11). 
 
This TEG recommendation then went to the Technical and Research Advisory 
Committee (TRAC) where it was reviewed and recommended in December 2006. It 
was next due to be reviewed by the Strategic and Technical Advisory Group (STAG) 
but this meeting was then cancelled in favour of an additional TEG review, to take 
into account newly available trial data that was signalling the occurrence of severe 
adverse reactions. It was only in October 2007 that the second TEG meeting took 
place. Although this second TEG also recognised IPTi was a ‘promising 
intervention’ it recommended another review be held in 2008 when new data became 
available (WHO, 2007a). The TEG concluded: 
 
Taking into account these safety concerns … the uncertainty over the 
magnitude of the protective effect against anaemia and severe 
malaria, the uncertainty concerning the efficacy against highly SP 
resistant parasites and the optimal dose and timing of administration, 
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the committee cannot recommend general deployment of SP-IPTi 
(WHO, 2007a, p. 7). 
 
The deliberations of the TEG were negatively perceived by some IPTi researchers as 
unnecessary delays in the evidence advisory process, and led to increasing frustration 
within the IPTi Consortium (Cruz and Walt, 2013). This led to increasing tensions 
both amongst the researchers, and with WHO-GMP and its TEG, over differences in 
perceptions of time urgency, the meaning of rigorous evidence review, and the role 
of scientists (Cruz and Walt, 2013).  
 
In an attempt to drive what was perceived to be a circular and slow moving process 
forward, the BMGF decided in mid-2007 to commission an independent study, not 
from another U.N. agency or academic institution, but from a U.S. non-governmental 
organisation, the U.S. Institute of Medicine (IoM), to evaluate the IPTi results. This 
process, however, was viewed by multiple individuals interviewed as being at best 
irritating, and at worse undermining, to WHO-GMP.  
 
A year later, in July 2008, the IoM review was finalised and, perhaps unsurprisingly 
according to some interviewees, concluded that there was “substantial evidence 
indicating that IPTi-SP significantly diminished the incidence of clinical malaria in 
infants living in areas of high and moderate intensity transmission” and “that an 
intervention with results of this magnitude is worthy of further investment.” 
(Institute of Medicine, 2008, p. 2 and 61). The IoM review also concluded that IPTi 
was “ready to move to a new level”, implying programme implementation in 
countries where IPTi would be effective (Institute of Medicine, 2008, p. 3).  
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So unusual was this series of events, that the angry reaction by then WHO-GMP 
director Dr. Kochi even ended up being covered by the newspaper The New York 
Times (see McNeil Jr., 2008). In the article, stemming from a leaked memo from Dr. 
Kochi to his boss, the then WHO Director General Dr. Margaret Chan, Dr. Kochi 
complained about the BMGF’s “growing dominance” which was “stifling a diversity 
of views” and “wiping out the health agency’s policy making function” (McNeil Jr., 
2008). He accused “leading malaria researchers” (presumably members of the IPTi 
Consortium because he later explicitly used IPTi as his example) of being “locked up 
in a cartel”, with “vested interest” from BMGF to have its funded research used in 
WHO policy recommendations as potentially having “implicitly dangerous 
consequences on the policy-making process in world health” (McNeil Jr., 2008). The 
news article goes on to quote Dr. Kochi with reference to IPTi: 
 
Kochi wrote, although it was "less and less straightforward" that the 
health agency should recommend [IPTi], the agency's objections 
were met with "intense and aggressive opposition" from Gates-
backed scientists and the foundation. The WHO, he wrote, needs to 
"stand up to such pressures and ensure that the review of evidence is 
rigorously independent of vested interests" (McNeil Jr., 2008). 
 
It is difficult to say whether the 2008 IoM conclusion, or indeed any form of pressure 
from the BMGF, had any bearing on WHO-GMP (interviewees from both WHO and 
BMGF suggested it did not) but in April 2009, eight years after the first IPTi study 
was published, and following the early retirement of Dr. Kochi, a final meeting of 
the TEG judged the IPTi evidence base to finally be sufficiently acceptable, and 
advised a global policy recommendation on IPTi by WHO to member states (WHO, 
2009).  
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4.4 Strengthening the policy process for global malaria control and elimination, 
and the emergence of SMC as a policy success 
The story of the policy journey for IPTi is recognised within the global malaria 
community, and as outlined in Chapter 1 particularly by researchers at LSHTM and 
other institutions involved with the IPTi Consortium, as an example of a process 
where the inherent tension between researchers, their funders, and policy makers 
could have been better managed (Cruz and Walt, 2013, LSHTM, 2014b). The 
political fall-out from the perceived delays and tensions in the IPTi policy process 
was among the factors that precipitated WHO-GMP to review its many existing 
policy setting mechanisms in what, by that point, following the perceived to be 
bridge-burning ‘Kochi era’, was an even more increasingly competitive global health 
policy environment for WHO-GMP (D’Souza, 2014).  
WHO-GMP recognised by 2010, under the leadership of a new director, and it 
should also be noted, former member of the IPTi Consortium, Dr. Robert Newman, 
that it needed to adapt to this new environment, while trying to maintain and 
strengthen its global leadership role in policy-setting (D’Souza, 2014). By that time, 
WHO-GMP’s normative role in setting policies and standards for malaria control had 
not been updated for several years, and WHO-GMP was perceived by many 
members of the global malaria community as being insufficiently able to respond to a 
rapidly changing political, funding, and epidemiological landscape (D’Souza, 2014).  
In 2011, WHO-GMP embarked on a policy-setting strengthening exercise – funded 
by the BMGF – to increase the timeliness, transparency, independence, and 
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relevance of its recommendations to WHO member states in relation to malaria 
control and elimination (see Appendix 4 - D'Souza and Newman, 2012 - for more 
details).  
 
In summary, in order to help re-design and implement a new policy-setting process, 
a small group of independent malaria experts was convened by WHO-GMP in 
March 2011 in Geneva to review previous and existing malaria policy processes and 
successful policy-setting models from other WHO departments (D'Souza and 
Newman, 2012). They proposed a framework for a new malaria policy committee to 
address the shortcomings of previous policy processes. During April and May 2011, 
feedback on the draft terms of reference was sought, received, and incorporated, 
from 50 external stakeholders (D’Souza, 2014). The result was the evidence advisory 
body, MPAC, first convened in 2012, which meets twice a year, as outlined in 
Chapter 1, to provide “independent strategic advice and technical input for … the 
development of WHO policy recommendations … as part of a transparent, 
responsive and credible policy setting process.” (D'Souza and Newman, 2012, p.2).  
 
The first body of evidence to come under MPAC review was for SMC. Research on 
SMC had been going on for several years before the MPAC was formed. As in the 
case of IPTi, enthusiasm for SMC was based on positive findings from a RCT, but in 
Senegal instead of Tanzania, also published in the Lancet, but in 2006 instead of 
2001, in this case showing an even higher 86% protective efficacy, compared to the 
59% protective efficacy of the first IPTi RCT (Cisse et al., 2006, Schellenberg et al., 
2001). More notably however, unlike with IPTi, an official consortium with an overt 
agenda to achieve policy goals was never formed, and there appeared to be little 
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tension between actors involved in the evidence advisory process. Instead, a series of 
informal collaborative meetings between SMC researchers and WHO-GMP with 
relevant national policy makers and programme managers, to identify outstanding 
priorities for research relevant to a SMC policy decision, took place in 2008 (Bhasin 
et al., 2014). These were followed by several large-scale evaluation studies in 2009 
to address these outstanding questions (see Cairns et al., 2012, Dicko et al., 2011, 
Konaté et al., 2011). Meanwhile, there were periodic informal reviews of the 
evidence dossier by experts to ensure that the necessary information was being 
collated for an informed decision by policy makers for when the time came (Bhasin 
et al., 2014). This culminated in a formal (and single) meeting of the TEG to review 
the evidence for SMC in May 2011, which resulted in a unanimous positive 
recommendation for the intervention despite the lack of an implementation 
mechanism (WHO, 2011c). The TEG concluded: 
 
Although there is evidence to support the initiation of SMC, there 
are still practical questions concerning the roll out of this additional 
malaria intervention. The committee did not feel that these questions 
should limit the imminent roll out and deployment of SMC, but can 
be incorporated into the implementation of the programme (WHO, 
2011c, p. 6). 
 
The recommendation was then reviewed by the newly formed MPAC in February 
2012, and by March, less than a month later, WHO-GMP issued the policy 
recommendation for SMC (WHO, 2012c). The MPAC meeting report, which took 
longer to appear in the Malaria Journal (2012) than it did for WHO-GMP to issue 
the SMC policy, summarised the MPAC discussions: 
 
The general conclusion was that there is a window of opportunity 
related to the current effectiveness of AQ-SP and that SMC should 
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be adopted soon, while operational experience and new evidence 
will be regularly reviewed by the MPAC. The MPAC recommended 
the adoption of SMC as a new malaria control strategy pending 
minor changes to the policy recommendation. There was strong 
consensus on the need to rapidly finalise and disseminate the SMC 
policy recommendation, ideally within two months of the MPAC 
meeting (MPAC meeting report, 2012, p. 5). 
 
The story of SMC, viewed and framed, as mentioned previously in Chapter 1, as a 
policy ‘success’ according to stakeholders involved due to its speedy policy 
development and lack of conflict, is now often used as an example of the strength, 
impact, and influence, of LSHTM malaria research (LSHTM, 2014a) as well as that 
of a ‘good’ WHO policy making process outcome (Snow, 2016, Greenwood, 2018), 
particularly in comparison to IPTi.  
 
For example, with reference to the 2012 meta-analysis of the results from the 2006-
2011 SMC trials, which were used to help inform the WHO SMC policy decision, 
Professor Bob Snow, a pre-eminent Kenya-based Oxford University malaria 
epidemiologist, who was not involved with the SMC studies himself, although he 
was clearly familiar with the timeline of events, summarised the value of SMC, as 
well as what was unusual about its policy development, in a 2016 article in PLOS 
Medicine: 
 
This [SMC meta-analysis] evidence led to policy statements by 
WHO the same year, and development of regional and national plans 
for implementation of SMC. Within a year, 3.2 million children aged 
less than five years were protected by SMC in seven countries. This 
history provides an exemplary illustration of how field research 
evidence can lead to early policy adoption and immediate donor 
assistance. Importantly, previous reservations on the use of drugs for 
malaria control seemed less of a concern for SMC than, say, for IPTi 
or MDA (Snow, 2016, p. 2). 
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The relative policy development success of SMC in comparison to IPTi, as part of 
the broader story of how all forms of intermittent malaria preventive treatment help 
in the fight against malaria, is a narrative that continues to be shared repeatedly 
within the global malaria community, most recently during the plenary talk, 
“Progress with Malaria Chemoprevention in Malaria Endemic Countries since 
1997”, at the Multilateral Initiative on Malaria (MIM) conference in Senegal in April 
2018 by Professor Sir Brian Greenwood (see Greenwood, 2018). Greenwood is an 
LSHTM professor of clinical tropical medicine and a malaria preventive treatment 
pioneer, who was involved with both IPTi and SMC sets of studies, and is one of the 
most-recognised and well-regarded UK contributors to the field of global malaria 
research (see The Royal Society, 1998).  
 
During his MIM plenary presentation, Greenwood covered the clinical and 
epidemiological evidence for, as well the chronological policy development of, 
intermittent preventive treatment (IPT) in pregnant women (IPTp), infants (IPTi), 
children (IPTc/SMC), and schoolchildren (IPTsc) – which are all forms of IPT – as 
public health interventions of great potential, although, as previously mentioned in 
Chapter 1, barely implemented in the case of IPTi, compared to SMC, which was 
lamentable given its benefits, according to him (Greenwood, 2018). On a slide titled 
“Why has IPTi not been adopted more widely?” Greenwood suggested that it was 
due to four factors, in his opinion: a combination of IPTi having a relatively modest 
impact on the overall incidence of malaria; a relatively restrictive WHO policy 
recommendation; a lack of local champions, such as national malaria control 
programmes and researchers; and the changing age distribution of malaria in 
children (Greenwood, 2018). While this thesis does not go into a lot of detail on the 
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changing epidemiology of malaria, which would cover factors such as incidence and 
changing age distributions (although these and other epidemiological factors are of 
course part of the broader and dynamic context in which global malaria policy 
development occurs), it does explore why the WHO IPTi policy recommendation 
might have ended up being ‘relatively restrictive’ (covered in Chapter 5, and related 
to aspects of the credibility and salience of the IPTi evidence base, which might have 
made developing and recommending a more expansive policy difficult for WHO-
GMP), and what might have led to ‘a lack of local champions’ (covered in both 
Chapters 5 and 6, and related to the salience of the IPTi evidence base, as well as the 
perceived legitimacy of its policy development process, which might have dampened 
enthusiasm for IPTi in some sub-Saharan African countries that might have 
otherwise benefitted from IPTi), among other perceptions and outcomes, in the case 
of IPTi, compared to SMC. 
 
4.5 Reflective summary 
 
A simplified timeline of steps involved in the development of the eventual WHO 
global policy recommendations for IPTi and SMC, which are outlined in more detail 
in previous sections of this chapter, is summarised in Figure 3 (see next page). 
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Figure 3. Simplified timeline of the IPTi and SMC policy development processes 
(D'Souza and Parkhurst, 2018). 
 
Although the timeline is presented in a simplified format, in reality, the two 
‘evidence to policy’ processes for IPTi and SMC took place within a continuously 
changing and dynamic internal and external environment for WHO-GMP. As Eckl 
(2017) points out, malaria policy is in reality often more conflictual than official 
accounts suggest, and those policies have narratives of their own (‘social lives’ as he 
puts it) that are often suppressed within the global malaria community’s desire for 
consensus around policy making.  
 
However, as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, these narratives provide necessary 
background and context for understanding the environments in which evidence 
advisory processes and policy development occurs, which in turn might affect the 
outcomes of those processes. The reality of global malaria policy setting for 
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intermittent preventive treatment, as we shall soon explore in the next two chapters, 
might be more complex than the global malaria community itself likely realises or 
acknowledges.  
 
It is in the spirit of trying to at least better appreciate, if not better understand, the 
complexities of the policy development process, that the next two chapters explore 
how the features of the evidence (Chapter 5) and the perceptions of the policy 
processes (Chapter 6) of IPTi and SMC compared with each other, according to 
those actors directly involved, and what the learning opportunities might be for 
researchers, policy-makers, and funders alike.   
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Chapter 5: The features of the evidence used to form global malaria 
intermittent preventive treatment policy  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter, the first of two main results chapters, explores the features of the 
evidence used to form policy in both the IPTi and SMC policy processes. In 
particular, and as outlined in my analytical framework in Chapter 2 based on the 
work of Cash and colleagues (2003), I explore the question of what is perceived to 
have constituted as ‘good evidence’ in this case, including interviewee 
interpretations and explanations of the ‘credibility’ and ‘salience’ of that evidence.  
Based on their role in the IPTi or SMC policy process (or in some cases, their role in 
both processes), informants were asked how, in their experience, would they 
describe the evidence base for either policy. Based on their responses, and in some 
cases following probes for examples of what they meant by descriptors such as 
‘strong’ or ‘good’, I asked about their experience of the evidence review process and 
what features of the evidence base(s) appeared to them to matter most, and why, 
when it came to forming the WHO policy recommendation for IPTi and SMC.  
Responses by interviewees, comprising primarily of clinical researchers, or policy 
makers with medical backgrounds, often reflected traditional thinking about the 
hierarchy of evidence and the role of RCTs in informing policy. They provide an 
inside perspective on how do features of the hierarchy of evidence, and known 
technical concerns affecting ‘credibility’, influence policy development processes 
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within WHO-GMP and its evidence advisory bodies. The chapter also explores non-
technical concerns, such as ‘salience’ and more nuanced facets affecting 
‘credibility’, and the extent to which these factors also matter in policy development 
in this case. 
 
5.2 Findings  
 
First I present the themes that emerged from my analysis of interviewee accounts of 
differences between the features of the evidence bases for IPTi and SMC, before 
summarising the findings with some reflections on this subset of my thesis results.  
 
5.2.1 Differences affecting credibility 
 
Cash and colleagues (2003) define credibility (according to them, one of three core 
determinants of effective evidence advice, in addition to salience and legitimacy) as 
involving “the scientific adequacy of the technical evidence and arguments” (p. 
8086). But as highlighted from the evidence use literature within public health (see 
Chapter 2), scientific adequacy has multiple dimensions when applied within the 
hierarchy of evidence common within public health policy development. For 
example, as described in section 1.4, for IPT RCTs, there isn’t one absolute concern, 
such as protective efficacy (the percentage reduction in the number of clinical 
malaria episodes in infants or children, typically in comparison to the control arm of 
the RCT), as critical as the protective effect may be, that is considered superior to 
other technical concerns. Policy makers have to balance other factors when 
considering the technical merits of an evidence base for policy consideration, such as 
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the consistency/repeatability of results (a reflection of the heterogeneity within 
pooled results from a collective body of RCTs, and how reliable an indicator they 
might be), possible drug side effects (which is a measure of drug safety) or other 
possible negative effects (increased drug resistance, and rebound effect, for example, 
both of which follow from only temporarily suppressing the numbers of malaria 
cases, before they might return at a higher rate than before, due to a lack of effective 
drugs, or loss of naturally acquired immunity). I will explore these known technical 
and measurable features of evidence (protective efficacy, repeatability/reliability, 
drug resistance and safety, and rebound) in the subsections that follow. In addition, I 
will explore how collectively these features of the evidence, along with some other 
more subjective elements, also appear to affect the perceived ‘strength and quality’ 
and credibility of the evidence, which will lead to the next chapter section (5.2.2) on 
differences affecting the salience of evidence. 
 
(i) Protective efficacy 
 
The IPTi Consortium conducted RCTs spanning different parts of East, South and 
West Africa and gathered data on a range of technical measures and outcomes, 
including efficacy, safety, drug resistance and drug choice, and interactions with the 
Expanded Programme on Immunisation (EPI), through which the intervention (IPTi 
drug doses) would be administered when the infant was taken to an immunisation 
clinic at 2, 3, and 9 months of age as part of its routine vaccination schedule (IPTi 
Consortium, 2010 - see also Figure 1).  
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The size of the studied population for IPTi was large: for example, approximately 
8,000 children participated in the IPTi RCTs; over 300,000 infants per year 
participated in the operational studies led by UNICEF in six countries; and more 
than 80,000 Sulfadoxine–Pyrimethamine (SP) doses were given in the Tanzanian 
community-level effectiveness study (IPTi Consortium, 2010). In comparison for 
SMC, the RCTs were similarly multi-faceted, large, and thorough, except more 
geographically focused to West Africa (WHO, 2011a).  
 
All of this seemed to bode well in terms of building a solid evidence base for both 
interventions, according to those involved in the research. However, at the end of all 
that work, the pooled protective efficacy– as described previously, the collective and 
averaged measure used to determine how many malaria cases were prevented, i.e. 
whether the intervention ‘worked’ based on the percentage reduction in the number 
of clinical malaria episodes between the RCT(s) intervention and control arms – was 
30% for IPTi (WHO, 2010). In comparison, for SMC it was 75% (WHO, 2012c).  
 
This difference in itself was not surprising to interviewees in retrospect, since unlike 
with IPTi, the SMC studies all took place within a narrow geographic band of West 
Africa with similar and highly seasonal transmission (60% of cases occurring within 
four months of the year). In contrast, IPTi trials took place all over sub-Saharan 
Africa in a variety of transmission and epidemiological settings (which is common 
for many malaria interventions). Therefore, it would have been expected that any 
given trial would show higher protective efficacy when tested in more narrow trial 
regions (although the absolute level would depend of course on features of the 
intervention, including the drugs used).  
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In addition, the pooled protective efficacy of IPTi is not dissimilar to other 
preventative malaria interventions widely recommended; for example, a systematic 
review of RCTs of the best known, and most studied, preventive intervention against 
malaria, insecticide-treated mosquito nets, showed that it has a pooled protective 
efficacy of 55% in children (Eisele et al., 2010), although there is statistical variation 
of this percentage figure depending on the study design and the unit of measurement 
(Kesteman et al., 2017). In any case, the complexity of preventing a complicated 
disease in a wide variety of (and ever-changing) epidemiological settings is the 
reason no ‘magic bullet’ exists in malaria control and why high coverage of a mix of 
interventions that is most suited to local transmission patterns is recommended by 
WHO (2015).  
It should also be highlighted that many respondents, including those involved with 
SMC, noted that the amount of data collected to support IPTi far outweighed the 
evidence for a previous preventative global malaria policy on IPTp (Intermittent 
Preventive Treatment in pregnant women versus IPTi which targets malaria 
prevention in infants). As mentioned in Chapter 4, WHO issued a policy 
recommendation on IPTp in 2000 – since removed and replaced on the WHO 
website by an updated IPTp policy issued in 2012 (WHO, 2012a) – on the basis of 
just one study by Shulman and colleagues (1999) in Kenya showing an overall 
protective efficacy of 39%. The hasty initial recommendation by WHO of IPTp, 
based on seemingly little evidence, was argued by several interviewees to be 
nevertheless justified in 2000 because the burden of disease was great and there were 
few alternative interventions at that time. In comparison with IPTp, however, the 
more evidence that was generated by the IPTi Consortium, the more it seemed to be 
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subjected to contestation within the scientific community, according to interviewees, 
and echoing previous findings by Cruz and Walt (2013). The difference in pooled 
protective efficacy alone cannot sufficiently explain why this happened. 
 
(ii) Repeatability, and reliability, of results 
 
Another main criticism of several interviewees regarding the features of the 
evidence, and closely linked to pooled protective efficacy, was that the positive 
results from the first IPTi trial were not reproduced to the same high levels in later 
trials – the pooled protective efficacy of IPTi was 30% (WHO, 2010), compared to 
the 59% protective efficacy from the first trial (Schellenberg et al., 2001), which is to 
say that IPTi trials subsequent to the first one showed much lower protective efficacy 
on average. For some, this raised questions about the benefits of IPTi:  
 
One of the big issues with IPTi was that the evidence didn’t all point 
in the same direction. So the decisions were, you know, I think it 
was harder for people to have the level of confidence in them that 
they might have had with SMC where there’s not much evidence 
going in the other directions. – KI41 
 
Heterogeneity was not an issue for the SMC set of studies, where the pooled 
protective efficacy of the intervention was 75% (WHO, 2011b), compared to the 
86% protective efficacy from the first trial (Cisse et al., 2006), which is to say that 
SMC trial results subsequent to the first one showed similarity with consistently high 
protective efficacy (WHO, 2011b, WHO, 2011c). Many interviewees seemed to 
assume this consistency between SMC trial results reflected positively on the 
strength of the results, which in turn might have helped the evidence base for SMC 
appear better, or less concerning, compared to IPTi. As one interviewee explained:  
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There was more heterogeneity in the IPTi results than the SMC 
results... And that’s another thing that worries you – heterogeneity – 
particularly if the index study… and this has happened quite a few 
times in malaria, the first study by the protagonists: big effect, and 
then the follow-up studies: not such big effects. That’s worrying. It 
didn’t seem to be happening with SMC. The effects were pretty 
good everywhere. – KI51 
However, the inconsistency between IPTi trial results can be explained (similar to 
the difference in protective efficacy between IPTi and SMC), as the difference can 
be due to features of the trial environments described in the previous section, i.e. 
there was more homogeneity between the highly targeted SMC study sites than 
between the hetrogeneous IPTi study sites, which would have likely contributed to 
more consistent RCT results for SMC. 
There is an additional explanation for the differences in consistency and overall 
protective efficacy between IPTi and SMC, suggested by a few interviewees as a 
possible confounding factor, and the source of some methodological contestation, 
which was the reliability of pooling data from six different trials for IPTi, which 
varied in terms of methods, dosing intervals, delivery schedules, and evaluation 
points. Even the IoM assessment (which had not reviewed the trials’ raw data, but 
reviewed the same data as WHO) suggested that the IPTi Consortium “obtain an 
independent technical audit of the accuracy of the study-level data and analyses 
included in the pooled analysis” (Institute of Medicine, 2008, p. 3). In comparison 
for SMC, there was no contestation around pooled data, perhaps because the results 
were more homogeneous due to the homogeneous transmission setting across study 
sites (see WHO, 2011b). 
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(iii) Drug resistance and safety issues 
 
Another key debate was around the usefulness of SP as the drug of choice for IPTi, 
first because of its growing resistance in some areas and second for its potential 
adverse effects. With regard to resistance, one interviewee observed: 
 
We had increasing SP resistance [with IPTi] and, here, resistance 
really bites. Now, in pregnant women, you have a lot of background 
immunity. Not a huge amount, but they have…they will [still] 
benefit from a failing drug. But an infant has no immunity, so an 
infant infected with a resistant parasite’s not going to benefit [from 
SP]. – KI55 
 
When the IPTi Consortium studies were designed in the early 2000s, SP was 
efficacious in many settings and, as still is the case, there were limited alternative 
drugs. The researchers were aware however of the drawbacks of growing SP 
resistance, and some studies were designed with alternative drugs (see Gosling et al., 
2009, Odhiambo et al., 2010). Later the IoM assessment of IPTi concluded that 
implementation should not be delayed or limited on the grounds of apprehension 
about an increase in SP resistance (Institute of Medicine, 2008). The issue of 
resistance was also raised as an issue for SMC, but instead of being viewed as a 
barrier, it worked as a facilitator; the argument being to use SP to reduce the malaria 
burden in West Africa while it still worked there (Ringwald et al., 2012). 
 
Another debate for IPTi that arose was around SP’s potential adverse effects. The 
first TEG review in 2006 found that: “Severe dermatological reactions tended to be 
reported more frequently in the SP group (5/3967) than in the placebo group 
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(1/3988)…[but] the observed risk of Serious Adverse Events was not statistically 
different in the SP and placebo groups....” (WHO, 2006a, p. 10). 
However, the subsequent reporting of four cases of adverse events created delays in 
the policy process, as these were subjected to further TEG review. Some respondents 
felt WHO was correct to be cautious especially when prescribing drugs to healthy 
infants. But, some in the IPTi Consortium also expressed frustration at these delays. 
Indeed, additional investigations concluded that the reported severe side effects were 
unlikely to be what was initially feared to be Stevens-Johnson syndrome, a severe 
and untreatable skin reaction. Further, the review by the IoM which assessed the 
same data that the TEG had examined concluded that IPTi was a safe intervention 
(Institute of Medicine, 2008). By 2009, when the third TEG met (see Figure 3), 
safety concerns about SP had been minimised by evidence provided through a large 
operational study by UNICEF, an implementation study in Tanzania, and the 
detailed assessment by the Safety Panel of the IPTi Consortium, with regard to the 
reported serious skin reactions (WHO, 2009).  
In comparison, no serious adverse events were reported for the SMC studies. 
However, as is the case for any form of mass drug administration, monitoring for 
side effects upon scaled-up programme implementation of SMC was a critical 
component of the WHO SMC policy recommendation (WHO, 2012c).  
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(iv) Rebound effect
Concern about rebound – that is, the possibility that treating largely asymptomatic, 
and otherwise healthy, individuals will ultimately lead to increased malaria 
morbidity and mortality once the intervention is stopped, due to decreased naturally 
acquired immunity (Breman and O’Meara, 2005, Aponte et al., 2009) – was, and still 
is, the subject of controversy for all forms of IPT as a type of mass drug 
administration. However, rebound is also hard to predict, partially because the 
biological mechanisms that might enable it (selection pressure for drug resistance 
mutations in malaria parasites, for example) are multi-faceted and not fully 
understood by scientists (Breman and O’Meara, 2005).  
For the IPTi policy development process, the third TEG in 2009 deemed that the 
issue of a rebound effect deserved further monitoring in light of the three studies that 
reported a rise in either malaria infections, anaemia, or severe malarial anaemia after 
the intervention (WHO, 2009). On the other hand, the IoM review had considered 
that “in no case was the rebound sufficiently large to negate the overall benefit of 
IPTi-SP” (Institute of Medicine, 2008, p. 60). The balancing of harm versus benefit 
weighed heavily on those involved with the IPTi policy decision. One TEG member 
said: 
[Long-term follow-up data] was one of the big problems [with IPTi] 
with the committee when we reviewed it. We wanted to know things 
like rebound, what was the overall benefit over a longer period of 
time. It’s pretty obvious … that if you give anti-malarials to 
somebody in a malaria endemic area, you’re going to reduce malaria 
for a period of time. The question is, what’s the overall benefits of 
doing that and what is the harm? – K151 
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In the case of SMC, which did not have long-term follow-up data either, the 
protective benefit of administering SMC was considered so large, and the window of 
SP effectiveness in West Africa perceived as narrowing so quickly, they seemed to 
outweigh the hypothetical risk of a potential rebound further down the line. 
 
(v) Strength and quality  
 
The difference in measures of, in particular, protective efficacy and repeatability, 
were often described as proxy measures for the relative higher quality and strength 
of the SMC evidence base. As described earlier, in comparison to IPTi, which only 
demonstrated itself as ‘working’, i.e. having a large effect on morbidity, in one of its 
study sites, the SMC set of RCTs consistently demonstrated high protective efficacy 
in all its study sites (WHO, 2011b).  
 
Some interviewees found the quality of both evidence bases to be comparable, with 
some suggesting that the evidence, and evidence use, for IPTi was marginally 
‘better’ because of the volume and breadth of data collected, reflecting the popular 
notion (within public health) that Smith (2013) critiques, that more use of the ‘best’ 
evidence equals ‘better’ use of evidence. Nevertheless, features of the evidence 
traditionally associated with technical quality, such as the volume of RCT data, and 
the standards by which that data is collected, seemed to be less of a concern to 
interviewees, or more of a secondary consideration, when the size of the intervention 
effect was large. One MPAC member reflected: 
 
I think that the evidence probably is comparable in terms of quality 
and the study design carried out. The IPTi studies were all done 
according to [Good Clinical Practice] standards. Every effort was 
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made to have those be comparable to what would be required for 
studies done for drug approval. Quite frankly, I think the SMC 
studies were not done, necessarily, to that standard but here the 
difference between the sort of controls and the impact was 
sufficiently large that people didn’t question the validity of the 
evidence. – KI23 
Ultimately though, many of those involved with the IPTi policy decision, felt that 
unlike with SMC, IPTi didn’t do what it was supposed to do, which was sufficiently 
demonstrate that it protected the lives of infants. As one MPAC member explained:  
There are two things about evidence. One is the quality of the 
evidence itself and the other is the result. I think the quality of the 
evidence for both IPTi and SMC were pretty good…The thing about 
SMC that impressed me as an outsider was that the studies were 
done in a large scale; they were done apparently well; and the effect 
was large. The more uncertain the effect, the more areas there are for 
arguments and concerns, and so on. So [SMC] had the advantage of 
having a bigger [protective] effect than IPTi. – KI51 
When it comes to the perceived strength of an evidence base, it could be argued that 
SMC is more of an outlier for preventive malaria interventions, given its 
consistency, but also relatedly, the narrow geographic focus of studies. As mentioned 
earlier, one explanation for the difference in intervention results is that the SMC 
portfolio was in fact designed for one (highly seasonal) transmission setting, versus 
IPTi, which covered a range of transmission settings to, in theory, help with policy 
uptake. For the SMC studies, they appeared to be designed with consistency in mind, 
in order to deliver a complete package of results that might aid policy deliberation. 
One interviewee reflected: 
Well I think the evidence base on SMC was more robust [compared 
to IPTi]. More coordinated, and what I mean by coordinated is that 
they used similar protocols in several sites. So I think the SMC 
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group, or the IPTc group then, they set out from the outset to try and 
answer… they designed studies to answer the policy question. So in 
that way they were able to influence the kind of data they generated 
because they asked the right questions. – KI42 
SMC researchers asking the ‘right’ questions is a theme that came up often in 
interviewee responses. It is possible that this helped lead to the level of SMC 
evidence being perceived as stronger or more robust, even though delivering a 
complete and robust package of results was also the explicit purpose of the IPTi 
Consortium. Several interviewees did point out this irony, while others pointed out 
that although SMC researchers’ efforts did not appear to be as explicit, the 
robustness of their evidence base is not something that happened by coincidence 
either, and that SMC researchers put considerable effort into making their research 
accessible but also acceptable, according to the norms and standards of the public 
health and global malaria community. 
This isn’t to say that the evidence base for IPTi didn’t similarly meet the standards of 
good scientific practice, because on face value, given the volume and breadth of 
RCT data considered valuable by those interviewed, it did. However, the IPTi RCT 
data also surfaced a lot more uncertainty compared to SMC, which made the 
interconnected factor of local applicability and relevance (salience) much harder to 
reach consensus on as part of the policy development process, and led to contestation 
over the evidence on IPTi. This juxtaposition between the evidence bases for IPTi 
and SMC appears to resemble what Contandriopoulos and colleagues (2010) 
highlight in their work, that in technically focused decision making, there is 
generally a perceived low level of contestation of the evidence. In such cases, 
technically focused debate tends to be resolved through ‘rational’ dialogues and 
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arguments, based upon a similar worldview amongst actors. In contrast, they say, 
high contestation of the evidence tends to lead to political debates and a strategic 
approach towards knowledge use (Contandriopoulos et al., 2010). The links between 
the contestation of otherwise seemingly credible evidence, and its political uses in 
policy development in this case study, will be explored in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
   
5.2.2 Differences affecting salience  
 
Contandriopoulos and colleagues (2010) also found in their systematic review of 
knowledge exchange interventions at the organisational and policy making level, that 
the external validity of evidence, that is the generalisability or local applicability 
(salience), and perceived alignment with existing knowledge, was awarded far 
greater weight than internal validity and scientific rigour (credibility) when 
considering which information was likely to be used in policy making. Cash and 
colleagues’ (2003) definition of salience is that it deals with “the relevance of the 
assessment [of scientific information] to the needs of decision makers” (p. 8086), 
which leaves the term ‘relevance’ (and ‘needs’) open to interpretation and 
application. Parkhurst (2017) is more specific, and prefers the use of the term 
‘appropriate evidence’ to replace ‘good evidence’ for policy, to stress the importance 
of evidence that isn’t just technically valid and scientifically credible, but politically 
relevant and locally applicable as well.  
 
It appears that salience, like credibility, can be viewed as being multidimensional 
and capturing several different elements, such as local applicability, contextual 
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relevance, generalisability, and even timing, as outlined in my analytical framework 
in Chapter 2. It should also be noted however, that specifically increasing the 
‘timeliness’ and ‘relevance’ of its policy recommendations are two of the reasons 
why WHO-GMP established MPAC as the primary mechanism for its policy 
development to benefit its member states (WHO, 2012b). This implies that elements 
of salience are of value to WHO-GMP. This subsection explores these concepts 
relating to differences in the salience of the evidence bases for IPTi and SMC, and 
what the implications were in the context of my case study. 
 
(i) Local applicability  
 
The perception of higher ‘strength’ for SMC might have been compounded by the 
fact that the SMC study sites in the intervention region of West Africa were also the 
proposed implementation sites for the SMC policy, which resulted in an unusual 
situation for the evidence advisory committees (TEG and MPAC) that systematically 
reviewed the evidence base on SMC, in order to advise WHO-GMP on a policy 
recommendation. It was unusual because, in many other cases, these bodies need to 
deliberate about the applicability of study findings from a wide range of settings to 
the target contexts, which are often not in the same locations, i.e. they have to gauge 
if what worked ‘there’ will also work ‘here’ (Cartwright and Hardie, 2012). Yet with 
SMC, because the study region was the implementation region, the RCT evidence 
base reviewed was considered to have both high internal and external validity, which 
as several interviewees pointed out, made making a positive policy recommendation 
an easy choice and a relatively straightforward process compared to IPTi. Whereas 
in comparison, the TEG for IPTi (MPAC did not exist at the time) had far more 
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nuances to consider in its systematic review of the evidence available at the time 
(WHO IPTi Technical Expert Group, 2008).  
 
For example, IPTi was sometimes described as ‘the wrong drug…at the wrong time’, 
to the extent that responding to this pervasive belief was part of a Q&A briefing pack 
prepared for IPTi Consortium spokespeople following one of their Lancet 
publications (IPTi Consortium, 2009). In reality, the programmatic feasibility 
(implementation) of IPTi was recognised as being extremely important by the IPTi 
Consortium. For example, two of the IPTi Consortium projects (see Figure 2) were a 
large operational study in six African countries led by UNICEF, and a community 
effectiveness study in Tanzania, which explored operational issues about how IPTi 
would work within the existing health system. Their results showed that overall IPTi 
was safe, affordable, acceptable, and possible to deliver within the existing health 
system (Manzi et al., 2009, Maokola et al., 2011, Pool et al., 2008, Schellenberg et 
al., 2010). While these findings (those that were available at the time) were 
examined by the third WHO TEG in 2009, and probably contributed to the decision 
to recommend IPTi, various respondents expressed additional concerns about 
implementation. For example, at the country level, capacity for implementation was 
considered an issue, and not only for IPTi. By the late 2000s it was known that IPTp 
coverage was low (Crawley et al., 2007, Worrall et al., 2007), especially for the 
required second drug dose (Menéndez et al., 2007), and that delivery problems 
accounted for delays in the spread of insecticide-treated mosquito nets, with 
considerable debate about best practice between different funding schemes.  
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From WHO-GMP’s perspective, the operational feasibility of an intervention was 
reported to be as important as its effectiveness and safety. For example, clear 
guidelines to national malaria control programme managers were and still are 
considered to be crucial. But there was concern about how IPTi could be 
implemented and monitored in view of the increasing drug resistance to SP in some 
parts of Africa, and the lack of capacity in some countries, particularly at district 
level, to monitor levels of drug resistance in order to know where best to target the 
drug (making the drug essentially ineffective in those areas, hence the view that it 
might be the ‘wrong drug’).  
(ii) Contextual relevance
WHO-GMP staff and some other interviewees were also uncertain as to how IPTi 
could be implemented and monitored in view of the local heterogeneity of countries’ 
epidemiological profiles and the need to disaggregate their policy to sub-national 
levels. This was less of an issue for the SMC policy consideration, as there was 
epidemiological homogeneity for the reasons described earlier, and because the 
policy would only apply to certain parts of certain countries where 60% of cases 
occurred within four months of the year, the policy in some ways was already 
disaggregated to sub-national levels.  
WHO-GMP guidelines also had to take into account the limited capacity of many 
national malaria control programmes, particularly at the district level. Although such 
issues were not specific to IPTi (they also apply to IPTp, indoor residual spraying for 
mosquitoes, and SMC, among other interventions), the actual relevance of IPTi was 
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also questioned in countries where EPI coverage was low, or where malaria was 
seasonal (which is to say that the delivery of the drug would not, in some areas of 
countries, be coinciding with the expected peaks in the number of malaria cases, 
hence the view that it might be delivered at the ‘wrong time’), as IPTi would have a 
very small effect (Chandramohan et al., 2005). 
 
Although the WHO IPTi-related TEGs (WHO, 2006a, WHO, 2007a, WHO, 2009) 
and some respondents, expressed concern about the risk that IPTi might displace 
other more effective malaria control measures – insecticide-treated mosquito nets, 
indoor residual spraying, artemisinin-based combination therapies, for example – 
this contrasted with the views of others, particularly within the IPTi Consortium, that 
IPTi could actually play a complementary role in malaria control. It seemed to be 
generally accepted by all interviewees that there will always be various constraints to 
hamper optimal effectiveness of any malaria control intervention, and therefore 
interventions should be seen as a package, that is, as additional to each other, and not 
as competitors. 
 
(iii) Generalisability 
 
SMC, in comparison to IPTi, was described as having higher ‘practicability’ and 
‘generalisability’ beyond just a research setting. This also seemed to contribute to its 
evidence base’s perceived strength. As one member of MPAC described: 
 
I think the evidence base for SMC is pretty strong. I mean there are a 
number of really quite convincing and sufficiently large studies that 
show major impact. I mean you’re always concerned with, I think, a 
number of things; one is the size of the studies, the consistency of 
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the results, and the scale of impact, and that’s the first step. 
Obviously you’re then concerned about the practicability, because 
there it’s quite possible to have an intervention which is in a 
controlled setting, demonstrably effective, but it may simply not be 
practical. I think SMC has the advantage of firstly, it’s got a good 
evidence base; the studies are sufficient numbers, sufficiently large, 
and showing really major impact and certainly some of the studies 
have been conducted under conditions which would allow you to 
already extend it to the idea that this could be applied in a control 
setting rather than a small-scale research study. – KI34 
The reasons for the difference in generalisability are varied, and among the 
explanations that were offered by interviewees was the difference in age group and 
banding (infants less than nine months for IPTi versus from six to sixty months for 
SMC), and also study location (highly seasonal transmission versus a variety of 
transmission settings). The SMC studies were focused only in areas of highly 
seasonal transmission, whereas the goal of the IPTi studies was to be generalisable to 
all of Sub Saharan Africa, which has far more variability in malaria transmission 
(year-round versus seasonal transmission), sometimes within the same country. This, 
in hindsight to those involved with the IPTi studies, made generalisability difficult 
due to the variability in results, compared to the relative homogeneity of the SMC 
study results due to the homogeneous transmission settings.  
In short, by conducting the SMC RCTs in the very countries where the intervention, 
if successfully tested, would be eventually implemented, the SMC researchers helped 
ensure that their studies had good internal as well as external validity, and that their 
portfolio of research as a whole, despite having some weaknesses such as no pre-
existing delivery mechanism, answered a wide enough range of useful questions to 
policy makers that it would be considered more relevant compared with IPTi. As one 
SMC researcher explained: 
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[SMC] was not just a purely academic study, it was really looking 
into how this will be translated into practice and I think that was 
what was really the most exciting aspect of it – it [was] really 
making sure that something that can work 100% will eventually 
work 100% and understanding the gaps…so we could come up with 
a battery of tools and answers to the implementation point, which I 
think is eventually with WHO and the national programmes to say, 
“Well, yes, this is efficacious, but will it be properly implemented 
and how?” And despite the fact that SMC didn’t have a clear 
delivery mechanism, like IPTi with the EPI system, different 
systems were tested through community health workers or health 
facilities or other [mechanisms]…So there was a comparison of what 
might work or might not work. – KI45 
 
IPTi delivery via the Expanded Program on Immunisation (EPI), WHO’s vaccination 
schedule for infants, was viewed by many as a potential strength, as it meant delivery 
would be through the existing health system, when most mothers were already 
visiting health clinics with their infants for their WHO-recommended vaccination 
schedule. Some interviewees, however, perceived the lack of a single pre-existing 
delivery mechanism as a potential strength for SMC, rather than a critical weakness, 
as to them it meant that national malaria control programmes could have more 
flexibility and control over how the intervention could best be delivered in their local 
context. 
 
On a final but critical point, in terms of implementation, some interviewees 
suggested that IPTi might have been of middle to low priority in Ministries of 
Health. While they perceived that research on IPTi ‘in country’ was considered to be 
highly credible (based on robust evidence, and undertaken by respected individuals 
and institutions), and IPTi was perceived to be a relevant intervention to address the 
existing burden of malaria, some interviewees perceived, and speculated, that 
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Ministries of Health were not especially interested in IPTi. They suggested that the 
timing or circumstance for introducing IPTi was not seen as urgent. Some suggested 
that this was due to the Global Fund review, which was happening at the time, which 
therefore resulted in a lack of resources to implement IPTi just when it was needed 
most. In comparison, SMC was perceived to have benefitted from the momentum of 
a relatively quick endorsement by the new MPAC, and a surge in implementation 
funds made available by UNITAID (a global health initiative hosted by WHO, and 
established by the governments of Brazil, Chile, France, Norway, and the U.K. to 
tackle infectious diseases like malaria) just as the WHO policy recommendation on 
SMC was made public, which is evidenced by its high level of policy uptake in 
comparison to IPTi. 
 
(iv) Timing 
 
By more fully and thoughtfully presenting the case for SMC, and eventually perhaps 
also benefitting from external circumstances outside the evidence review process 
such as the surge in implementation funding availability, the SMC researchers 
seemed to shine a light on an obvious potential window of opportunity for an SMC 
policy. One MPAC member pointed out: 
 
There’s a simple rule about getting things into policy, and that is you 
need loads of data. So, really big studies; and [SMC researchers] did 
really big studies. So, beyond safety and efficacy, there are other 
things you consider before you make a policy decision. Okay, well 
we debate a lot about whether we should consider price. Because 
price is a relative thing. I mean it’s not the actual cost of goods; it’s 
how much it will draw away from other interventions. So, if you 
have a policy, if you have something that somebody’s going to pay 
for – it can be very expensive, but somebody is going to pay for it. 
However, with SMC it was dirt cheap. And so there was a feeling, 
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“This is really doable. We’ve got the drugs, they work…” There’s a 
window of opportunity. And it’s not going to cost too much. So 
there’s a bit of a trifecta in a way. – KI51 
 
WHO-GMP staff agreed that this window of opportunity (inexpensive drugs that 
work extremely well, although in a rapidly decreasing area, due to spreading drug 
resistance) accelerated policy uptake, even with lack of evidence around 
implementation. One WHO-GMP staff member admitted: 
 
There was a very strong sense that we have a limited window of 
opportunity because the two drugs in consideration were 
Amodiaquine and Sulfadoxine-Pyrimethamine. Both drugs actually 
have some evidence of resistance, certainly no longer useful in all of 
the Eastern and Southern Africa. But still effective in parts of 
Central Africa and mainly West Africa. So if we were going to, let's 
say, postpone the recommendation asking for more evidence, more 
experience, more operational research, you really risk that the whole 
system would be delayed, and we didn’t have any other efficacy and 
safety data with alternative medicine, so this was like, the only body 
of evidence was these two medicines, and the evidence of impact 
was extremely strong – a 70% reduction in incidence and in severe 
malaria admissions. Okay, there was not so much experience on how 
you can roll it out, what is potentially a highly cost-effective 
intervention, because the medicines are relatively inexpensive. If you 
have a delivery arm that is community workers, it's not so expensive, 
you know. So [SMC] was an area where we can say the 
recommendations were in a way accelerated, or came into policy, 
without having first all the evidence [on implementation 
mechanisms]. – KI35  
 
Several interviewees referred to SMC as being an easy choice in terms of its low 
cost, high efficacy, and a large supply of drugs. One way to explain this phenomenon 
is that it was a rare ‘window of opportunity’ where, unlike for the case of IPTi, 
Kingdon’s (2003) three streams – a ‘problem’ that needs solving, a ‘policy’ solution 
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that is available, and the ‘political’ will to act on it – seemed to have come together 
at the same time.  
 
Kingdon’s (2003) multiple streams that intersect to form policy windows of 
opportunity, is one of several theories often stressed in the evidence use literature 
(for example, see Cairney and Kwiatkowski, 2017, Court and Young, 2003), which 
highlight the importance of opportune timing. In other words, whether a policy 
solution is perceived to be ‘the right drug, at the right time’, and how such policy 
solutions are constructed and negotiated, which is inevitably nuanced, given viable 
solutions involving major policy change take time to develop. Here SMC stands in 
some contrast to IPTi, which was often described as ‘the wrong drug, at the wrong 
time’.  
 
Kingdon (2003) also describes ‘policy stream’ solutions as evolving; they can be 
proposed by one actor and then reconsidered, modified, and ‘softened’, by a large 
number of actors, as some issues take time to become accepted within policy 
networks. IPTi and SMC appear to demonstrate some ‘softening’ over time within 
the global malaria community; many interviewees touched on what is common 
knowledge if you have worked for long enough in global malaria, that although IPTi 
and SMC might sound like relatively new interventions, the initial trials for their 
previous iterations, upon which a more solid evidence base was then built, are more 
than 30 years old (Greenwood, 2018). In addition, because the evidence to policy 
process for IPTi mostly took place before the evidence to policy process for SMC, 
with a little bit of overlap, it is possible that that the SMC researchers were 
influenced by the IPTi researchers about how to (or not to) engage with the policy 
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process. Alternatively, SMC policy makers (for the most part the same experts who 
also advised on the IPTi policy) might have subconsciously warmed to the concept 
of intermittent preventive treatment over time.  
 
As both IPTi and SMC policy development processes demonstrate, the production of 
a perceived policy solution, no matter how ‘credible’ or ‘salient’, may take a long 
time to be considered sufficiently acceptable, for reasons that are hard to untangle, 
and suggest that they might have more to do with just the evidence itself.   
 
5.3 Reflective summary  
 
The particular features of malaria (for example, that it was a severe problem and a 
global priority) should have assured IPTi a place on the global malaria policy 
agenda. Although there were some problems in attaining and interpreting data, the 
indicators used by most IPTi researchers were credible and well-established, and the 
IPTi researchers appeared to be credible and well-established themselves. It was 
around the protective efficacy and safety of IPTi-SP, however, that uncertainties 
arose, and led to increasing contestation of the evidence and the politicisation of IPTi 
as a policy solution, which as discussed previously, is seen to drive ‘political’ uses of 
evidence. 
 
Although the results from the first trial and others suggested that IPTi was cost-
effective, easy to implement through EPI, and that it fulfilled many of the standard 
(to the public health community) criteria of an effective intervention, the studies 
following the first trial did not reach the same level of protective efficacy, raising 
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questions for more research. After additional studies reported their results in 2007, 
uncertainty only increased. While this contributed to scientific debate, and arguably 
more scrutiny on IPTi than many other malaria interventions, it also slowed down 
the IPTi Consortium’s ability to achieve its goal of a quick policy solution, for 
reasons that were confusing and frustrating to Consortium members, but seemingly 
logical to WHO-GMP’s evidence advisory bodies, even though no feature of the 
evidence alone stands out as being so problematic that it would justify policy 
inaction (IPTi pooled protective efficacy, though relatively low in comparison for 
SMC, being otherwise relatively normal, or even good, compared to other malaria 
contol interventions). In other words, despite the IPTi researchers’ best efforts, ‘good 
evidence’ (in the form of the IPTi RCTs) did not appear to be enough for IPTi to be 
perceived as an acceptable policy solution to WHO-GMP and its TEG. 
 
In the case of SMC, the factors that appear to have edged its evidence base over the 
evidence base for IPTi was that it was ultimately perceived to be more relevant to the 
question being asked by the TEG, with the perception of its relative quality as an 
intervention being boosted by the size of its effect (the large drop in morbidity), and 
the high consistency of the results in the various study sites. In other words, SMC 
appeared to be exactly ‘the right drug, at the right time’, emerging as a perceived 
policy solution of superior strength and quality in comparison to IPTi.  
 
Exploring the features of the evidence alone does not entirely account for why this 
was the case, and suggest that other less obvious factors besides the credibility and 
salience of the respective evidence bases mattered in how IPTi and SMC policy 
development was perceived by WHO-GMP, its TEG, and other actors in the process.  
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The findings from this and the previous contextual chapter suggest that the process 
of evidence use, and the political nature of evidence, may also have a nuanced role to 
play in policy development (Liverani et al., 2013, Oliver et al., 2014b, Parkhurst, 
2017) and in how, why, and to what extent, IPTi and SMC were perceived to be 
acceptable policy solutions, or rather, not an acceptable policy solution in the case of 
IPTi. Here exploring the third strand of Cash and colleagues’ (2003) model, 
regarding legitimacy, and the importance of process, might provide further insights 
and lessons within this case study, and are the findings I explore next. 
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Chapter 6: The process of forming global malaria intermittent preventive 
treatment policy 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This results chapter continues the exploration of the various influences on the uses of 
the IPTi and SMC evidence bases in global health policy development, focusing on 
the processes through which evidence ultimately informs global malaria policy 
decisions, in the cases of the WHO IPTi and SMC policies.  
 
This chapter focuses on the third element of my analytical framework, which was 
drawn from Cash and colleagues’ (2003) model regarding legitimacy, and the 
multiple component factors that may influence perceptions of it. Exploring the 
angles of legitimacy in the context of this case complements the previous chapter on 
the features of good evidence because, although the conceptualisation of ‘good’ or 
appropriate evidence notes that evidence should address multiple social concerns, the 
processes through which those concerns are made clear and addressed also matter 
(Parkhurst, 2017), and require further exploration in order to improve our 
understanding of the complexity of evidence use in policy making.  
 
Definitions of legitimacy can differ by academic discipline, but here I broadly refer 
to it as the “generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 594). Cash and colleagues 
(2003) offer a similar though slightly more defined view that legitimacy reflects “the 
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perception that the production of information and technology has been respectful of 
stakeholders’ divergent values and beliefs, unbiased in its conduct, and fair in its 
treatment of opposing views and interests” (p. 8086) which could be considered a 
reflection of what they view to be ‘desirable, proper, or appropriate’ within their 
cases from the field of sustainable development. I prefer the use of the broader 
definition of legitimacy in the context of my case study, because I don’t just explore 
the production of information, I also explore the development of policy itself. In 
addition, the broader definition acknowledges that concepts such as ‘bias’ and 
‘fairness’ and other elements of ‘appropriateness’, which I explore in this chapter, 
are essentially socially constructed, which is left unstated and perhaps taken for 
granted in Cash and colleagues’ narrower definition of legitimacy. 
 
Within the context of global malaria preventive treatment policy development, and 
the global malaria community’s own socially constructed system of norms, values, 
and beliefs, the policy development process for SMC was perceived by stakeholders 
to be ‘better’ by being seemingly smoother and less contentious a journey compared 
to the process for IPTi. This chapter attempts to explore how and why the SMC 
policy development process was considered to be smoother and less contentious 
relative to IPTi, and how often seemingly implicit, though sometimes explicit, codes, 
behaviours, and structures within policy development processes influence how the 
policy development process is perceived, which may in turn contribute to 
perceptions of its legitimacy, where actor/stakeholder acceptance of the policy 
development process or outcome could be considered an early embodiment of 
perceived ‘policy success’, as was the case for SMC.  
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6.2 Findings 
 
First I present the themes that emerged from my analysis of comparing differences 
between IPTp and SMC policy processes, before summarising the findings with 
some reflections on this subset of my thesis results. 
 
6.2.1 Differences affecting legitimacy 
 
As we can gather, based on the exploration of the concepts of ‘credibility’ and 
‘salience’ in the previous chapter, legitimacy is a broad concept that is made up 
from, and can rely on, a wide range of possible factors. These are explored in the 
following subsections on structural differences, expectations and framing, conflicting 
agendas, transparency, and representation, which emerged from my data and 
subsequently helped inform my analytical framework. Many of the themes discussed 
in this section on the legitimacy of IPTi and SMC policy development processes can 
be seen to relate to what March and Olsen (2011) would call the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’, and how it influences institutional behaviour as well as the 
behaviour of individuals within those institutions. They offer that policy making is 
driven by the ‘rules’ of appropriate behaviour, and that these rules are followed by 
actors within institutions because they are seen as “natural, rightful, expected, and 
legitimate”, and help fulfil their perceived obligations of their role within a group. In 
other words, actors will “do what they see as appropriate for themselves in a specific 
type of [institutional] situation.” (March and Olsen, 2011, p. 1) 
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According to March and Olsen (2011), as well as other scholars of institutional 
theory and approaches (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008, Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, 
Peters, 2005, Suchman, 1995), institutions (such as the IPTi Consortium, the BMGF, 
or WHO-GMP, in this case) come in a variety of forms, and can be viewed as 
collections of procedures, which are enacted by actors within those institutions, who 
often use rules as part of a code of appropriate behaviour, which is socially and 
collectively learned, and internalised.  
 
In the context of my case, the IPTi Consortium was technically a network of 
institutions, a time-limited global malaria research partnership to be specific, whose 
explicit goal was to see IPTi through to becoming a WHO global malaria policy 
recommendation. In comparison to the looser or more informally connected 
association of actors that worked on SMC, the IPTi Consortium was a formal 
coalition of different and overlapping communities of researchers and policy makers 
(see IPTi Consortium, 2003 and Figure 2). At its centre, and similar to SMC, was a 
community composed of professional researchers and scientists (primarily linked to 
LSHTM, but also involving other renowned academic institutions specialising in 
malaria such as the Barcelona Institute of Global Health, where the IPTi 
Consortium’s ‘core administration’ was based – see Figure 2). These actors shared a 
common commitment to tackling malaria to prevent morbidity and mortality, 
especially in infants and children in Africa, but, as we shall explore in the subsequent 
subsections, there were also several differences when it came to their own logics of 
appropriateness, and the rules by which they conducted themselves. 
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(i) Structural differences 
 
One of the reasons for process-related differences which may have impacted 
eventual policy outcomes, and the reason why the two policy development processes 
within this case are not directly comparable (as previously discussed in section 1.4) 
is something I came to realise over the course of my interviews and concurrent 
analysis, which was that there were structural differences in how the IPTi and SMC 
research groups were organised, as well as differences in the WHO evidence 
advisory processes that reviewed both the IPTi and SMC evidence bases in order to 
make a policy recommendation to WHO-GMP. These research-related and policy 
development process-related structural differences, discussed next, would likely have 
affected the implicit and explicit rules or codes of appropriate behaviour followed by 
the actors within the IPTi Consortium and WHO-GMP for example, and may in turn 
have influenced the various elements affecting the legitimacy of the IPTi and SMC 
policy development processes, such as actor expectations, and research or policy 
process framing, transparency, and membership and representation on committees 
(themes that emerged from my interview data, which are explored in the subsections 
that follow this one on structural differences).     
 
Research-related structures 
 
As described in previous chapters, the encouraging results of the first IPTi trial in 
Ifakara, Tanzania in 2001 (Schellenberg et al., 2001) led to excitement among the 
core group of scientists involved in this trial, because they had proof of an 
intervention that could potentially transform the landscape of global malaria control 
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efforts, particularly in Africa. This led to the creation soon after of the IPTi 
Consortium, a formal research consortium whose primary aim was to inform policy 
and practice for IPTi in Africa through their own scientifically robust and policy-
oriented research (IPTi Consortium, 2003). In comparison, the various researchers 
that worked on SMC studies did not have a formal structure and had no such explicit 
policy aim. 
 
In addition, and unlike with the SMC set of studies, the BMGF was considered to be 
a member of the IPTi Consortium (see Figure 2), liaising with a broad set of 
stakeholders in order to see knowledge executed as practice. Other consortium 
members viewed the BMGF as a highly valued funder and active member of the 
consortium. Several interviewees referred to the strong professional reputations of 
the BMGF representatives involved in the IPTi Consortium, describing the BMGF as 
having the advantage of being able to identify problems and solutions quickly, 
providing leverage to move issues forward, as well as to acting as brokers or 
facilitators in the policy process, although as we will soon discuss, this was not 
necessarily always well received. In comparison, for the SMC set of studies, the 
BMGF maintained, and was perceived as maintaining, far more distance as a funder.  
 
The third institution or set of actors involved with the policy process for both sets of 
studies was WHO-GMP. Similar to the BMGF (and in contrast to the SMC set of 
studies later on), WHO-GMP was also involved with the IPTi Consortium as a 
member, via the BMGF-funded and WHO-hosted IPTi Policy Platform (see Figure 
2). As described earlier, the objective of the Policy Platform was to bridge the 
perceived research‐policy gap, by facilitating the evidence from the IPTi studies 
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through the WHO evidence review process, so that WHO-GMP could reach a global 
policy recommendation on IPTi (WHO, 2006b).  
 
Policy development process-related structures 
 
As mentioned previously, at the time of the IPTi Consortium, and prior to the 
existence of MPAC, the evidence review process at WHO-GMP involved multiple 
levels of evidence review (see Appendix 3). The first level was the TEG, which 
reported to the TRAC, which in turn reported to the STAG, before a policy could 
finally be signed off by the WHO (D’Souza, 2014). Interventions involving vaccines 
(programme delivery through WHO’s EPI vaccine schedule in the case of IPTi) also 
needed to be endorsed by the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) which 
serves as the high-level evidence advisory body of the Department of Immunisation, 
Vaccines and Biologicals (IVB) at WHO (essentially, the SAGE is the IVB and 
vaccines equivalent of what is now the MPAC for WHO-GMP and malaria). Since 
IPTi was designed to be delivered through the EPI programme, it was due to be 
reviewed by all four of the committees mentioned above.  
 
In contrast, by the time for evidence review of the SMC set of studies in 2011, and 
benefiting from a restructure that was specifically intended to make the policy 
process more transparent, responsive, and credible (see D'Souza and Newman, 
2012), there were just two levels, the TEG and the MPAC, which the TEG reported 
to.   
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Beyond these research and policy development process-related structural differences 
however, there were a few other themes that emerged from comparing the 
differences in the policy development processes for IPTi and SMC. 
 
(ii) Expectations and framing 
 
One marked difference between the policy processes for SMC and IPTi was that the 
SMC researchers did not have the expectation (nor the pressure of an explicitly 
stated goal) of a linear policy process where their research would have immediate 
policy impact.  
 
In the proposal sent to the BMGF in 2003, the researchers who would later form part 
of the IPTi Consortium stated “the evaluation of IPTi should proceed ... rapidly ... if 
results of the early morbidity studies are consistent ….” (IPTi Consortium, 2003, p. 
11). It was clear that despite mention of the conditional “if”, that there were high 
expectations that IPTi knowledge transfer would be quick and that “…by the end of 
2005 it may be possible to make a policy recommendation on IPTi.” (IPTi 
Consortium, 2003, p. 15). Further, there was consensus at the time among all 
members of the Consortium (researchers and policy makers) that the process from 
research to policy should be rapid: “UNICEF and WHO are prepared to provide the 
necessary technical and policy support to enable programme implementation as soon 
as the relevant information becomes available.” (IPTi Consortium, 2003, p. 2). 
 
It was thus planned that policy engagement would take place alongside (and not at 
the end of) the process of generating the evidence on IPTi. A strategy was devised 
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(known within the IPTi Consortium as ‘the green line’), which set out a clear 
schedule that by the end of 2005, the Consortium would have generated a substantive 
body of evidence on IPTi-SP (efficacy, EPI interactions, safety and drug resistance) 
to inform a policy recommendation (see Figure 1); and that by 2008 it would 
produce further scientific evidence on IPTi as related to the above areas but using 
drugs other than SP to provide WHO with alternatives in the face of increasing drug 
resistance (WHO, 2006b).  
 
By framing the value of their research, and their own success as a consortium, 
around a quick policy recommendation by WHO, the IPTi Consortium put 
themselves, and by extension, the WHO-GMP evidence advisory process, under 
significant pressure. One interviewee later recalled: 
 
Now where the IPTi consortium went wrong was that there was this 
day which was called the “green line” where we all go to it with all 
our evidence, and then the policy decision to implement IPTi would 
be made, but of course the reality is that the evidence would be 
considered and then a decision for IPTi policy would be made. But it 
wasn’t really figured out like that. It was figured out that the “green 
line” meant green for go, and IPTi would be recommended, and IPTi 
would be implemented. And I think that that was really the biggest 
error, [the] supposition that the data would support a decision to go 
ahead. – KI44 
 
Although similar policy engagement also took place alongside the process of 
generating evidence on SMC, that process was perceived to be more organic, for 
example, via informal (by WHO standards) meetings between SMC researchers, 
WHO, and national malaria control programmes, in 2008.  
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The SMC researchers, in comparison, were not part of a formal ‘SMC Consortium’ 
with an overt agenda to achieve policy goals. One reason for this is that they might 
have learned lessons from observing the experience of global malaria colleagues in 
the IPTi Consortium, who were in the midst of repeated TEG reviews and tensions 
with WHO-GMP at around the same time, although no SMC interviewees explicitly 
stated that they were influenced by the IPTi Consortium in this way. In any case, 
SMC researchers did not appear to have high expectations of quick knowledge 
transfer, nor the pressure of self-imposed ‘green lines’ to contend with, which might 
have contributed to a less fraught policy process with relatively tempered 
expectations, despite consistently highly efficacious trial results. 
 
The advocacy-oriented optimistic framing of the IPTi Consortium was clear in their 
proposal to establish the Policy Platform which was sub-headed “Planning for 
Success” (WHO, 2006b). In the ‘expected outcomes’ section of the proposal, it 
stated: “This 4-year programme of work assumes that the research evidence on IPTi 
will be favourable” (WHO, 2006b, p. 5). 
 
While none of the subsequent trials to the first Ifakara one in Tanzania achieved the 
same high level of protective efficacy (Aponte et al., 2009) – in contrast to the SMC 
set of studies which showed consistently highly levels of efficacy described in the 
previous chapter – the 2006 TEG nevertheless advised WHO that IPTi be 
conditionally introduced where appropriate. Had WHO accepted the policy advice 
and issued a recommendation on IPTi, the IPTi Consortium’s internal framing and 
vision of a linear policy process with definitive RCT results would have been 
realised.  
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However, in 2007, the TEG and WHO-GMP rescinded their policy decision. This 
decision was based on the final results from the IPTi trials in Ghana in 2007, which 
reported the occurrence of some severe side effects. A second TEG meeting took 
place in October 2007 (see Figure 3), which reviewed the existing data, in addition to 
further data and analysis (WHO, 2007a). The conclusions of the second TEG were 
more cautious than the first one, citing safety concerns and uncertainty around the 
level of protective efficacy for IPTi, saying that while IPTi-SP “remains a promising 
intervention... [and the] established benefits ... might override the safety concerns”, it 
recommended another TEG review take place in 2008 when new data became 
available (WHO, 2007a, p. 7). 
 
(iii) Broken consensus 
 
As the linear approach of the IPTi Consortium was challenged, many in the research 
and policy community felt conflicted, which was perceived by many interviewees as 
relating to the tension between scientific independence and advocacy (Cruz and 
Walt, 2013).  Some interviewees talked of the enormous ‘psychological effect’ from 
the positive results produced by the first trial, although a few interviewees suggested 
that with hindsight these may have been overly optimistic, as pooled protective 
efficacy results from Aponte and colleagues (2009) within the IPTi Consortium, and 
the drawn out policy development process for IPTi, later demonstrated.  
 
The confidence in the initial results, and the seemingly large amount of funding (for 
the time period) invested in the IPTi Consortium (USD $28 million), were suggested 
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to have led to pressure for a quick IPTi policy recommendation. Other interviewees 
suggested that the IPTi Consortium may have been partially blinded by its overt 
advocacy-oriented approach, and therefore couldn’t see perceived flaws in its 
research or behaviour. On the other hand, while conceding that the energy generated 
by the first IPTi trial played a strong part in setting the tone for the Consortium and 
its work, some Consortium members pointed out that in a time of limited policy 
alternatives, their enthusiastic (almost evangelical, according to some interviewees) 
approach was justified. 
 
Other reflections by interviewees also illustrated the growing unease among and 
between IPTi Consortium members. There was a perception among some members 
of the IPTi Consortium that there was some form of ‘a party line’ or unspoken rule 
about how they ought to frame or position their research in the face of uncertainty. 
For example, a few IPTi Consortium members felt that inconclusive results, or 
concerns over adverse side effects whose causes were unknown, were met with some 
hostility from more senior members of the IPTi Consortium. Others resented that 
there was a peer review process within the IPTi Consortium before papers could be 
submitted to scientific journals. They, as researchers, felt discomfort at the seeming 
conflict of interest that lay between producing evidence, and then shaping or 
presenting it in a way that felt, to them, somewhat corporate. These insights are 
consistent with Cruz and Walt’s (2013) previous findings about the IPTi policy 
process, and the tensions and challenges between actors that arise when brokering 
the boundary between science and advocacy (Smith and Stewart, 2017). Yet other 
interviewees felt “it doesn’t matter if someone’s perceived to be an [advocate], as 
long as the process is good” (KI36). According to some interviewees, the lack of 
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consensus within the IPTi Consortium on how best to manage evidence generation 
and facilitation appeared to further break down the longer the seemingly strained 
policy development process went on.  
 
In the following subsections, I explore the growing tensions and possible sources of 
conflict arising from what appeared to be differences in expectations and framing, 
and a breakdown in consensus, among the three main groups of actors involved in 
the IPTi and SMC policy processes: researchers, the BMGF (funders), and WHO-
GMP (the policy makers/ stewards of evidence-based policy and guidance for 
malaria-endemic countries). 
 
(iv) Conflicting agendas 
 
As highlighted in the chapter subsections so far on the differences in institutional 
structures, and expectations of, and framing by, the IPTi researchers, the IPTi 
Consortium was specifically designed to draw on its strengths as a group of 
researchers, funders, and policy makers to support, analyse, and synthesise the 
findings from a number of IPTi studies across various disciplines, and through the 
Policy Platform to inform the evidence review process to get to a global IPTi policy 
decision (IPTi Consortium, 2003). However, the breakdown in consensus and 
increasing tensions between actors that have been described so far were moving the 
Consortium down a path where the political nature of evidence, and the tensions it 
was causing between actors, would soon come to a head, or rather, in terms of the 
policy development process, a stall.  
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Part of the cause for conflict might have been that the IPTi Consortium, from its 
inception, framed its activities as part of a linear process to translate research into 
policy by setting up the Policy Platform in parallel to evidence generation, and in 
order to accelerate the policy process (WHO, 2006b). However, in reality, the IPTi 
Consortium was made up of actors from different institutions, with different 
institutional logics, ranging from a focus on science (e.g. LSHTM), to a concern with 
‘saving lives’ (BMGF), and agreeing global malaria policy (WHO-GMP).  
 
Researchers as policy advocates 
 
When in 2007 the TEG overturned its 2006 policy advice to WHO-GMP (see Figure 
3), reportedly due to safety concerns, the decision reflected a tension created by the 
contestation over evidence which some IPTi researchers took seeming personal issue 
with. Some IPTi researchers suggested the change was due to how they were being 
perceived as advocates, rather than the evidence base itself. In these IPTi 
researchers’ view, WHO policy decisions should be based on evidence alone. One 
IPTi Consortium member explained the reason for their indignation: 
 
The tool should be judged on the merit of the evidence, not on how 
the investigators are perceived...whether they’re more vocal or less 
vocal or activists or not activists. I mean it’s nonsense. The problem 
is the moment one accepts the world of perceptions to influence a 
policy making process then we have a big, big problem…In a policy 
making process [perception] is irrelevant as long as the data, and the 
quality [of the evidence] is good. All our [IPTi] data [was] published 
in very highly respected journals....We produced 60, 70 papers and 
it’s not that we hid the evidence; all the evidence was immediately 
put in the public domain. What else [could] we do? They can say, 
“We don’t like [IPTi researcher] because he’s a loud mouth.” Fine, I 
can perfectly understand that, but that should not impact the way the 
evidence is viewed. – KI36 
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However, researchers being perceived as advocates did appear to impact the way the 
(IPTi) evidence was viewed, and how it was subsequently dealt with by WHO-
GMP’s evidence advisory bodies, which speaks to what Smith and others (Smith, 
2013, Smith et al., 2016) describe as some of the risks and unintended consequences 
of researchers engaging with public health advocacy, such as perceptions of bias, the 
loss of credibility due to perceptions of undue funder influence (discussed in the next 
subsection), and actually constraining, versus enabling, policy action. Related to this 
last point, one TEG member reflected: 
 
[Because of] the safety, lack of efficacy, uncertainties…it was a 
political hot potato. That’s how it was introduced to me. There’re a 
lot of pressures. The investigators are pushing. BMGF are pushing. 
At the highest levels within WHO. This is a real political hot potato. 
So we decided that we weren’t going to reject it, but we weren’t 
going to accept it. We decided we needed more information. – KI51 
 
This form of stalling appears to have contributed to a perception of the commonly-
held view within public health of ‘two sides’ pitted against the other (Lin and 
Gibson, 2003). As one IPTi Consortium member summarised: 
 
It was bad. Aggressive from some of the researchers, aggressive 
from some members of the BMGF, an aggressive push back from 
WHO, I’ve never seen anything like it before. Everyone seemed to 
rally on the two sides. – KI49 
 
There was the earlier-described tension within the research community as well, 
where some IPTi Consortium members expressed their commitment to contributing 
to public health (reducing malaria morbidity and mortality) by wanting to directly 
impact the policy process via proactive advocacy-oriented engagement, which is 
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what Cairney (2015) suggests more researchers should be doing. Others felt, 
however, that scientists had to stay neutral and focused on the research, and that 
directly engaging with the policy process was outside their area of authority and 
comfort zone i.e. that it somehow felt inappropriate. Still others in the IPTi 
Consortium were torn between both science and advocacy, feeling compelled to 
generate robust evidence, but also responsible for actively influencing the policy 
process (see also Cruz and Walt, 2013).  
 
Although these tensions were less of an issue within the SMC policy process, many 
SMC researchers also echoed these mixed views about the role of researchers, and 
where exactly they should step into the part of the policy development process that 
involves some level of advocacy, sometimes at the necessary expense of objectivity 
according to Cairney and Kwiatkowski (2017). One SMC researcher explained their 
own views on the matter: 
 
You try to make sure that the key people know about it and that’s by 
having a meeting or a symposium. Taking that any further, I’ve 
always been on the side that investigators shouldn’t become 
lobbyists, and that somebody else should do that. You may need a 
lobbyist, but those are different people, it shouldn’t be the 
investigators who did the trials…they may be asked to help, but you 
shouldn’t have one of the key investigators initiating that process. – 
KI29 
 
It would appear that the perceived overt advocacy by some IPTi Consortium 
members, a role not congruent with how good scientists should be seen to behave 
according to the expectations of many of their peers, caused this set of actors to 
appear less neutral and therefore less credible, and so undermined their perceived 
legitimacy within the IPTi policy development process. This was a consistent 
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reflection across the various groups of interviewees – funder, researcher, TEG 
members and WHO staff. For example, one member of BMGF reflected: 
 
I think clearly a problem [was] that WHO perceived the IPTi 
Consortium as being a mixture of investigators and advocates, and 
without a clear separation of those. So they saw this group as putting 
evidence forward and advocating strongly for implementation, for 
adoption of policy and implementation of IPTi. In fact, I think, in 
some ways the Consortium was perceived more as advocates than as 
sort of independent, unbiased investigators and so that colours the 
way things are looked at. If you think these people are flogging 
something and they’ve got lots of biases, then surely their data is 
biased and they’re not revealing … For example, they may not have 
done the studies well enough to be sure that there aren’t adverse 
reactions. That was a big issue. You could ask “Really? Did you 
really set things up so you picked up the signals?” –KI23 
 
Many within the IPTi Consortium also expressed unease at the fine line between 
science and advocacy, the pressure it created, and ultimately the breakdown, instead 
of building, in trust it brought about between various actor groups, another critical 
component of a ‘good’ policy development process (Cairney and Kwiatkowski, 
2017). One Consortium member recalled an incident during a conference call to 
discuss the pooled analysis of IPTi results: 
 
All these people are on a pooled analysis phone call and the end 
point of the pooled analysis would be manipulated to get the best 
figure. And one day they got manipulated and suddenly the death 
rate was higher in the [research] arm. So it’s “Oh, no we can’t do 
that.” You don’t manipulate the data to make it look good. And I 
think that kind of behaviour undermined the consortium so 
massively that people just thought these people they’re, you know, 
they have their own agendas, they’re pushing this because, so I mean 
right from the start you know when you look at it from that kind of 
tainted lens you’re just paranoid about the consortium. –KI44 
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The claim of data manipulation is not a point that was commonly repeated, although 
it was generally acknowledged that pooling data for IPTi was difficult due to the 
variation in results across sites, and that changing figures, and aggressively pushing 
for them, drew suspicion, particularly from WHO-GMP. As one WHO-GMP staff 
member explained: 
I got irritated by what I saw of…the internal communication in the 
IPTi Consortium...the way they were planning how to work with 
WHO, how to get through to which levels and deciding what kind of 
decision making approval and what WHO policy is and so on, 
instead of leaving that to us...that pushiness definitely made things 
worse; it made me extremely irritated. –KI46 
In comparison, the researchers who were part of the SMC studies were perceived to 
have played their expected neutral role, which might have helped maintain their 
credibility, through appearing to be more fair and unbiased. One WHO-GMP staff 
member reflected: 
I think a lot of people like I perceive the [SMC researchers] to be 
behaving the way that you expect scientists should behave…really 
seeing various sides and carefully looking at various angles. –KI35 
This perceived caution and neutrality, perhaps meant to be symbolic of their 
scientific impartiality and rigour, was also reflected by many SMC researchers as 
something they were proud of, as it was a value that set them apart from IPTi 
researchers. One SMC researcher elaborated: 
I would say that the [Principal Investigators] involved in IPTi were 
very emotional, very much driven by, kind of ideology driven. They 
had strong belief that this is the best policy. And then, secondly, that 
spilled into promising this funder that this is a fantastic policy, it will 
become a policy by X number of years, we are creating data to make 
that policy, we are sure to make it a policy. [SMC researchers] didn't 
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have an expectation. There was no [ideology]...even though we saw 
80 plus per cent protective efficacy, still there were doubters. –KI32 
 
It seems that the behaviour and actions of the SMC researchers may have helped 
maintain the perceived legitimacy of the SMC policy-development process relative 
to IPTi. In addition, the SMC researchers’ relatively neutral behaviour did not go 
unnoticed by observers of WHO’s evidence advisory processes, who could also be 
considered sources of legitimacy for WHO policy decisions, since they form part of 
the audience or jury that judges whether the policy development process has been 
credible and acceptable, which in turn affects how policies themselves are perceived. 
One IPTi and SMC stakeholder explained: 
 
SMC [researchers], whilst being obviously also funded by the 
BMGF did not have the same aggressive push. I’ve never heard 
anybody say anything bad about how SMC was introduced [for 
policy consideration]. – KI49 
 
Funders as consortium members 
 
One of the IPTi Consortium’s most influential members was the BMGF, credited 
with, amongst other things, inaugurating a new era of scientific commitment to 
global health problems through its energetic advocacy (The Lancet, 2009) and 
research (Black et al., 2009). The BMGF’s participation in key meetings of the 
Consortium was largely seen as positive and helpful, particularly in the instance of 
what felt like the ‘lost year’ of 2008 when frustrations among Consortium members 
had reached a peak because they perceived the WHO evidence review process to 
have stalled.  
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In the IPTi Consortium members’ view, the WHO-GMP evidence review and policy 
development process for IPTi lacked transparency and was too influenced by WHO-
GMP staff, such as then WHO-GMP director Dr. Kochi, who were believed to have 
had personal reservations about IPTi as a malaria prevention intervention. One 
member of BMGF explained their perspective of what happened during the IPTi 
process: 
There was a certain degree of slowness, if not reluctance, within 
WHO, the [Global] Malaria Programme, to actually review the IPTi 
data…I think there was not a lot of enthusiasm amongst people 
responsible for this, to get this done. So it really required a lot of 
pushing. And as you know, we eventually said, “Well, it’s not 
happening in WHO. We’re gonna go to the Institute of Medicine” 
and we asked the Institute of Medicine…So it’s interesting to see 
how they handled that and how IOM came out with their report, 
which stands as some contrast to how the WHO handled the process. 
It really required pushing to get things done. You’ve got to have a 
policy making process which is … a transparent, predictable, 
credible process that’s accepted by the community… [For IPTi] it 
became a matter of individuals and the position and influence of 
individuals who were in the [WHO Global Malaria] Programme. – 
KI23 
This period, thus, exposed tensions as to whose mandate it was to translate evidence 
into policy and practice. WHO-GMP felt pressurised by the BMGF to move faster 
than it deemed reasonable. The BMGF responded to other IPTi Consortium 
members’ perceptions of a stagnant process, by, for example, commissioning the 
IoM review. From the BMGF’s perspective, their behaviour was justified by the 
Consortium’s frustration and lack of trust in the WHO-GMP policy development 
process. They explained: 
I think the difficulty was, we actually had to push on WHO just to 
get this done, which is why we went to the Institute of Medicine. I 
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mean, it’s like saying, “Can we can get some other group to look at 
this and kinda push WHO into doing something?!” [WHO] sort of 
said, “Well, you know, you don’t have enough evidence yet” and 
began to insist on peer review publications of all evidence, which is 
bogus. I mean, that’s totally bogus and that’s what we felt. “Well, 
we really can’t consider this because these are not published yet in 
peer review journals.” That’s a bunch of nonsense. Sorry. – KI23 
 
The BMGF’s behaviour was then criticised by some stakeholders as challenging 
WHO’s – albeit perceived to be weak at the time – policy development process 
without taking into consideration either the responsibilities WHO had towards its 
members states when providing a global policy recommendation, not to mention its 
formal mandate to be the provider of that particular type of policy advice. Several 
interviewees expressed their discomfort with the seeming power struggle between 
two influential institutions (WHO and BMGF), with one IPTi consortium member 
admitting: 
 
WHO at that time didn’t have a totally transparent and accepted 
approach to [set policy] which led the BMGF to go to the Institute of 
Medicine to do another review because they weren’t happy with the 
process… that’s not ideal, the Institute of Medicine in Washington 
shouldn’t be deciding policy for African countries; they don’t have 
any mandate to do that. – KI54 
 
One possible reason for these perceived missteps was that the BMGF was both a 
funder (in their case, wanting to see positive outcomes, in this case a WHO 
recommendation, as promised to them as a near certainty in the IPTi Consortium’s 
proposal to them in 2003, which they subsequently approved and funded) and an 
IPTi Consortium member. Although the Consortium was coordinated via a ‘core 
administration’ secretariat based in Barcelona, the BMGF essentially still managed 
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sub-project finances and results reporting (IPTi Consortium, 2003), including the 
Policy Platform established within WHO-GMP (WHO, 2006b) – see Figure 2.  
 
By seeming to have attempted to undermine WHO-GMP through its efforts to speed 
up the policy development process, the BMGF might have inadvertently undermined 
its own credibility as an actor within the IPTi policy process, thus affecting the 
perceptions of the various actors involved, and the perceived legitimacy of the 
process itself. One staff member at the Foundation reflected on their lessons learned: 
 
Quite clearly, the Gates Foundation was not regarded as 
independent. In fact, I think there was a concern that because we 
were funding WHO, we contaminated the process. It was perceived 
that we were funding WHO not to do an independent assessment, 
but to develop a policy recommendation for IPTi. That our goal was 
not an independent review, but a policy recommendation, almost like 
it didn’t matter what the evidence was… You know, it wasn’t just 
making the grants and the whole process of shepherding this effort… 
we were also trying to get this process to work. With that investment 
of money and effort, if you were to ask me now, “Was it worth it?” I 
would say, “No, we got it wrong.” –KI23 
 
This is in contrast to the SMC policy process where the BMGF was perceived at 
least to be very much ‘hands off’ and less aggressive, which might have made the 
process appear more acceptable as a result. A SMC researcher reflected on their 
experience compared to that of IPTi colleagues: 
 
[SMC] was also funded by the Gates Foundation, interestingly, but 
there was no pressure from the Gates Foundation at all. It was 
completely the academics who did the study, [and] went to WHO. 
[There was] less pressure. – KI32 
 
Other stakeholders and observers of both the IPTi and SMC processes echoed this 
perception, of a more tempered approach by BMGF when it came to SMC, which 
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perhaps benefitted from their experience from the IPTi policy development process. 
For example, one stakeholder remarked: 
 
SMC came through a similar process but somehow, and I think it’s 
because the Gates Foundation, and others, probably learnt key 
lessons, and it was more clearly through a [process] and a different 
way of funding that didn’t look like it was the Gates Foundation 
versus the WHO. – KI49 
 
Reflections on policy development process learnings like these were common; the 
lack of pressure and, as a result, conflict during the SMC policy development 
process was considered by many key informants to be its positive defining feature, in 
contrast with what was viewed by many as almost ‘par for the course’ for IPTi and 
its seemingly constant legitimacy undermining missteps. 
 
WHO as consortium members 
 
One such perceived misstep was WHO-GMP’s own role as both participant and 
reviewer of the IPTi Consortium’s work. From the start, the IPTi Policy Platform 
was in an ambiguous and precarious relationship within the WHO – it was part of the 
Consortium, but also part of WHO-GMP (WHO, 2006b). One of the Platform’s first 
actions was to support the independent TEG meeting held in 2006, but when the 
reports of potential serious side effects were made, the WHO staff who were part of 
the Policy Platform felt caught between strongly convinced IPTi Consortium 
members, and uncertainty about safety from researchers and programme managers 
within and outside the Consortium.  
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It appears that two key assumptions in the original concept of the Policy Platform, 
that the partnership and cohesion between institutions would remain high, and that 
the Policy Platform would help direct the WHO policy development process rapidly 
towards an IPTi policy decision (WHO, 2006b), turned out to be mistaken. In reality, 
the Policy Platform was unable to negotiate the tensions over the distinctly different 
expectations of the various actors involved. One of the SMC researchers who had 
also been involved in the IPTi process reflected:  
 
I think having the IPTi Consortium funding a position within GMP 
created a bit of a tension. Because [it's like] you're having a plant in 
the policy-making department, that we are producing this 
information, and that person is paid by the IPTi Consortium. So, 
some of the people who were not part of the IPTi Consortium within 
GMP, they were probably seeing the pressure coming from [the 
Consortium]. So there's a bit of a division within the GMP staff 
themselves - those pro-IPTi, and those cautious towards IPTi. But 
SMC did not have such a position within GMP. There may have 
been divisions, there may have been differences of opinion, but that's 
not because of the SMC people funding somebody. That's the 
difference. – KI32 
 
In retrospect, many key informants felt that the Policy Platform was a strategic 
mistake, and that WHO-GMP should never have been part of the IPTi Consortium, 
let alone home to its policy facilitating platform; that this was a conflict of interest 
and detracted from the legitimacy of the process and the ‘balancing act’ that is a 
WHO policy recommendation. One IPTi Consortium member who later went on to 
work at WHO explained the reason for their now changed point of view: 
 
There was one WHO staff member who was put on the IPTi 
proposal as part of the Consortium. Later on, this wound up raising 
questions about whether one should have someone as part of a 
consortium who is part of the institution that will be judge and jury 
of the evidence being generated. Does that blur those lines too 
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much?  I have to say that I have probably changed my view of that 
over time. I remember at the time being indignant that how could 
WHO have agreed to be part of the consortium, and then later 
reversing its position and claiming that it was not right for WHO to 
play that role. Now that I have spent time at WHO, and understand 
the importance of the independence of that evidence making process, 
I now understand those concerns. And I think that it probably is not 
a good idea to have someone as part of a consortium who is part of 
the agency that is convening the evidence review process; some 
separation is necessary. It doesn’t need to be a firewall. There can be 
a dialogue, but you can’t have that person be part of the group. They 
need to be having regular exchanges with the group and helping to 
steer the sort of evidence base that’s required, but not be implicated 
as part of that group. I think that is an important balancing act. – 
KI39 
 
This was not a mistake that appeared to be repeated for the SMC set of studies. Not 
only was there no irate consortium to deal with, and it would appear, no overt policy 
agenda, WHO-GMP was the one positively perceived as a ‘hands on’ partner, 
meeting for informal consultations between 2009 and 2010 when SMC researchers 
were collectively preparing their dossier for evidence review by the TEG. This was 
not perceived to be a conflict of interest by WHO-GMP, but rather that it was in 
everyone’s interest to make the process smooth while still maintaining institutional 
integrity via independence, mutual respect, and transparency. One WHO-GMP staff 
member recalled their experience with SMC: 
 
I think [the SMC researchers] were much more systematic. A very 
good indication was the convening of early meetings with WHO to 
discuss how the evidence should be presented, and who should be 
attending the evidence review meeting. This preparatory work was 
essential and very productive for both sides. – KI42 
 
Thoughtful preparation, and a clear WHO process for evidence review, that was 
transparent to all involved, appeared to be quite an important feature of the SMC 
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policy development process according to many interviewees, both within and outside 
of WHO. As a result, it would appear that during the SMC policy development 
process, WHO-GMP was able to fulfil its own ideal expectations of itself and its 
mandate without having to defend itself against other actors as it felt forced to do 
during the IPTi policy development process. By maintaining its credibility during the 
SMC process, WHO-GMP appears to have maintained its legitimacy as a global 
health policy actor, which might have helped maintain the legitimacy of the policy 
development process itself. 
 
(v) Consensus versus transparency 
 
The data suggest that the breakdown in consensus and lack of trust in the policy 
process, due to the diverging expectations, perceived biases, and conflicting agendas 
of the various groups of actors involved (researchers, funder, WHO), led to a slower 
policy development process for IPTi, in comparison to SMC.  
 
One MPAC member explained what they viewed to be the link between consensus 
within the policy development process, and the quality of the evidence base, and 
subsequent policy outcomes: 
 
I was aware of the very strong and divergent views of some of the 
people involved in [IPTi] and the fact that that was the case, that it 
was over a long period of time, that it had engendered really quite 
divergent views, implied … usually when there’s very divergent 
views and the [policy process] is stretched out it normally implies 
that the evidence base isn’t clear. Because if the evidence base is 
clear then it won’t be difficult to come to a decision. IPTI – in my 
understanding – didn’t achieve good consensus very quickly, and 
I’m not sure that it ever achieved consensus, and I think that’s 
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reflected in the degree to which it’s not been taken up by countries. – 
KI34 
Although several interviewees also highlighted the lack of consensus around IPTi as 
being problematic – either cause for concern from the point of view of WHO-GMP 
staff, or cause for frustration from the point of view of IPTi Consortium members – 
others, however, suggested that they didn’t view a lack of consensus to be a defining 
issue for IPTi (given policy decisions in malaria are rarely as clear cut as they 
seemed to be in the case for SMC), but rather it was the lack of transparency around 
the policy process for IPTi, which really lead to problems and deepening mistrust 
between all the actors involved. These key informants suggested that in many ways 
they viewed lack of consensus, or contestation, to be relatively normal, and that it 
was not unusual to respectfully agree to disagree with colleagues in scientific debates 
(although in the case of IPTi, disagreements were not always viewed as being 
respectful), as long as it was clear how policy conclusions were drawn. Many 
informants suggested that there was an implicit understanding that policy makers 
often have multiple considerations beyond evidence when making policy decisions, 
however that made process transparency all the more key. One researcher who was 
involved with both IPTi and SMC policy processes elaborated: 
For IPTI, it did not seem like a clear process; it seemed a bit cloak 
and dagger, or that events were taking place in a smoky dark room. 
There was no transparency as to how the process was supposed to be 
conducted. For the review of SMC, the fact that the Malaria Policy 
Advisory Committee had been convened in a transparent way, that 
everyone was aware who was on it, that there was clear terms of 
reference for the committee, that the Director General had signed off 
on the process, I think gave a lot of credibility in advance to the 
process, which is really important. If people coming into an evidence 
review have no idea what to expect, no idea what the steps are going 
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to be, no idea who ultimately is making those decisions, then I think 
the process is on the rocks before it even gets going. – KI44 
 
This was a view that was echoed by many interviewees, and would appear to imply 
that transparency of the evidence consideration and policy making steps might have 
been equally critical, and potentially even more important, than achieving consensus, 
at least in this case.  
 
(vi) Membership and representation 
 
The data also suggest that there was an additional form of transparency that was 
important to respondents, other than the evidence review process itself (that is, the 
various steps involved and the criteria for evidence review and policy consideration). 
This had to do with transparency about who was represented on the WHO evidence 
advisory bodies, and why.  
 
For example, during the policy development process for IPTi, there was a perceived 
lack of transparency about representation on the TEG. Although according to those 
interviewed, TEG members were appointed by the director of WHO-GMP following 
consultation with other members of the WHO-GMP secretariat, it was not clear what 
the criteria for TEG membership was. Some interviewees were of the view that the 
TEG membership was not always appropriate. Since the TEG was the critical 
decision node for IPTi, interviewees had very strong views on its membership, how 
the meetings were conducted, and the dominance of some members over others. 
Some interviewees expressed concern about a perceived lack of balance in the TEG 
because one of the co-chairs was an expert on Asia rather than Africa, and appeared 
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to be strongly against the use of SP for IPTi because of their own career-defining 
work on malaria drug resistance. However, although several interviewee accounts 
seemed to echo this concern, in reality the same co-chair later (in April 2009) 
supported the recommendation of IPTi, and later also supported the recommendation 
of SMC (which also uses SP), which suggests that perhaps some of these concerns 
might have just been perceived conflicts of interest, or internal explanations of slow 
processes. 
 
In comparison for the SMC process, although the TEG meeting in May 2011 was 
held in closed session (it was before WHO-GMP’s policy strengthening exercise was 
completed and MPAC was first convened), the MPAC membership process was (and 
still is) open to application (versus director appointments), against clear membership 
criteria, and a mixed (internal and external stakeholder) nomination review panel. In 
addition, its deliberation proceedings are held in open session, which are all criteria 
that appear to matter to WHO-GMP stakeholders when it comes to policy 
development (D’Souza, 2014). 
 
Another element to membership and representation mentioned by some interviewees, 
and echoed by SMC researchers, was that the IPTi policy development process 
might have benefitted had there been more developing country researchers and 
policy makers involved, given the links and ultimate benefit to the policy’s end users 
in sub-Saharan Africa. One interviewee reflected: 
 
The thing that I think made SMC very powerful is that it was very 
powerfully rooted in country research institutions, so that the 
countries that might potentially benefit from SMC were very 
strongly involved in setting up the research agenda, and executing 
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that research agenda, so that there was traction in seeing this through 
to the end, in a sense. That if it were recommended, it wouldn’t run 
up against a brick wall because it really came from an understanding 
on the ground of the value of the research. – KI39 
These interviewee reflections suggest that improved representation (in both evidence 
advisory bodies and within research groups), in addition to improved transparency 
around evidence advisory body membership, might have had a role to play in 
improving the perceived legitimacy of policy development processes for SMC 
compared to IPTi.  
6.3 Reflective summary 
The study findings suggests that in a time where it has become the norm, at least 
within the field of major infectious diseases such as malaria, for diverse groups of 
actors (researchers, funders, policy makers) to collaborate on large research projects, 
that further investigating actors’ perceived roles and expectations is a potentially 
useful way of better understanding how evidence and policy interact in sometimes 
complex and not immediately obvious ways. These actors’ subsequent actions within 
the policy development process, and how this in turn influenced their perceived 
neutrality and credibility, might be a potentially useful way of better understanding 
legitimacy within policy processes, and the various factors that influence perceptions 
of legitimacy. 
The case of IPTi demonstrates that when research, funding, and policy making 
institutions have common goals but conflicting agendas, how they are viewed by 
other actors in the process gets affected, which in turn can negatively impact the 
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perceived legitimacy of the policy development process itself. Conversely, the case 
of SMC demonstrates that clearly defined roles and more transparent, inclusive, and 
clear processes, can in turn positively influence whether policy development 
processes are perceived in various ways as being credible and acceptable, or as Cash 
and colleagues (2003) would suggest, respectful of stakeholders’ values and beliefs, 
and fair in its treatment of opposing views and interests. 
If the previous chapter concluded that in comparison to IPTi, the SMC policy 
development process benefitted from what Parkhurst (2017) would define as more 
‘appropriate’ evidence (that is, high quality evidence, relevant to the policy concerns, 
constructed in useful ways, and applicable to the local context), the exploration in 
this chapter indicates that SMC policy development also benefited from better 
processes of evidence use, such as clearer and more transparent evidence advisory 
structures and operational procedures than IPTi, which was clearly an influencing 
factor, among others, in how the SMC policy development process was, and still is, 
positively perceived.  
Although this chapter focused primarily on stakeholder experiences and perceptions 
of the policy process, the necessary steps taken by WHO-GMP to improve their 
policy development processes in the period between the IPTi and SMC policy 
recommendations – such as open consultation and participation in meetings, and 
more transparency during the evidence advisory process – can each be seen as 
perhaps contributing to WHO-GMP and its evidence advisory bodies’ ability, and 
credibility, in providing timely and relevant policy advice that is accepted as 
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legitimate by policy actors and researchers within WHO’s evidence advisory 
systems, and by members of the global malaria community more broadly.  
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Chapter 7: Discussion, conclusions, and lessons learned 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
We know from the evidence use literature that evidence, in its multiple forms, is 
often perceived as playing key roles in public health policy development, although 
how and why evidence is used and when, despite the wide range of research on the 
subject, is less clear. This study was born of the notion that a more holistic 
understanding of what influences the use of evidence in policy making may help 
shed more light on the complexity of evidence use. This understanding may help, in 
multidimensional ways, to increase and improve evidence use, which is the goal of 
many public health organisations, including the WHO, so that they may ultimately 
improve public health outcomes. Critically appreciating the particular challenges of 
understanding and adapting scientific knowledge in order to achieve gains in public 
health outcomes is also one of the aims of LSHTM’s DrPH programme. 
 
In the context of the aims of the DrPH programme, and as a public health 
practitioner with a research interest in ways to improve the good governance of 
evidence, the aim of my thesis was to better understand the influences on the use of 
evidence within global health policy making organisations such as the WHO, using 
two intermittent preventive treatment policy development processes (IPTi and SMC) 
within the case study setting of the WHO’s malaria department – the Global Malaria 
Programme. Specifically, my thesis objectives were to: (a) explore the factors that 
influenced the consideration of particular evidence; and (b) examine how factors 
associated with the policy process influenced eventual policy outcomes. I did this by 
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exploring the features of the evidence used (Chapter 5) and the process of forming 
global intermittent preventive treatment policy within WHO-GMP (Chapter 6) 
during what was, and in some ways continues to be, a dynamic time period in the 
field of global malaria control and elimination (see Chapter 4). 
 
This last chapter discusses the key findings from the analysis of IPTi and SMC 
policy development differences affecting ‘credibility’, ‘salience’ and ‘legitimacy’ 
that was presented in the preceding two results chapters, beginning with some 
concluding reflections, followed by the limitations of the study, implications for 
public health researchers and practitioners, and finally ending with some overarching 
conclusions on what the study contributes to improving public health policy and 
practice worldwide, which is the overarching goal of the DrPH programme, as well 
as the mission of LSHTM, my employer, more generally.  
 
7.2 Discussion and concluding reflections 
 
Explaining the differences in the policy development processes between IPTi and 
SMC requires understanding a set of interacting factors related to features of the 
evidence base as well as features of the process by which it was brought to bear on 
policy making.  
 
IPTi was introduced as an innovation that was pursued by a group of committed 
public health practitioners and researchers, and internally framed along the lines of a 
quick and linear process. The IPTi Consortium’s proposal to BMGF included a clear 
schedule of, and a Policy Platform to facilitate, its idealised policy development 
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process. IPTi Consortium members believed that more evidence delivered in a timely 
way would persuade policy makers to recommend IPTi. However, over time, this 
internal expectation and pressure to meet the deadlines they had set for themselves in 
their proposal to BMGF, led to a breakdown in consensus and trust between actors, 
followed by delays in IPTi’s policy development.  
 
In comparison, the SMC policy process was never viewed as a battle between the 
actors involved. Here the policy process was viewed as open, inclusive, and 
transparent, which was WHO-GMP’s intention of what a good policy process should 
look like when it formed MPAC (D'Souza and Newman, 2012). By learning from its 
experience with IPTi, and optimising the design and function of its principal 
evidence advisory committee (MPAC) to better serve its institutional needs, WHO-
GMP was perceived as having strengthened its malaria policy development process.  
 
When it comes to the features of the evidence used to inform policy, what appears to 
have edged the SMC evidence base over the one for IPTi was that, ultimately, it was 
more relevant to the question being asked by WHO-GMP’s evidence advisory 
committees, with its perceived value as an intervention being boosted by the size and 
potential impact of its protective efficacy, and the high consistency of the results 
across RCT sites. Although the reasons for this difference (the highly focused and 
similar transmission settings for SMC studies) can be explained, a pooled protective 
efficacy of 75% for SMC compared to 30% for IPTi made the potential public health 
impact of SMC a difficult policy option to ignore. In other words, while the results 
of the RCTs for IPTi would be considered credible by standard evidence hierarchy 
measures, and comparable to other preventive malaria interventions, the evidence 
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base for SMC compared to IPTi was perceived to be both credible and salient, which 
contributed to making it appear better, or more appropriate, for policy consideration.  
 
The study findings also suggest that the breakdown in consensus and trust in the 
policy process, due to the different expectations, conflicting agendas, and in some 
instances, the overt advocacy of the actors involved, might have contributed to the 
perception of problems that undermined the legitimacy of the policy development 
process for IPTi, in comparison to SMC. The contestation around the IPTi policy 
process might have contributed to negative perceptions of its policy value. 
Contestation, as a form of deliberation and consensus building, is not necessarily a 
‘bad’ thing, particularly when built into institutional arrangements that aim to 
improve the legitimacy of governing processes through deliberation and inclusion of 
multiple views (Scharpf, 2006). Some scholars have seen the need for deliberation as 
particularly important when public policy often relies on delegation to scientific 
experts that serve to provide scientific advice (van Eeten, 2001). Institutional 
approaches in the policy sciences recognise that institutions can be thought of in 
terms of formal structures, and also as rules that shape how decisions are made 
(Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, Peters, 2005, March and Olsen, 2011). In the case of 
SMC, although there was not necessarily as much deliberation over the evidence as 
there was for IPTi, it appears that having clear expectations from all sides of the 
evidence advisory process, with a clear structure and terms of reference for MPAC 
members, as well as transparency of the evidence consideration, might have led to 
the process for SMC appearing more legitimate to those involved in it evidence 
advice and policy development. 
 
171 
 
In summary, Cash and colleagues’ (2003) findings from the field of sustainable 
development, that evidence must be credible, salient, and legitimate to be accepted 
by the public, appears to equally apply within evidence advisory committees in this 
particular case. It should be noted however, that these findings are not meant to 
imply that one evidence base was stronger or weaker than the other was, or that the 
process of evidence use is necessarily more important than features of the evidence 
itself. Indeed, both feature in important but differing ways. As such, these findings 
help to reinforce how the factors of credibility, salience, and legitimacy all appear to 
influence evidence use, with particular insights into an agency (WHO) with a 
particular technical remit and expert bodies of stakeholders informing global health 
policy making for malaria control and elimination.  
 
While these findings emerge from a pair of specific malaria policy developments, 
there may be reasons to believe similar issues could be relevant elsewhere. Indeed, 
the issues of credibility, salience, and legitimacy were drawn from a very different 
study conducted on sustainable development related to concerns of the lay public as 
well as of scientists. Thus seeing similar issues arise in a technical body made up of 
individuals with broadly similar scientific training helps to illustrate that even in 
these groups, features outside scientific quality can matter when it comes to evidence 
use for policy development.  
 
Although context is not specifically a factor in Cash and colleagues’ (2003) 
framework, it is clear that it too had an influencing role to play in how evidence use 
for policy development was perceived in the case of IPTi and SMC, and helps 
highlight how the concepts of credibility, salience, and legitimacy are themselves 
172 
 
perhaps more complex, multidimensional, and inter-related than the simplicity of the 
framework implies. For example, the high salience of the SMC evidence base 
appeared to increase both its credibility and its legitimacy, but the context-specific 
uniqueness of the time and place of the development of the SMC evidence base (that 
it was targeted only for areas with highly seasonal malaria transmission, using drugs 
that were still highly effective in countries where drug resistance was rapidly 
encroaching) suggests that had the trials taken place a decade before, or a decade 
later, perhaps the credibility, salience, and legitimacy of the SMC evidence base and 
the processes for its use for policy development may have been perceived 
differently.  
 
Similarly, context could also have played a role in how the advocacy planning of the 
IPTi Consortium was positively framed at its inception but negatively perceived 
during its execution. For example, forms of advocacy would have likely played a 
role in the resurrection of malaria as a global health issue, and the decision by the 
BMGF to make it a core programme area for funding global research partnerships 
such as the IPTi Consortium. But the perceived ‘sanctity’ of global policy 
development at WHO, and the importance it places on its institutional values, such a 
neutrality and independence, meant that the IPTi Consortium’s overt advocacy and 
the BMGF’s subsequent interference, which could be argued was open and obvious 
and therefore not necessarily underhanded even though it was perceived that way, 
was not acceptable to WHO-GMP and other stakeholders during the IPTi policy 
development process. This suggests that the legitimacy/acceptability of advocacy as 
a public health tool, and the credibility of those actors involved with advocacy 
efforts, may change depending on the stage of evidence use for policy development 
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it is being deployed for. For example, it is possible that the credibility and legitimacy 
of the IPTi evidence base and the actors involved may have stayed intact had they 
delayed their advocacy efforts until after a global policy was developed, and national 
policy makers were considering how best to adopt it to their local settings (salience 
being an issue for the IPTi evidence base, and one of the reasons developing a sub-
Saharan Africa wide policy was challenging). So instead of viewing academic 
advocacy in public health as being somewhat of a dichotomy between ‘selling’ and 
being ‘facilitational’, which is what a recent review of the public health advocacy 
literature suggests (Smith and Stewart, 2017), perhaps it is possible to be both (or 
neither) depending on the stage of the evidence use for policy development process, 
and of course, the context.  
 
What the case of SMC policy development compared to IPTi highlights is not just 
the role of context in shaping the multidimensional ways in which credibility, 
salience, legitimacy, and even advocacy, can be perceived, but also the role and 
importance of appropriate institutional processes for maintaining evidence, policy, 
and actor legitimacy. Although this study focused on the internal evidence advisory 
processes within WHO-GMP, it is possible that having better internal processes for 
maintaining certain ‘checks and balances’ might have also benefited the IPTi 
Consortium and the BMGF before they continued down the decision pathway of 
applying seemingly increasing pressure on WHO-GMP global policy development 
processes.  
 
Regarding global policy development, what might be an important additional factor 
for WHO however, as it continues to improve its internal policy and guideline 
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development processes (WHO, 2007b), is to consider more specifically the processes 
followed by its evidence advisory bodies, in addition to concern over how to judge 
or rank evidence, and how to institutionalise these processes, for example via the 
terms of reference and operating procedures for its evidence advisory bodies. 
Specifically considering how to build evidence advisory structures that are perceived 
to be open, inclusive, and transparent – manifestations of a fair process where it is 
clear that multiple considerations and values have been taken into account 
(Parkhurst, 2017, Cash et al., 2003) – might serve to promote the legitimacy of 
WHO’s policy decisions and decrease potential conflicts of interests in a global 
health-funding environment where private funders, in particular the BMGF (Black et 
al., 2009, Cohen, 2002, McCoy et al., 2009b), are viewed as, and often critisised for, 
having increasing influence on the global health agenda, in ways that might not be 
free of conflicts of interest, or accountable in the same ways as traditional forms of 
international development and aid funding from governments (Cohen, 2006, Okie 
2006, Stuckler et al., 2011, Harman, 2016, McCoy and McGoey, 2011, McGoey, 
2015, McGoey, 2012).  
For example, the BMGF are already one of the largest donors to the WHO (Brown et 
al., 2006), and within the field of global malaria, they funded both the IPTi 
Consortium and many of the SMC studies, in addition to the policy-strengthening 
grant that led to the creation of MPAC (Bhasin et al., 2014, D'Souza and Newman, 
2012, IPTi Consortium, 2003). Rightly or wrongly, there is very little in the world of 
global malaria control and elimination that is not funded or at least influenced by 
BMGF (Eckl, 2014). While many in the global health and malaria communities are 
quick to point out the positive outcomes of what funding coming from the BMGF 
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can achieve (Targett et al., 2009, The Lancet, 2009), the study findings illustrate the 
importance of process legitimacy in addition to concern over outputs and outcomes, 
and ways in which those processes might be embedded, or institutionalised, in 
evidence consideration for WHO policy development.  
 
The thesis findings help address a gap in the evidence use literature, and contributes 
to the public health advocacy literature, by providing a unique insider perspective 
and detailed account of what actually influences the use of evidence within an 
influential global health policy making institution, the WHO, and on an important 
global health issue, preventing malaria illness and death in infants and children. The 
congruence of the study’s findings within the existing literature (that it isn’t just 
evidence that matters in policy making, and that politics can and will have a role to 
play as well, but that the process can be successfully managed via better systems of 
evidence advice) also helps strengthen their validity, which in turn can help inform 
lessons for public health research and policy professionals, as well as future research, 
bearing in mind the limitations of the study and areas for future research, which are 
discussed next. 
 
7.3 Limitations and areas for future research 
 
This case study, being highly context-specific as case studies tend to be, has some 
limitations that might influence how the findings should be interpreted, and the 
broader lessons that can be drawn from them, as well as areas for future research. 
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This study compared two intermittent preventive treatment policy processes in depth 
(IPTi and SMC), using the accounts of actors involved in one or both processes as its 
main sources, in addition to supporting background documents, and my own 
observation notes from my time at WHO-GMP. The original intention was to do a 
comparative case study of the two policies, because the evidence-to-policy journeys 
appeared to be very similar at first glance. However, in reality, although there were 
indeed some similarities, there were also major differences, not least the change in 
evidence advisory systems within WHO-GMP between the IPTi and SMC policy 
decisions that were intended to improve evidence use, as well as the uniqueness of 
the evidence base for SMC (as mentioned previously, it is rare to have a WHO-
GMP-recommended intervention with such high protective efficacy, targeted to such 
a specific sub-region) which made a direct comparison of IPTi with SMC difficult.  
The unit of case study ended up being WHO-GMP itself, as an example of a global 
health institution seeking to improve its evidence advisory systems, with the analysis 
of the two policy processes still providing insight into the complexity of how 
evidence actually informs eventual policy decisions, and what factors influence its 
use. In retrospect, given the number of interviewees that also mentioned IPTp (the 
original IPT in pregnancy policy from 2002) as a comparator to both IPTi and SMC, 
it might have been interesting to more formally include it as part of my case study 
analysis of evidence use within WHO-GMP over time.  
That said, there is no shortage of interesting policy decisions within malaria (or other 
major global health challenges) one theoretically could have focused on; my 
eventual choice, as mentioned in my methods chapter, was partially informed by my 
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work, and those actors I had access to. This might have influenced my findings, 
although every effort was made to provide a broad range of perspectives (junior and 
senior researchers, policy makers, and funders involved with both IPTi and SMC) 
about what took place at the time of evidence advice to WHO on IPTi and SMC.  
 
The length of time that had lapsed since the IPTi policy decision might have affected 
recall, although given I was less concerned with establishing a single ‘truth’ and was 
more interested in capturing experiences and perspectives (which will vary 
depending on the point of view of the person being interviewed), I have no reason to 
believe that any key informant held back on their descriptions of their experiences. 
Indeed, I was surprised by how many interviewees (researchers, policy makers, and 
funders) who had been involved with IPTi still felt quite passionately about their 
experience. It is difficult to say whether this openness might have been influenced by 
the fact that many interviewees also considered me a colleague and ‘one of them’, 
and so we, to some extent, had a shared history and a common language; my own 
impression is that the researchers and policy makers wanted and were very willing to 
share their experiences of evidence use and policy making, regardless of who was 
interviewing them (perhaps it was refreshing to be on the other side of research given 
their daily work, or perhaps it is part of being human to want to share stories of 
previous experiences, especially negative ones).  
 
This of course is to some extent speculation and a reflection of my own experience 
having spent a significant period of time at LSHTM (eight years) and WHO (five 
years) working on malaria, but based on my findings and interactions with my key 
informants to describe their experiences, I do sense this ‘shared history’ for lack of a 
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better term, also influenced evidence use over time, particularly given most all of the 
members of WHO-GMP’s evidence advisory bodies are researchers themselves, and 
tend to switch back and forth between the two roles, in many cases over several 
decades. For example, as previously noted, some current members of MPAC, as well 
as some WHO-GMP staff, were former members of the IPTi Consortium, which 
would influence their perceptions of what good evidence use might mean. But 
because my case was singularly focused on two specific IPT policy development 
processes, there was a limit to how far back in time I analysed the relationships and 
links between actors, and reported them in my study findings. For example, at 
present, within the community of IPTi and SMC researchers, and their respective 
evidence advisory counterparts, exist friendly rivalries and alliances that in some 
cases go back to a time when some of the actors were doctoral students themselves, 
or mentors and mentees whose relationships were later fractured (though in some 
cases subsequently mended) and that history is carried through to subsequent 
generations of their own doctoral students, who in turn became independent 
researchers, evidence advisors, and doctoral supervisors, themselves. As I mentioned 
at the start of my thesis, the global malaria community is in reality quite small – a bit 
like an interconnected family tree – and as it turns out, the extended network of 
direct and indirect links to LSHTM is quite large.  
 
Although these insights were not directly offered as reflections to my interview 
questions, they were sometimes alluded to during the course of my interviews and 
interactions, and might be an interesting area of study for other forms of social 
science research in future. In any case, what these realisations highlight to me is that 
there is an extraordinary depth of contextual information that, despite best efforts 
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(for example, see Chapter 4), probably doesn’t get sufficiently captured in case 
studies such as this one. In fact, one could argue that had I not had such intimate 
knowledge of my interviewees through working so closely with them, I might not 
have realised the historical connections between actors, to then report them as a 
limitation of the study i.e. to not have better explored those connections in retrospect. 
 
Another area of future research to supplement the findings from this study would be 
to include more in-country perspectives on evidence use i.e. views from local 
researchers and policy makers. Although I did include some in-country perspectives, 
I decided against focusing too heavily on this set of actors, because my study was 
more focused on what led to the global level policy decision for IPTi and SMC 
among global level policy actors, rather than how this then impacts local policy 
consideration and implementation. However, better understanding local policy 
consideration and implementation of global malaria policies, and how they may be 
interlinked (i.e. enthusiasm for implementation at country level as reflections of the 
evidence advisory process at the global level), may also shed light on the complexity 
of evidence use in policy making, and the relationship between global and national 
policy development processes. For example, it is possible that the relative credibility, 
salience, and legitimacy, of SMC policy development at the global level, is reflected 
in the stark differences in national level policy uptake and implementation between 
SMC (currently 12 countries) and IPTi (still one country).  
 
In addition, I would consider broadening the time scale to include all forms of 
intermittent preventive treatment policy development within WHO-GMP, to see if 
each policy development process has had a subsequent effect on the evidence 
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consideration or acceptability of the next form of IPT. Circumstantial evidence 
would suggest that evidence advisors and policy makers appeared to ‘soften’ and 
become less stringent over time, but that could also be due to the addition of more 
drug safety and drug resistance information to the research literature as the IPT 
interventions are more widely implemented.  
 
Despite these limitations, and the wide ranging possibilities for future research, the 
findings as presented within this thesis still provide unique insight and a wealth of 
lived experience of the complexity of evidence use within a WHO department. Case 
studies of this kind are not common within the field of evidence use, or within the 
global malaria community, and the interviewee accounts serve as a form of 
documented history in the evolving story of intermittent preventive treatment, and its 
role within global malaria control and elimination.  
 
7.4 Key lessons for public health researchers and policy professionals 
 
The findings from this thesis allow for a number of potentially useful lessons for 
public health researchers, as well as the policy professionals who often work closely 
in tandem with them. 
 
1. Embedding good governance and systems of evidence use is important and 
necessary to ensure the outcomes of policy processes are accepted as legitimate 
 
Policy development processes within technical evidence advisory bodies are 
subject to many different influencing forces, including – appropriately – political 
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ones, and weathering the exigencies of these forces, via better systems of 
evidence use, is part of managing the process, and maintaining its legitimacy, so 
that policy solutions are accepted by the actors within that process. For example, 
appreciating and acknowledging the differences in the institutional norms, 
values, and expectations, of individual members of research consortia prior to the 
evidence review and policy development process, might improve their future 
interactions when working together to reach a policy solution. However, norms, 
values, and expectations can vary across and within institutions, contexts, and 
over time, and therefore good governance should be viewed as an ongoing 
process in itself, in need of continuous quality improvement, rather than simply a 
checklist or an activity that is done at a particular time, and in a particular setting, 
or in a particular way. Indeed, although there are some elements of good 
governance and how they are implemented that might be viewed as transferable 
good practice (see below), some elements can also be unique and context-
specific, as what is perceived to be appropriate evidence and processes for policy 
development may vary depending on the policy issue, its political importance, 
and the actors involved, among other factors.  
 
That said, optimising the processes of evidence review and policy development 
to maximise quality, relevance, and legitimacy, by making them as explicit and 
transparent as possible, through clear evidence review criteria, public availability 
of background documentation, and open session evidence review meetings, for 
example, can and should be a governance aim for all evidence advisory-oriented 
organisations, including WHO (in fact, this is the subject of a recently published 
September 2018 special issue of Global Challenges that draws lessons from 
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across different evidence advisory committees across multiple institutions; a 
peer-reviewed paper based on this thesis contributes to that special issue and is 
included as Appendix 5). Other measures could include open calls and 
transparent selection processes for the membership of evidence advisory bodies, 
so that there is confidence that those involved in these processes are as fair, 
equitable, and representative of local populations as possible (Boaz et al., 2015, 
Parkhurst, 2017). This does not mean that conflict will not occur; scientific 
debate may take time to resolve, especially if more evidence is needed for 
resolution, but it may help manage potential conflict.  
 
Finally, based on the findings from the case of IPTi and SMC, it must be 
recognised that rigorous evidence review processes are costly in terms of time, 
and sufficient staff and financial resources should be guaranteed for this task, 
that ideally are not funded by sponsors or producers of evidence, i.e. some degree 
of independence should be maintained, to help maintain the legitimacy of the 
policy development process. 
 
2. Employing advocacy as a tool to facilitate evidence use in policy development 
should be handled with care, and be mindful of contextual appropriateness 
 
While the idea of an advocacy-oriented Policy Platform to accompany the 
research process was well intentioned, a key lesson from the IPTi Consortium 
(one that SMC and subsequent malaria researchers appear to have absorbed) is 
that placing it within WHO did not sufficiently recognise potential conflict 
between the institutional norms and values of WHO and other partners in the 
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IPTi Consortium. So anticipating the process of translating research into policy, 
and being prepared to advocate for research when policy windows may allow it, 
might be worthwhile, but embedding a policy and evidence support team in an 
independent (non-WHO) organisation might be preferable.  
 
For example, such a team might be positioned in a research or academic 
organisation (or possibly a non-governmental organisation) not itself involved in 
the subject of the research, but with access to those involved, and the skills to 
review and synthesise data produced. One example from within LSHTM is the 
Policy Innovation Research Unit (PIRU) that works at the request and on behalf 
of the UK Department of Health and Social Care and the National Health 
Service, while still being a separate entity (PIRU, 2018).  
 
It would also be important for such a policy support team to have good links to, 
or members from, the countries most potentially affected by the research 
findings, so that national level policy makers and programme managers can help 
ensure that any evidence use and policy development are contextually relevant. 
 
3. Including ways for potential beneficiaries in be involved in evidence review and 
policy development processess may also help policy and programme 
implementation in the long-term   
 
While the normative power of a WHO endorsement is necessary to policy 
adoption and implementation in many countries, it is likely to be far from 
sufficient. A real challenge, and as discussed within the limitations section, a 
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potential area for future research, is within global policy development, what are 
the processes that influence improved country level policy uptake and 
implementation. This may involve ‘bottom-up’ processes, with strong national 
researchers and policy makers involved throughout, as happened with the case of 
SMC. But this depends on building capacity in countries and between northern 
and southern institutions over decades, as well as adequate and sustainable 
funding.  
 
A possible lesson from the SMC policy process, though not explicitly explored in 
this thesis which was focused on what led to a global level policy decision, is 
that involving key regional and local policy makers and programme managers 
who contributed to decision making processes about highly locally relevant 
research, may have facilitated the way the issue was perceived at country level, 
and as a result, the processes of national policy adoption and implementation. 
This possible interconnection between global and local policy making would be 
an interesting area, among others (see previous section), for future research on 
evidence use in policy development, which may help to improve policy and 
programme implementation, and public health outcomes, in future. 
 
7.5 Final thoughts 
  
In the case of the policy development processes for IPTi and SMC, the study 
findings show that ‘good evidence’ from a purely technical (credibility) perspective 
was not sufficient to ensure universal agreement and uptake of recommendations, 
even within a highly technocratic body such as the WHO-GMP. The findings 
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suggest that evidence also needed to be relevant (salient) to the policy question being 
asked, and that technical actors retained a concern over the legitimacy of the process 
by which technical evidence was brought to bear in policy development. Cash and 
colleagues’ (2003) findings from the field of sustainable development, that evidence 
must be credible, salient, and legitimate to be accepted by the public, appears to 
equally apply within evidence advisory committees, at least in this case, albeit 
nuanced by their specific contextual realities.  
 
While the WHO has principally focused on technical criteria for evidence inclusion 
in its policy and guideline development processes, the study of the MPAC suggests 
that the design and functionality of its evidence advisory committees might also have 
a role to play within its overarching evidence advisory system. Other evidence 
advisory committees within WHO should also consider enabling transparent, 
responsive, and credible processes of evidence review, to ensure that they are 
effective in producing advice that ultimately leads to policy recommendations by 
WHO. This is already the subject of work recently undertaken by other scholars in 
this field (Global Challenges, 2018, Gopinathan et al., 2018, Gopinathan and 
Hoffman, unpublished), which will hopefully lead to stronger systems of evidence 
use within WHO, for the public health benefit of its member states, which is a stated 
goal of the organisation (WHO, 2018). Such legitimacy may also be important for 
implementation of WHO recommendations by WHO member states, particularly 
considering the current funding environment in which WHO is highly reliant on 
external sources of funding, both for programmatic work, as well as for funding 
research that aims to ultimately inform public health policy and practice.  
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Strengthened systems of evidence use may also be important for improving the 
strategic agility of public health institutions like WHO in responding to new global 
health threats, and the ever-changing political and epidemiological contextual 
dynamics of old threats, such as malaria. For example, at the time of submitting this 
thesis, there are indications that malaria may once again not be as high a global 
health priority it once was between 2000 and 2015, which is the time period my case 
study took place in, and that “after an unprecedented period of success in global 
malaria control, progress has stalled” (WHO, 2017b). This is evidenced by the 5 
million case increase in malaria cases worldwide in 2016, following a plateau in 
global malaria funding investment (WHO, 2017b), which speaking as a member of 
the global malaria community, is challenging.   
 
The lessons from this thesis on the implicit and explicit complex realities of evidence 
use in policy development might also apply to other types of evidence advisory 
bodies, such as NICE in the UK and other similar organisations, and are important 
considerations for both generators of evidence (public health researchers within 
academic research institutions, such as LSHTM) as well as the institutions, such as 
the BMGF, that fund them.  
 
As a public health practitioner myself, I have found the process of conducting this 
study, and engaging with my findings and what they might mean, a valuable and 
motivating lesson in how I perceive evidence, and ways to improve its use, in policy 
and programme decision making in my current work and in the future; I hope my 
peers and colleagues will find these study findings and reflections useful to their own 
current and future practice as well.  
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Appendix 1: Interview topic guide 
Thank you very much for your time. Is there anything you would like to add before this interview wraps up?
Objectives Question Follow-up/Probe 
Tell me a little bit about what you do and what you see as your role in the 
SMC evidence to policy process? 
(And/or depending on actor) How would you describe your role in the IPTi policy 
process?  
Explore the factors 
that influence the 
consideration of 
particular evidence 
In your experience, how do policy topics make their way to the global 
malaria agenda? 
In your experience, how would you describe the evidence base for SMC? 
For IPTi? 
In your experience, how would you describe the evidence review process 
for SMC? For IPTi? 
In your experience, how do policy decisions get formulated within GMP? 
In your view, how did SMC get on the policy agenda? What about IPTi?  Why do 
you think that is?      
How does this compare to [the other policy]? Why do you think that is? 
Do you have an example of what you mean?      
Examine how 
factors associated 
with the policy 
process influence 
eventual policy 
outcomes 
What do you see as the role of the different people or groups involved in 
the SMC policy process? In the IPTi policy process? 
What do you see as the internal factors that might have affected the SMC 
policy process? And the IPTi policy process? 
What do you see as the external factors that might have affected the SMC 
policy process? And the IPTi policy process? 
(Repeat for all three factor categories) Why do you think that is? Can you tell me a 
little bit more about that? 
(Lastly) Is there anything else you can think of that might have had a role to play in 
the SMC policy process? In the IPTi policy process? (repeat probes)   
Thanks. Looking back, what would you say were the biggest things that had an 
impact on the SMC policy? on the IPTi policy? (repeat probes) 
Describe current 
evidence review 
and policy setting 
processes, and how 
and why they came 
about 
Tell me your views or experiences about the MPAC? 
What do you see as the role of MPAC?  What about within GMP? 
How does this compare to previous policy setting processes at GMP? If so, 
how would you describe them in comparison to how MPAC operates? 
Tell me a bit more about that… From your experience, how would you describe 
how they arrive at policy recommendations? How would you describe their 
evidence review procedures?  In your view, is there anything else that influences, or 
should influence, how they make recommendations?  
What do you see as the reasons WHO-GMP might have created this committee? 
What is similar? Different? Anything else? 
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Appendix 2: Interview information sheet and consent form 
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 
Keppel Street, London, WC1E 7HT, United Kingdom 
INTERVIEW INFORMATION SHEET AND CONSENT FORM 
Study title: Evidence use for policy recommendations: a comparative case study 
of Intermittent Preventive Treatment policy processes at the WHO 
Global Malaria Programme  
Investigator Name: Bianca D’Souza   
Contact Details:   bianca.dsouza@lshtm.ac.uk or +44 (0)789 435 1117 
This study forms the thesis component of a Doctorate in Public Health that is being undertaken 
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Appendix 3: Previous (pre-MPAC) WHO-GMP policy setting processes for 
malaria (source: WHO-GMP, see D’Souza, 2014) 
 
I) Pre-2005: WHO Expert Committee on Malaria 
 
This Committee, made of members of the WHO Expert Panel on Malaria, is the formal body 
of experts mandated by the WHO constitution to advice the Director-General on technical 
policies and strategies for malaria control and elimination. It is a group convened by the 
Director-General for the purpose of reviewing and making technical recommendations on 
malaria. Expert committees are established by the Executive Board or the World Health 
Assembly, and it is the Director-General who convenes the meetings and decides on the 
participants, who are drawn from the expert advisory panels. The membership of an expert 
committee is not standing. In fact, a member of an expert committee is an expert appointed 
by the Director-General (from among the Expert Panel) to serve at any particular meeting of 
that committee. Reports of meetings of the WHO Expert Committee on Malaria after 
approval by WHO Director General are presented as a part of a series of formal publications 
titled the WHO “Technical Report Series”. 
 
The WHO Expert Panel met 20 times, at regular intervals from 1947 to 1968 (almost on an 
annual basis), and then progressively less frequently. The Expert Committee last met in1998. 
As a policy-setting body, the Expert Committee suffered from cumbersome nomination and 
convening procedures that limited its nimbleness in reviewing evidence and setting policy. 
This limitation was highlighted by the ever-increasing pace with which evidence was being 
generated, the increasing degree of specialisation within malaria control, and a changing 
malaria landscape in countries, which led to increasing demands from global malaria actors 
for timely policy documents. While the committee has not met recently, the Expert Panel 
members themselves are still called upon to review documentation relating to Malaria 
Elimination Certification. It is the Chairperson of the Expert Committee who is tasked with 
gathering the opinions of other panellists regarding country petitions for elimination 
certification, and making a recommendation to the WHO Director-General. 
 
II) Post-2005/ Pre-2012: Three-level policy review process 
 
In the mid 2000's, owing to the expansion of malaria control options and the growing areas 
of knowledge and specialization pertaining to malaria control and elimination, WHO-GMP 
established a new 3-level policy review process  
 
a) Level 1 -- Technical Expert Groups (TEG)  
 
TEGs were convened by the WHO-GMP director, if and when necessary, to advise WHO-
GMP on work relating to the following six key areas for malaria control;  
 
• Economics, Finance and Impact (EFI); 
• Scaling-up and Capacity Development (SCD); 
• Case Management (CM); 
• Insecticide-treated bed nets (ITN); 
• Indoor residual spraying (IRS);  
• Preventive Chemotherapy (PC). 
 
The TEGs comprised of senior scientists and experts in the relevant specialised areas of 
work, and policy makers and implementers in endemic countries selected by the WHO-GMP 
secretariat, often in consultation with the WHO Regional Malaria Advisers. In each of the 
six areas of work identified above, they were tasked with: a) reviewing new evidence in the 
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relevant areas of work and their implications for strategy, policy, and plans; b) helping 
identify gaps in evidence and define specific priority areas of research; and c) monitoring 
and evaluating activities directed and managed by WHO-GMP within their specific area of 
work. While some of these TEGs were quite active, others only met once.  
b) Level 2 --Technical and Research Advisory Committee (TRAC)
The TRAC was designed as a study group, convened by the WHO-GMP director, with the 
aim of advising and guiding WHO-GMP on the development of policies and guidelines, 
ensuring operational coordination at all levels. It also discussed the priority research agenda 
on malaria control. The Committee was composed of persons with experience and expertise 
on malaria, public health and programme management, ensuring comprehensive 
geographical representation. 
The terms of reference of TRAC mandated that they: a) advised on malaria epidemiology 
and disease burden; b) oversaw the development and progress of operational policies and 
plans to assist in scaling up intervention coverage to achieve the malaria targets in countries; 
c) advised on strategies and opportunities to ensure that the malaria control interventions
received predictable and sustainable resources; d) oversaw the franchising and
commissioning of research by WHO-GMP; and e) reviewed the outputs from TEGs and
transformed evidence and experiences from research into technically sound and feasible
policy.
TRAC composition included leading experts, who were appointed as the Chairs of each of 
the TEGs, and other selected experts. WHO-GMP supported the TEG chairs to compile draft 
work plans of their respective TEGs to be shared with TRAC members. The TRAC aimed to 
serve as a steering group to ensure that WHO-GMP proposals and plans were technically 
sound and responsive to the needs of countries. It also provided a forum for discussion of the 
proposed research and funding opportunities among leading scientific experts, international 
agencies, donors, and national implementers. 
c) Level 3 --Strategic and Technical Advisory Group (STAG)
The STAG was a steering group, which was designed to advise the Director-General on 
priorities for WHO strategy development, and how WHO should best organize its work to 
provide global leadership on malaria. It was constituted by high level officials, 
representatives of member states, and key stakeholders such as aid organizations, NGOs, 
academia and researchers. This high level group was also tasked with advocating and 
overseeing the global research agenda on malaria. Many departments at WHO headquarters 
currently have a STAG; these STAGs or their equivalents generally meet on an annual basis. 
Organisational delays, funding limitations, and complexities inherent in a three-layered 
system, limited the utility of that approach, and, as a result, the TRAC and the STAG each 
met only once. In addition, not all TEGs were convened on a regular basis. WHO-GMP 
policy-setting activities post-2005 largely occurred as ad hoc technical consultations of 
convened experts – mainly of TEG members plus additional experts co-opted for the specific 
issue being addressed. Regular meetings of the TRAC and STAG, and the regular convening 
of the WHO Expert Committee on Malaria stopped taking place. 
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Strengthening the policy setting process for
global malaria control and elimination
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Abstract
The scale-up of malaria control efforts in recent years, coupled with major investments in malaria research, has
produced impressive public health impact in a number of countries and has led to the development of new tools
and strategies aimed at further consolidating malaria control goals. As a result, there is a growing need for the
malaria policy setting process to rapidly review increasing amounts of evidence.
The World Health Organization Global Malaria Programme, in keeping with its mandate to set evidence-informed
policies for malaria control, has convened the Malaria Policy Advisory Committee as a mechanism to increase the
timeliness, transparency, independence and relevance of its recommendations to World Health Organization
member states in relation to malaria control and elimination.
The Malaria Policy Advisory Committee, composed of 15 world-renowned malaria experts, will meet in full twice a
year, with the inaugural meeting scheduled for 31 January to 2 February 2012 in Geneva. Policy recommendations,
and the evidence to support them, will be published within two months of every meeting as part of an open
access Malaria Journal thematic series. This article is a prelude to that series and provides the global malaria
community with the background and overview of the Committee and its terms of reference.
Keywords: global, malaria, policy recommendations, WHO
Background
The World Health Organization Global Malaria Pro-
gramme (WHO-GMP) has four essential roles [1] (i) to set,
communicate, and promote the adoption of evidence-based
norms, standards, policies, and guidelines; (ii) to keep inde-
pendent score of global progress; (iii) to develop approaches
for capacity building, systems strengthening and surveil-
lance; and (iv) to identify threats to malaria control and
elimination, as well as new opportunities for action.
Last year, WHO-GMP embarked on a major review and
re-design of its policy setting process in order to be more
responsive to the rapidly evolving malaria landscape. As
highlighted in the World Malaria Report 2011 published
last month, the world is witnessing impressive progress in
the development and uptake of malaria control tools,
resulting in significant reductions of malaria-related mor-
bidity and mortality in many countries [2]. At the same
time, there is increasing pressure on the malaria policy
setting process to keep pace with the evidence being gen-
erated both through research efforts and the massive
implementation of malaria control tools. A stronger and
more agile policy setting approach is increasingly impor-
tant and necessary in the face of a projected shortfall in
funding and growing resistance of Plasmodium falciparum
to anti-malarial drugs and of anopheline mosquitoes to
insecticides [2-4]. The global malaria community must
make the most effective use of the tools it has in order
to meet international targets for malaria control set for
2015 [2].
A small group of independent malaria experts was con-
vened in March 2011 in Geneva to review previous and
existing malaria policy processes and successful policy-set-
ting models from other WHO departments. They pro-
posed a framework for a new malaria policy committee -
strongly modelled on the Strategic Advisory Group of
Experts (SAGE), which sets global policy for immuniza-
tions - to address the shortcomings of previous policy pro-
cesses. During April and May 2011, feedback on the draft
terms of reference was sought, received, and incorporated
from 50 external stakeholders.
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Following approval of the terms of reference by the
WHO Director General in August, an open call for
nominations was held in September 2011. From the 100
applications received, an independent nomination panel
with representation from key partner organizations
selected 15 members, who were appointed in November
2011 by the WHO Director General [5].
The inaugural meeting of the Malaria Policy Advisory
Committee (MPAC) will take place in Geneva from 31
January to 2 February 2012 in open session [6]. The com-
plete terms of reference for the Committee, outlined in
this article, are publicly available online for reference [7].
Aims and functions of the Malaria Policy Advisory
Committee
The mandate of MPAC is to provide independent strategic
advice and technical input for the development of WHO
policy recommendations on all aspects of malaria control
and elimination as part of a transparent, responsive and
credible policy setting process.
The MPAC advises the WHO Director-General speci-
fically on:
1. appropriate malaria policies and standards based on
programmatic experience by WHO member states and
malaria control partners as well as reviews of the best
available evidence;
2. engagement of WHO-GMP in malaria-related
initiatives;
3. major issues and challenges to achieving global
malaria goals;
4. the identification of priority research and control
activities to address identified challenges.
Roles and responsibilities of MPAC members
The MPAC’s 15 members serve in a personal capacity
and represent a broad range of disciplines, expertise, and
experience encompassing many aspects of malaria con-
trol and elimination. Members of MPAC, including the
Chair, have been appointed to serve for an initial term of
three years. Each term may only be renewed once, for a
period of up to an additional three years.
The MPAC has no executive or regulatory function.
Its role is solely normative; it provides advice and
recommendations to the WHO Director General,
including response to urgent issues as needed. Members
of MPAC play a critical role in ensuring the reputation
of WHO in providing high quality, well considered, evi-
dence-informed advice and recommendations on
malaria control and elimination. A register of members’
declaration of interests is maintained by WHO and will
be made available on the WHO-GMP website.
Meetings and operational procedures
The MPAC will meet bi-annually for three days, with
dates generally set at least six months in advance. The
frequency and duration of meetings will be adjusted as
necessary. MPAC recommendations will be taken by
consensus. In the exceptional situation that consensus
on a particular issue cannot be reached, the Chair shall
report the majority and minority view.
Representatives of the Roll Back Malaria Partnership
Secretariat, the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria Secretariat, the United Nations Children’s
Fund and the Office of the United Nations Special Envoy
for Malaria have been invited to participate as standing
observers in MPAC meetings and deliberations. Relevant
staff from WHO Headquarters and Regional Offices will
attend as members of the Secretariat. In addition, three
rotating National Malaria Control Programme managers
from around the world will be invited as resource persons
to observe and participate in the meeting.
The MPAC meetings are open to other observers,
including representatives from WHO regional technical
advisory groups, non-governmental organizations, techni-
cal agencies, academic institutions, and donor organiza-
tions. Additional experts and technical resource persons
may also be invited to meetings to contribute to specific
agenda items. Observers will not take the floor unless
requested to do so by the Chair and will not participate in
the formulation of MPAC recommendations.
The MPAC will work with WHO-GMP to develop its
priorities of work and meeting agendas, with input from
malaria endemic countries. In time, a wider group will be
invited to contribute on agenda items in advance of each
meeting via open consultation on the WHO-GMP
website.
The MPAC will be kept informed by WHO-GMP and
partner agencies of progress in the implementation of
strategies and the attainment of objectives at both a
country and regional level.
Evidence review mechanism
Time-limited and specific Evidence Review Groups
(ERGs) will be established to review and provide evi-
dence-based information and options for recommenda-
tions. These options will be discussed by the full MPAC
in sessions open to representatives of stakeholders inter-
ested in malaria.
Selected current Technical Expert Groups (TEGs), e.g.
the TEG on malaria chemotherapy, will continue to
function but will fall under the umbrella of MPAC
together with the shorter-term ERGs. The MPAC,
together with the WHO-GMP Director, will review the
need for existing TEGs, and the creation of new ones,
on a regular basis.
A transparent and timely policy setting process
In order to seek broader input and allow for the exchange
of information and views, and to ensure transparency and
inclusivity, the majority of discussions will occur in open
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session. However, the actual deliberations and develop-
ment of recommendations by the MPAC will take place in
a closed session in order to protect the integrity and inde-
pendence of the committee from pressure and undue
influence. Transparency is still ensured however as min-
utes will be made available on the WHO-GMP website
following each meeting, together with the approved
MPAC recommendations which will be published within
two months of every meeting in the Malaria Journal.
Approved meeting agendas, minutes, and recommenda-
tions will be archived and will continue to remain publicly
available and easily accessible on the WHO-GMP website.
This article is the first in what will be a thematic ser-
ies of policy recommendations to be published in the
Malaria Journal following every MPAC meeting.
Conditional policy recommendations
In the absence of a robust evidence base, temporary condi-
tional recommendations, clearly identified as such and
based on a combination of the best available evidence and
expert opinion, may be issued to provide guidance for
regions and countries in the interim period. Conditional
recommendations will be reviewed regularly at MPAC
meetings in case adjustments need to be made based on
newly available evidence.
Discussion
The call to strengthen the policy setting process for
malaria control and elimination so that it is more respon-
sive to the rapidly evolving malaria landscape has been
heard. In critically reviewing its policy setting process and
implementing changes to increase the timeliness and
transparency of its policy recommendations, WHO-GMP
is highlighting both its willingness to engage with key part-
ners and its commitment to assist WHO member states in
meeting their goals for malaria control and elimination.
WHO-GMP has reached this stage of strengthening the
policy setting process for malaria control and elimination
through the support of the global malaria community.
Convening the MPAC is just the first step in making the
policy setting process truly timely and transparent.
WHO-GMP and MPAC will need to continue to
engage with the global malaria community in order to
successfully fulfil their roles and functions. Further
strengthening the policy setting process for malaria con-
trol and elimination will involve drawing on the
strengths of the global malaria community and the tools
in their arsenal. This will include requesting expertise
and experience for ERGs and TEGs in order to inform
malaria policy recommendations.
Conclusion
The malaria landscape will continue to evolve. However,
change, if anticipated and effectively responded to, can
bring about positive transformation. WHO-GMP, MPAC,
and the global malaria community as a whole, together
have an unprecedented window of opportunity to set poli-
cies and programmes in place that will enable them to
achieve the ambitious global goals that have been set for
malaria.
List of abbreviations
ERGs: Evidence Review Groups; MPAC: Malaria Policy Advisory Committee;
SAGE: Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on immunization; TEGs: Technical
Expert Groups; WHO-GMP: World Health Organization Global Malaria
Programme.
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focus is not so much on the outcomes of 
decisions, but rather on the internal pro-
cesses involved—observing what is some-
times referred to as the “black box” of how 
evidence actually informs the policy pro-
cess,[3] within the primary global health 
institution responsible for the production 
of normative guidance to 193 member 
states.[4]
The use of evidence has been a long 
established part of the policy process, and 
within public health, research evidence 
is widely considered as the necessary 
foundation for many health policy deci-
sions.[5] However, many have argued that 
the implied linear process between the 
knowledge produced by researchers and 
the policies developed by policy makers 
oversimplifies and does not adequately 
account for the complexities and political 
nature of policy making.[6]
There is already a substantial body of 
work focused on the use of evidence in 
policy.[5c,7] Many works concerned with 
“uptake” of research findings have attempted to identify ways 
to overcome “barriers” and increase “knowledge transfer”.[8] 
Yet, numerous scholars have also drawn attention to the short-
coming of these approaches, including how they tend to exclude 
political considerations from policy decision making.[6b,9] The 
public health community, it has been argued, has to consider 
how to move beyond simple notions of barriers and facilitators 
or a “more is better” approach.[6b,9] Parkhurst,[6b] for instance, 
argues that a shift is needed to engage with questions of what 
improved evidence use looks like by asking explicitly normative 
questions about how we might judge “good evidence” in terms 
of policy appropriateness, and the “good use of evidence” from 
a perspective of the decision making process. These considera-
tions can then enable reflections on how to improve “evidence 
advisory systems” over time, rather than simply focusing on 
uptake of single pieces of research.[6b]
Scientific advisory committees within technical agencies 
(such as WHO) could be seen in many ways as archetypal 
technocratic agencies within such evidence advisory systems—
made up of experts that are explicitly tasked with review of 
scientific information. In the case of the WHO Global Malaria 
Program (WHO-GMP), the focus of this study, scientific advi-
sory committee members are tasked with reviewing the evi-
dence and advising WHO in their development of global policy 
recommendations to control and eliminate malaria.[10]
This paper presents findings from a case study of two different policy 
development processes within the WHO’s malaria department. By comparing 
the policy processes for the interventions of intermittent preventive treatment 
in infants versus children, the findings suggest that “good evidence”  
from a technical perspective, though important, is not sufficient to ensure  
universal agreement and uptake of recommendations. An analysis of 29 key 
informant interviews finds that evidence also needs to be relevant to the  
policy question being asked, and that expert actors retain a concern over the 
legitimacy of the process by which technical evidence is brought to bear in 
the policy development process. Previous findings from the field of sustain-
able development, that evidence must be credible, salient, and legitimate to 
be accepted by the public, appears to apply equally within scientific advisory 
committees. While the WHO has principally focused on technical criteria for 
evidence inclusion in its policy development processes, this study suggests 
that the design and functionality of its advisory bodies must also enable 
transparent, responsive, and accepted processes of evidence review to ensure 
that these bodies are effective in producing advice that engenders change in 
policy and practice.
Improving Evidence Use
1. Introduction
This paper presents findings from a study investigating 
evidence use in global malaria policy development at the World 
Health Organization (WHO). Past work looking at decision 
making at WHO has engaged with topics such as its criteria 
for guideline development,[1] or critical reflection on the organi-
zation’s response to global health crises.[2] Here, however, the 
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There is also a growing literature providing insights into the 
role and function of scientific advisory committees. Many of 
these are concerned with how to improve their inner workings 
in one way or another, for example by including patient expe-
rience information,[11] or economic information,[12] in order to 
promote the integration of evidence into health policy and prac-
tice. Other literature has been concerned with exploring how 
such bodies deal with constructing or facilitating a process less 
prone to bias, for example by applying clear, comprehensive, 
and consistent evidence inclusion criteria.[13]
What many of these studies have in common is their focus 
on advisory bodies serving national governments. In health 
care, an exemplar often referenced is the National Institute 
for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in England and Wales, 
which serves a mandated role to develop guidelines and make 
decisions that can have direct influence over policy and prac-
tice for the National Health Service. Yet, few studies examine 
the processes and perceptions of global health scientific advi-
sory committees, which advise institutions such as the WHO. 
This may be an important distinction, however, because global 
health governance systems are decidedly different to national 
bodies, given the lack of a supreme authority and much more 
indirect systems of accountability to population groups.
This paper focuses on WHO-GMP, as an example of an inter-
national policy and guidance producer, and presents the findings 
from a case study of two different policy development processes 
for malaria control and prevention that took place within the 
department between 2006 and 2012. Both policies relate to 
what is known within the global malaria community as “inter-
mittent preventive treatment”, or IPT, which is the delivery of 
a treatment dose of an antimalarial drug given at prespecified 
times for the prevention of malaria, regardless of the presence of 
symptoms or confirmed malaria infection. The two policy devel-
opment processes that are compared are for the policies for IPT 
in infants (IPTi) versus in children (IPTc – now known as Sea-
sonal Malaria Chemoprevention or SMC). Although there are 
commonalities between the two policies, the two policy develop-
ment processes that led to them resulted in two very different 
perceptions by stakeholders about the success of those pro-
cesses. For IPTi,[14] the process through which evidence was used 
to inform policy was contentious and considered less than ideal 
to those who were involved.[15] In comparison for SMC,[16] the 
process was viewed by those involved as a model of efficiency.[17]
By comparing the negative perception of one process in rela-
tion to the positive assessment of the other, however, this paper 
aims to explore some of the key features and influences shaping 
the use of evidence to inform policy decisions according to key 
stakeholders who serve within this technical body advising on 
global health guidelines.
2. Data Collection and Analysis
Data for this analysis came from 29 key informants interviewed 
between October 2014 and October 2015. The interviews were 
semi-structured and sampling was purposive to ensure a wide 
range of perspectives from those involved in the IPTi and/or 
SMC policy processes. They included: (a) staff from the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), funders of the IPTi and 
SMC studies; (b) staff from the research institutions who con-
ducted the IPTi and SMC studies; (c) members of two of WHO-
GMP’s scientific advisory committees—the Chemotherapy 
Technical Expert Group (TEG) and the Malaria Policy Advisory 
Committee (MPAC)—who advised WHO-GMP on the IPTi and 
SMC policies; and (d) staff from WHO-GMP responsible for 
issuing the IPTi and SMC policies to relevant member states.
Data also included published and unpublished documentary 
sources, including official policy documents for IPTi and SMC, 
scientific advisory committee meeting reports for IPTi and 
SMC, and internal BMGF and WHO-GMP documents on IPTi 
and SMC. Observational notes documented during meetings 
and conferences between March 2011 and October 2015 were 
also considered, as supplementary to the interview and docu-
ment analysis. Data was organized and analyzed with the use 
of the Nvivo10 software package. Results were analyzed the-
matically, with no strict boundaries between data collection and 
analysis, as some themes began to emerge during the course 
of data collection. The interviews produced multiple narratives, 
which sometimes complemented or contradicted each other, 
but collectively provided insights into evidence use and the 
policy process from the point of view of the participants in it, 
which was the purpose of this interpretive case study.
The broad starting framework for analysis was derived from 
a study by Cash and colleagues,[18] conducted in the field of 
environmental sustainability. The authors found that the effec-
tiveness of science to inform policy rested on three key factors: 
credibility, which refers to the scientific adequacy of the evi-
dence; salience, which refers to the relevance of the science to 
the needs of decision-makers; and legitimacy, which refers to 
the perception that the evidence generation and use has been 
unbiased and fair in its treatment of divergent stakeholder 
interests. Parkhurst,[6b] similarly draws on this work to discuss 
the concepts of “good evidence” for policy or the “good use of 
evidence” within policy processes. “Good evidence” in this work 
is taken to capture evidence which is both appropriate to spe-
cific decisions being made (reflecting salience), but also of high 
quality according to principles of scientific good practice (often 
espoused by champions of so-called evidence based, or evi-
dence informed, policymaking). “The good use of evidence” for 
policy, however, is presented by Parkhurst as capturing multiple 
concepts of legitimacy—including input legitimacy (decisions 
made by authorized representatives of the public); output legiti-
macy (decisions that achieve their intended goals to serve the 
public); and throughput legitimacy (decision processes them-
selves judged legitimate by beneficiaries). These broad concepts 
related to credibility, salience, and legitimacy, then allowed 
exploration of data to consider how similarities and differences 
might be seen between the two policy processes studied—in 
terms of features of the evidence base, its relevance to needs, 
and the process by which the evidence was used.
3. Findings
3.1. A Tale of Two Processes
Malaria is a complex, mosquito-borne, infectious disease, and 
a major global public health problem. In 2015 there were over 
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200 million new cases of malaria and nearly 500 000 deaths.[19] 
An estimated 90% of malaria cases and 92% of malaria deaths 
occur in Africa, the majority among children below five years of 
age.[19] This makes this particular age group in this particular 
geographical location an important target for global health policy 
makers and funders of public health research and programs who 
have a vested interest in reducing the global burden of malaria 
for moral, economic, and global health security reasons.[20]
According to many in the global malaria community, the late 
1990s marked a turning point in global interest in malaria.[21] 
There was a resurgence of international attention for the dis-
ease after what was perceived to be the relative failure of the 
malaria eradication campaign of the 1960s.[21b] Over the fol-
lowing decades, the malaria agenda went from the grand aspi-
ration of eradication to a period of neglect to what is once again 
a recovered and enthusiastic vision of “accelerating toward 
elimination”, which is the goal of WHO’s 2016–2030 global 
strategy for malaria.[20,21b]
The resurgence in attention was accompanied by a huge rise 
in the funds available for malaria research, control, as well as 
advocacy. This is reflected in the creation of Multilateral Initia-
tive on Malaria in 1997, the Roll Back Malaria Partnership in 
1998, BMGF in 1999, and the Global Fund against HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2001.[22] The increase in funding, 
particularly from the BMGF,[23] provided new opportunities for 
research for increasing numbers of researchers, and it led to 
greater discussion among researchers around how few inter-
ventions against malaria existed.[24] At the end of the 1990s 
there were limited tools for malaria treatment and control, but 
that would soon change.[21b]
In 2001, the results of a randomized controlled trial (RCT) 
in Tanzania using Intermittent Preventive Treatment in 
infants (IPTi) employing the antimalarial drug Sulphadoxine–
Pyrimethamine, delivered through the Expanded Program on 
Immunization, showed that this could be a useful intervention 
as it reduced clinical malaria episodes in infants by 59%.[25] 
This generated much enthusiasm among the core group of sci-
entists involved in the trial, and subsequently in the medical 
profession,[26] because the results were considered potentially 
game-changing compared to the 35% pooled protective efficacy 
of malaria prevention interventions in pregnancy, i.e., Intermit-
tent Preventive Treatment in pregnant women (IPTp) and insec-
ticide-treated mosquito nets (ITNs).[27] The researchers involved 
along with researchers from other institutions, and staff at 
WHO and UNICEF, subsequently formed a cross-institu-
tional BMGF-funded global research partnership in 2003—the 
IPTi Consortium—that declared that they had “developed a 
research and implementation agenda that will rapidly resolve 
the outstanding scientific questions about this innovative form 
of malaria control, and move the intervention into policy and 
practice” within five years, by the end of 2008.[28] They also 
added, somewhat ambitiously, that they had “prepared a stra-
tegic plan showing how, by the end of 2005, sufficient informa-
tion will exist on which to base a policy recommendation.”[28]
As part of the strategic plan and policy goals of the IPTi 
Consortium, a concurrent Policy Platform was established in 
WHO-GMP in 2005 to review the evidence gathered through 
the Consortium’s research groups.[29] Its role was to prepare 
evidence as it became available from the IPTi studies for a 
WHO technical review, so that WHO-GMP could reach a global 
recommendation on IPTi. This technical review involved the 
assessment of evidence by a series of WHO scientific advisory 
committees—a TEG, a Technical and Research Advisory Com-
mittee (TRAC) that reviewed TEG recommendations, and a 
Strategic and Technical Advisory Group (STAG) that reviewed 
TRAC recommendations.
For IPTi, the first TEG meeting was held in October 2006 and 
assessed the results of 11 studies on the efficacy and safety of 
IPTi in infants and children.[30] At the time of the 2006 review, 
three of the trials on efficacy and safety were not published. The 
recommendation of the 2006 TEG to WHO was for countries 
to implement IPTi alongside rigorous monitoring, and if as 
additional data on IPTi emerged, there would be further assess-
ments of the intervention. This TEG recommendation went to 
the TRAC in December 2006 where it was endorsed. The final 
level of review, before going to the WHO Director General, 
was at the STAG due to be held in May 2007. However, WHO 
cancelled this meeting and decided that a second TEG should 
be convened. This decision was triggered by newly available 
results of the outstanding trials released early in 2007, which 
reported the occurrence of severe adverse reactions that had 
not been reported in previous trials. In October 2007 a second 
meeting of the TEG took place, recognizing IPTi was a “prom-
ising intervention” but they recanted their previous recommen-
dation and, to be cautious, suggested another review be held 
in 2008 when new data became available.[31] The deliberations 
of the TEG were negatively perceived by some IPTi researchers 
as unnecessary delays in the evidence advisory process, and led 
to increasing frustration within the IPTi Consortium.[15] This 
led to increasing tensions both amongst the researchers, and 
with WHO-GMP and its TEG, over differences in perceptions 
of time urgency, the meaning of rigorous evidence review, 
and the role of scientists.[15] In an attempt to drive what was 
perceived to be a circular and slow moving process forward, 
the BMGF decided to commission an independent study 
from the U.S. Institute of Medicine (IoM) in mid-2007 to eval-
uate the IPTi results. This process, however, was viewed by 
multiple individuals interviewed as being at best irritating and 
at worse undermining to WHO-GMP. In July 2008, the IoM 
review concluded that IPTi was “worthy of further investment” 
and was potentially “ready to move to a new level,” implying 
program implementation in countries where IPTi would be 
effective.[32] It is difficult to say whether the 2008 IoM conclu-
sion had any bearing on WHO-GMP (interviewees suggested it 
did not) but in April 2009, eight years after the first IPTi study 
was published, a final meeting of the TEG judged the IPTi evi-
dence base to finally be sufficiently acceptable, and endorsed 
a global policy recommendation on IPTi by WHO to member 
states.[33]
The political fall-out from the perceived delays and tensions 
in the IPTi policy process was among the factors that precipi-
tated WHO-GMP to review its many existing policy setting 
mechanisms in what by that point was an increasingly com-
petitive global health policy environment for WHO-GMP.[34] 
Specifically, in 2011, WHO-GMP embarked on a policy setting 
strengthening exercise to increase the timeliness, transparency, 
independence, and relevance of its recommendations to WHO 
member states in relation to malaria control and elimination.[35] 
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The result was the scientific advisory committee, MPAC, first 
convened in 2012, to provide “independent strategic advice 
and technical input to the WHO for the development of policy 
recommendations covering all aspects of malaria control and 
elimination.”[35]
The first body of evidence to come under this new system 
of MPAC review was for SMC. SMC is defined as the intermit-
tent administration (once a month, up to four months) of full 
treatment courses of an antimalarial medicine (Amodiaquine + 
Sulphadoxine–Pyrimethamine) to children under the age of five 
during the malaria season to prevent malarial illness by main-
taining therapeutic antimalarial drug concentrations in the 
blood throughout the period of greatest malarial risk.[16]
Research on SMC had been going on for several years before 
the MPAC was formed. As in the case of IPTi, enthusiasm for 
SMC was based on positive findings from a RCT, but in Sen-
egal instead of Tanzania, also published in the Lancet, but in 
2006 instead of 2001, in this case showing an even higher 86% 
protective efficacy, compared to the 59% protective efficacy of 
the first IPTi RCT.[25,36] More notably, however, unlike with the 
previous case, an official consortium with an overt agenda to 
achieve policy goals was never formed, and there appeared 
to be little tension between actors involved in the evidence 
advisory process. Instead, a series of informal collaborative 
meetings between SMC researchers and WHO with relevant 
national policy makers and program managers to identify out-
standing priorities for research relevant to a SMC policy deci-
sion took place in 2008.[37] These were followed by several 
large-scale evaluation studies in 2009.[38] Meanwhile, there were 
periodic informal reviews of the evidence dossier by experts to 
ensure that the necessary information was being collated for 
an informed decision by policy makers.[37] This culminated 
in a single formal meeting of the TEG to review the evidence 
for SMC in May 2011, which resulted in a unanimous positive 
recommendation for the intervention despite the lack of an 
implementation mechanism.[39] The recommendation was 
reviewed by the newly formed MPAC in February 2012, and 
by March, six years after the first SMC study was published, 
WHO-GMP issued the policy recommendation for SMC.[16]
Although the overall timeline between initial results publi-
cation to an eventual policy recommendation by WHO-GMP 
had some similarities for both IPTi and SMC (Figure 1), as 
described earlier, many stakeholders viewed the policy develop-
ment process for SMC as considerably better—a “model” pro-
cess[17]—to that for IPTi. The reasons for why appear to relate to 
both features of the evidence itself as well as perceptions of the 
policy process, explored next.
3.2. Strength and Quality of Evidence (Credibility)
Although there were several questions about the efficacy 
of IPTi (such as the extent to which IPTi merely delayed the 
onset of malaria and how much that mattered, or the impact of 
increasing drug resistance to Sulphadoxine–Pyrimethamine in 
parts of East Africa), the main criticism of several interviewees 
regarding the nature of the evidence was that the positive 
results from the first IPTi trial were not reproduced to the same 
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high levels in later trials—the pooled protective efficacy of IPTi 
was 30%,[14] compared to the 59% protective efficacy from the 
first trial,[25] which is to say that IPTi trials subsequent to the 
first one showed much lower protective efficacy on average. For 
some, this raised questions about the benefits of IPTi:
One of the big issues with IPTi was that the evidence didn’t all 
point in the same direction. So the decisions were, you know, I 
think it was harder for people to have the level of confidence in 
them that they might have had with SMC where there’s not much 
evidence going in the other directions. – KI41
Heterogeneity was not an issue for the SMC set of studies, 
where the pooled protective efficacy of the intervention was 
75%,[40] compared to the 86% protective efficacy from the first 
trial,[36] which is to say that all SMC trial results showed simi-
larity with consistently high protective efficacy.[39,40]
Many interviewees seemed to assume this consistency 
between SMC trial results reflected strength of the results, 
which in turn might have helped the evidence base for SMC 
appear of higher quality compared to IPTi. However, the incon-
sistency in IPTi trial results is not necessarily a sign of weak-
ness or lower quality, as the difference can be due to features 
of the study environments. The SMC studies all took place 
within a narrow geographic band of West Africa with similar 
and highly seasonal transmission (60% of cases occurring 
within four months of the year). In contrast, IPTi trials took 
place all over sub-Saharan Africa in a variety of transmission 
and epidemiological settings (which is common for many 
malaria interventions). Therefore, it would have been expected 
that any given trial would show higher protective efficacy, and 
greater consistency, when tested in more narrow trial regions 
(although the absolute level would depend of course on features 
of the intervention, including the drugs used).
In addition, the protective efficacy of IPTi is not dissimilar to 
other preventative malaria interventions widely recommended; 
for example, the best known preventive intervention against 
malaria, ITNs, has a protective efficacy of 55% in children.[27] 
The complexity of preventing a complicated disease in a wide 
variety of (and ever-changing) epidemiological settings is the 
reason no “magic bullet” exists in malaria control and why high 
coverage of a mix of interventions that is most suited to local 
transmission patterns is recommended by WHO.[20] So when it 
comes to protective efficacy as a proxy measure of the strength 
of an evidence base, it could be said that SMC is more of an 
outlier for preventive malaria interventions, given its consist-
ency but also relatedly, the narrow geographic focus of studies. 
When thinking about the IPTi case in retrospect, many inter-
viewees conceded this point, but opened up as to other reasons 
why they found the SMC evidence base to be relatively stronger 
and more credible.
3.3. Policy Relevance (Salience)
The perception of higher “strength” for SMC might have been 
compounded by the fact that the SMC study sites in the inter-
vention region of Africa were also the proposed implementation 
sites for the SMC policy, which resulted in an unusual situation 
for the scientific advisory committees (TEG and MPAC) that 
systematically reviewed the evidence base on SMC in order to 
advise WHO-GMP on a policy recommendation. In many other 
cases, these bodies need to deliberate about the applicability of 
study findings from a wide range of settings to the target con-
texts. Yet with SMC, because the study region was the imple-
mentation region, the evidence base reviewed had both high 
internal and external validity, which as several interviewees 
pointed out, made making a positive policy recommendation 
an easy choice and a relatively straightforward process com-
pared to IPTi. Whereas in comparison the TEG for IPTi (MPAC 
did not exist at the time) had far more nuances to consider in 
its systematic review of the evidence available at the time.[41]
For example, IPTi was sometimes described as “the wrong 
drug… at the wrong time,”[42] even though in reality, the pro-
grammatic feasibility (implementation) of IPTi was recog-
nized as being extremely important by the IPTi Consortium.[43] 
Unfortunately, this did not appear to be enough. WHO-GMP 
and some other interviewees were uncertain as to how IPTi 
could be implemented and monitored in view of the increasing 
drug resistance to Sulphadoxine–Pyrimethamine in some parts 
of Africa and the lack of capacity in some countries, particu-
larly at district level, to monitor levels of drug resistance in 
order to know where best to target the drug (making the drug 
essentially ineffective in those areas, hence the view that it 
might be the “wrong drug”). In addition, the actual relevance 
of IPTi was also questioned in countries where the coverage 
of its delivery mechanism, the Expanded Program on Immu-
nization, was low, or where there was highly seasonal malaria 
transmission (which is to say the delivery of the drug would 
not in some areas of countries be coinciding with the expected 
peaks in the number of malaria cases, hence the view that it 
might be delivered at the “wrong time”), as IPTi would have 
a very small effect.[44] Although these issues were not specific 
to IPTi, WHO guidelines had to take into account local hetero-
geneity of countries’ epidemiological profiles and the need to 
disaggregate their policy to sub-national levels. This was less of 
an issue for the SMC policy consideration, as there was epide-
miological homogeneity for the reasons described earlier, and 
because the policy would only apply to certain parts of certain 
countries where 60% of cases occurred within four months of 
the year, the policy in some ways was already disaggregated to 
sub-national levels.
SMC, in comparison to IPTi, was also described as having 
higher “practicability” and “generalizability” beyond just a 
research setting. This also seemed to contribute to its evidence 
base’s perceived “strength” and salience. As one member of 
MPAC described:
I think the evidence base for SMC is pretty strong. I mean there are 
a number of really quite convincing and sufficiently large studies 
that show major impact. I mean you’re always concerned with, I 
think, a number of things; one is the size of the studies, the con-
sistency of the results, and the scale of impact, and that’s the first 
step. Obviously you’re then concerned about the practicability, be-
cause there it’s quite possible to have an intervention, which is in a 
controlled setting, demonstrably effective, but it may simply not be 
practical. I think SMC has the advantage of firstly, it’s got a good 
evidence base; the studies [have] sufficient numbers, are sufficiently 
large, and showing really major impact, and certainly some of the 
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studies have been conducted under conditions which would allow 
you to already extend it to the idea that this could be applied in a 
[real-life] setting rather than a small-scale research study. – KI34
The reasons for the difference in generalizability are varied, 
and among the explanations that were offered by interviewees 
was the difference in age group and banding (infants versus 
children), and the study location (highly seasonal transmission 
versus a variety of transmission settings). The SMC studies 
were focused only in areas of highly seasonal transmission 
whereas the goal of the IPTi studies was to be generalizable 
to all of Sub Saharan Africa, which has far more variability 
in malaria transmission, sometimes within the same country. 
This, in hindsight, made generalizability difficult due to the 
variability in results, compared to the relative homogeneity of 
the SMC study results due to the homogeneous transmission 
settings.
In short, by conducting the SMC RCTs in the countries 
where the intervention, if successful, would be eventually 
rolled out, SMC researchers helped ensure that their portfolio 
of research answered a wide enough range of useful questions 
to policy makers that it was considered more relevant com-
pared with IPTi. This is despite SMC having some perceived 
implementation-related weaknesses such as no single pre-
existing delivery mechanism. For example, IPTi delivery via 
the Expanded Program on Immunization was viewed by many 
as a potential strength, as it meant delivery would be through 
the existing health system, when most mothers were already 
visiting health clinics with their infants for their WHO-recom-
mended vaccination schedule. Some interviewees, however, 
perceived the lack of a single pre-existing delivery mechanism 
as a potential strength for SMC, rather than a critical weakness, 
as to them it meant that national malaria control programs 
could have more flexibility and control over how the interven-
tion could best be delivered in their local context.
3.4. Legitimacy of the Process
A final theme explored was features related to the perceived 
legitimacy of the two processes, and how this may help to 
explain why interviewees saw the SMC process as better than 
that for IPTi. At the time of the IPTi Consortium, the evidence 
review process at WHO-GMP involved the assessment of evi-
dence by a series of scientific advisory committees—the TEG, 
TRAC, and STAG.[34] By the time of evidence review for the 
SMC studies in 2011, however, a restructure intended to make 
the policy process more “transparent, responsive, and cred-
ible,”[35] meant there were two levels, the TEG and the MPAC, 
which the TEG reported to. Beyond this, however, two further 
sub-themes emerged related to the legitimacy of the processes.
3.4.1. A Difference in Expectations and Framing
One difference between the policy processes for SMC and IPTi 
was in the researchers’ expectations of the policy process. As 
mentioned previously, in the IPTi Consortium funding pro-
posal approved by the BMGF in 2003, the researchers had high 
expectations that results would be consistent, and knowledge 
transfer would be quick. Policy engagement was planned to take 
place alongside the process of generating evidence on IPTi. A 
strategy was devised which set out a clear schedule that in 2006, 
that is to say at the time of the first TEG meeting, the Consor-
tium would have generated a substantive body of evidence on 
IPTi to inform a WHO policy recommendation in that year. By 
framing the value of their research and their own success as a 
Consortium around a quick policy recommendation by WHO, 
the IPTi Consortium put themselves, and by extension, the 
WHO-GMP evidence advisory process, under significant pres-
sure. One interviewee recalled:
Now where the IPTi consortium went wrong was that there was 
this day which was called the “green line” where we all go to it with 
all our evidence, and then the policy decision to implement IPTi 
would be made, but of course the reality is that the evidence would 
be considered and then a decision for IPTi policy would be made. 
But it wasn’t really figured out like that. It was figured out that the 
“green line” meant green for go, and IPTi would be recommended, 
and IPTi would be implemented. And I think that that was really 
the biggest error, [the] supposition that the data would support a 
decision to go ahead. – KI44
Although similar policy engagement also took place along-
side the process of generating evidence on SMC, that process 
was perceived to be more organic, for example, via informal (by 
WHO standards) meetings between SMC researchers, WHO, 
and national malaria programs in 2008. The SMC researchers 
were not part of a formal “SMC Consortium” with an overt 
agenda to achieve policy goals. One reason for this is that they 
might have learned lessons from observing the experience of 
global malaria colleagues in the IPTi Consortium, who were in 
the midst of repeated TEG reviews and tensions with WHO-
GMP at around the same time. In any case, SMC researchers 
did not appear to have high expectations of quick knowledge 
transfer, nor the pressure of self-imposed “green lines” to con-
tend with, which might have contributed to a less fraught policy 
process with relatively tempered expectations, despite consist-
ently highly efficacious trial results.
3.4.2. Conflicting Agendas
The IPTi Consortium was made up of actors from different 
institutions with different primary objectives ranging from a 
focus on science to a concern with delivering programs. One 
thing they did have in common was high expectations that 
IPTi knowledge transfer would be quick and uncomplicated.[28] 
Unfortunately, perceptions of the IPTi Consortium and views of 
it having an overt agenda, appeared to affect the functioning of 
the advisory bodies involved. This led to the perception of two 
sides pitted against the other. One interviewee summarized:
It was bad. Aggressive from some of the researchers, aggressive 
from some members of the BMGF, an aggressive push back from 
WHO, I’ve never seen anything like it before. Everyone seemed to 
rally on the two sides. –KI49
There was also a tension within the research community. 
Some IPTi Consortium members were strongly committed to 
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contributing to public health by clear engagement in the policy 
process. Others felt, however, that scientists had to stay neutral 
and research-focused. Although these tensions were less of an 
issue within the SMC policy process, many SMC researchers 
also expressed similar views about the role of researchers:
You try to make sure that the key people know about [your study 
results] and that’s by having a meeting or a symposium. Taking 
that any further, I’ve always been on the side that investigators 
shouldn’t become lobbyists, and that somebody else should do that. 
You may need a lobbyist, but those are different people, it shouldn’t 
be the investigators who did the trials…they may be asked to help, 
but you shouldn’t have one of the key investigators initiating that 
process. – KI29
The perceived overt advocacy by some IPTi Consortium 
members may have contributed to undermining their legiti-
macy within the IPTi policy development process. This was 
a consistent reflection across the various groups of inter-
viewees—funder, researcher, and WHO staff. One interviewee 
shared their perception of the tension between WHO-GMP and 
the IPTi Consortium from that time:
I think clearly a problem [was] that WHO perceived the IPTi 
Consortium as being a mixture of investigators and advocates, 
and without a clear separation of those. So they saw this group as 
putting evidence forward and advocating strongly for implementa-
tion, for adoption of policy and implementation of IPTi. In fact, 
I think, in some ways the Consortium was perceived more as ad-
vocates than as sort of independent, unbiased investigators and so 
that colors the way things are looked at. If you think these people 
are flogging something and they’ve got lots of biases, then surely 
their data is biased and they’re not revealing … For example, 
they may not have done the studies well enough to be sure that 
there aren’t adverse reactions. That was a big issue. You could ask 
“Really? Did you really set things up so you picked up the 
signals?” – KI23
In comparison, the researchers who were part of the SMC 
studies were perceived to have played a more neutral role, 
which was seen to help maintain their legitimacy. For example, 
one interviewee reflected:
Many people, including myself, perceived and liked that the [SMC 
researchers] behaved the way that you expect scientists should be-
have…they really saw the various sides and carefully looked at the 
various angles [of the research question]. –KI35
Reflections like these were common; the lack of pressure 
and, as a result, conflict during the SMC policy development 
process was considered by many interviewees to be its positive 
defining feature, in contrast with IPTi and its seeming legiti-
macy undermining missteps.
A big perceived misstep was the creation of the IPTi Policy 
Platform, which was part of both the Consortium and WHO-
GMP.[29] Many interviewees felt that WHO-GMP should never 
have been part of the IPTi Consortium or home to its Policy 
Platform, as it was a conflict of interest and detracted from the 
legitimacy of the process and the independent “balancing act” 
that is a WHO policy recommendation. One interviewee shared 
what they perceived to be a valuable lesson learned:
There was one WHO staff member who was put on the IPTi pro-
posal as part of the Consortium. Later on, this wound up raising 
questions about whether one should have someone as part of a 
consortium who is part of the institution that will be judge and 
jury of the evidence being generated. Does that blur those lines too 
much? I have to say that I have probably changed my view of 
that over time. I remember at the time being indignant that how 
could WHO have agreed to be part of the consortium, and then 
later reversing its position and claiming that it was not right for 
WHO to play that role. Now that I have spent time at WHO, and 
understand the importance of the independence of that evidence 
making process, I now understand those concerns. And I think 
that it probably is not a good idea to have someone as part of a 
consortium who is part of the agency that is convening the evidence 
review process; some separation is necessary. It doesn’t need to be 
a firewall. There can be a dialogue, but you can’t have that person 
be part of the group. They need to be having regular exchanges 
with the group and helping to steer the sort of evidence base that’s 
required, but not be implicated as part of that group. I think that 
is an important balancing act. –KI39
Having an overt policy agenda was not a mistake repeated 
by the researchers for the SMC set of studies. In addition, here 
WHO-GMP involvement was viewed positively; they were seen 
as a “hands on” partner, meeting again for informal consulta-
tions between 2009 and 2010 when SMC researchers were col-
lectively preparing their dossier for evidence review by the TEG. 
This was not perceived to be a conflict of interest by WHO-
GMP. It was seen to be in everyone’s interest to make the pro-
cess smooth while still maintaining institutional integrity via 
independence and transparency. Having a clear and transparent 
evidence review process for SMC appeared to be quite impor-
tant to many interviewees. One interviewee recalled:
For IPTI, it did not seem like a clear process; it seemed a bit cloak 
and dagger, or that events were taking place in a smoky dark room. 
There was no transparency as to how the process was supposed to be 
conducted. For the review of SMC, the fact that the Malaria Policy 
Advisory Committee had been convened in a transparent way, that 
everyone was aware who was on it, that there was clear terms of ref-
erence for the committee, that the Director General had signed off 
on the process, I think gave a lot of credibility in advance to the pro-
cess, which is really important. If people coming into an evidence 
review have no idea what to expect, no idea what the steps are 
going to be, no idea who ultimately is making those decisions, then 
I think the process is on the rocks before it even gets going. – KI44
During the SMC policy development process, WHO-GMP 
was able to fulfill its own ideal notion of structural and legitimate 
power, without having to defend itself against other actors as it 
felt pressured to do during the IPTi process. By maintaining its 
power during the SMC process, WHO-GMP maintained its legit-
imacy as a global health policy actor, which might have helped 
maintain the legitimacy of the policy development process itself.
4. Discussion
Explaining the differences in the policy development pro-
cesses between IPTi and SMC requires understanding a set 
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of interacting factors related to features of the evidence base 
as well as features of the process by which it was brought to 
bear on policymaking. IPTi was introduced as an innovation 
that was pursued by a group of committed public health prac-
titioners and researchers, and internally framed along the lines 
of a quick and linear process. The IPTi Consortium’s proposal 
to BMGF included a clear schedule and a Policy Platform to 
facilitate the policy development process. Consortium members 
believed that more evidence delivered in a timely way would 
persuade policymakers to recommend IPTi. However, over 
time, this internal expectation and pressure to meet the dead-
lines they had set for themselves in their proposal to BMGF led 
to a breakdown in consensus and trust between actors, followed 
by delays in its policy development. In comparison, the SMC 
policy process was never viewed as a battle between the actors 
involved. Here the policy process was viewed as open, inclusive, 
and transparent, which was WHO-GMP’s intention of what a 
good policy process should look like when it formed MPAC.[35] 
By learning from its experience with IPTi, and optimizing the 
design and function of its principal scientific advisory com-
mittee to better serve its institutional needs, WHO-GMP was 
perceived as having strengthened its malaria policy develop-
ment process.
What appears to have edged the SMC evidence base over the 
one for IPTi was that, ultimately, it was more relevant to the 
question being asked by the TEG, with its perceived value as 
an intervention being boosted by the size and potential impact 
of its protective efficacy, and the high consistency of the results 
across RCT sites. Although the reasons for this difference (the 
highly focused and similar transmission settings for SMC 
studies) can be explained, a pooled protective efficacy of 75% 
for SMC compared to 30% for IPTi made the potential impact 
of SMC a difficult policy option to ignore. In other words, while 
the results of the RCTs for IPTi would be considered “credible” 
by standard evidence hierarchy measures, and comparable to 
other preventive malaria interventions, the evidence base for 
SMC compared to IPTi was perceived to be both “credible” and 
“salient”, which contributed to making it appear better, or more 
appropriate for policy consideration.
The study findings also suggest that the breakdown in con-
sensus and trust in the policy process, due to the different 
expectations, conflicting agendas, and in some instances, the 
overt advocacy of the actors involved, might have contributed to 
the perception of problems that undermined the policy develop-
ment process for IPTi, in comparison to SMC. The contestation 
around the IPTi policy process might have contributed to nega-
tive perceptions of its policy value. Contestation, as a form of 
deliberation and consensus building, is not necessarily a “bad” 
thing, particularly when built into institutional arrangements 
that aim to improve the legitimacy of governing processes 
through deliberation and inclusion of multiple views.[45] Some 
scholars have seen the need for deliberation as particularly 
important when public policy relies on delegation to scientific 
experts that serve to provide scientific advice.[46] Institutional 
approaches in the policy sciences recognize that institutions 
can be thought of in terms of formal structures, and also as 
rules that shape how decisions are made.[47] In the case of 
SMC, although there was not necessarily as much deliberation 
over the evidence as there was for IPTi, it appears that having 
clear expectations from all sides of the evidence advisory pro-
cess, with a clear structure and terms of reference for MPAC 
members, as well as transparency of the evidence considera-
tion, might have led to the process for SMC appearing more 
“legitimate” to those involved in it evidence advice and policy 
development.
These findings are not meant to imply that one evidence 
base was stronger or weaker than the other was, or that the 
process of evidence use is necessarily more important than fea-
tures of the evidence itself. Indeed, both feature in important 
but differing ways. As such, these findings help to reinforce 
how the factors of credibility, salience, and legitimacy all 
appear to influence evidence use, with particular insights into 
an agency with a particular technical remit and expert body of 
stakeholders informing global health policy making.
While these findings emerge from a pair of specific malaria 
policy developments, there may be reasons to believe similar 
issues would be relevant elsewhere. Indeed, the issues of credi-
bility, salience, and legitimacy derived from a very different 
study conducted on sustainable development related to con-
cerns of the lay public as well as of scientists. Thus seeing sim-
ilar issues arise in a technical body made up of individuals with 
broadly similar scientific training helps to illustrate that even 
in these groups, features outside scientific quality can matter 
when it comes to evidence use for policy and planning.
What might be an important additional factor for WHO how-
ever, as it continues to improve its internal guideline develop-
ment processes,[4] is to consider more specifically the processes 
followed by its advisory bodies, in addition to concern over how 
to judge or rank evidence. Specifically considering how to build 
evidence advisory structures that are open, inclusive, and trans-
parent might serve to promote the legitimacy of its policy deci-
sions and decrease potential conflicts of interests in a global 
health-funding environment where private funders are viewed 
as having increasing influence on the global health agenda.[48] 
For example, the BMGF are already one of the largest donors 
to the WHO, and within the field of global malaria, they funded 
both the IPTi Consortium and many of the SMC studies, in 
addition to the policy-strengthening grant that led to the crea-
tion of MPAC.[28,35,37,48f,49] There is very little in the world of 
global malaria control and elimination that is not funded or at 
least influenced by BMGF.[50] While many in the global malaria 
community are quick to point out the positive outcomes of what 
funding coming from the BMGF can achieve,[48e] the findings 
here illustrate the importance of process legitimacy in addition 
to concern over outputs and outcomes.
5. Conclusion
In the case of the policy development processes for IPTi and 
SMC, the findings show that “good evidence” from a purely 
technical (credibility) perspective was not sufficient to ensure 
universal agreement and uptake of recommendations, even 
within a highly technocratic body such as the WHO-GMP. 
The findings suggest that evidence also needed to be relevant 
(salient) to the policy question being asked, and technical 
actors retained a concern over the legitimacy of the process 
by which technical evidence was brought to bear in the policy 
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development process. Cash and colleagues findings from the 
field of sustainable development,[18] that evidence must be 
credible, salient, and legitimate to be accepted by the public, 
appears to equally apply within scientific advisory committees, 
albeit nuanced by their specific contextual realities.
While the WHO has principally focused on technical criteria 
for evidence inclusion in its policy and guideline development 
processes, the study of the MPAC suggests that the design and 
functionality of its scientific advisory committees might also have 
a role to play within its overarching evidence advisory system. Sci-
entific advisory committees should consider enabling transparent, 
responsive, and credible processes of evidence review, to ensure 
that they are effective in producing advice that ultimately leads 
to policy recommendations by WHO. Such legitimacy may also 
be important to implementation of recommendations by WHO 
member states, particularly considering the current funding envi-
ronment in which WHO is highly reliant on external sources 
of funding, both for programmatic work, as well as for funding 
research that aims to ultimately inform policy and practice.
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